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Abstract 
 
We present an in-depth analysis of the music industry and use our findings to judge the practical 
assumptions and design of an original theoretical model.  The model is in three stages, where, in a 
Hotelling-type framework, the last agents to act are consumers who choose between copying, purchasing, 
or staying out of the market for music.  Prior to the last stage, the record label chooses its profit 
maximizing price and, in the first stage, we incorporate the artist-label bargaining agreement into a 
theoretical framework using the Nash cooperative bargaining solution.  The current structure of the music 
industry is a combination of the oligopoly and monopolistic competition models, consisting of five major 
labels and many independents.  Despite major labels’ advantage in large-scale distribution, we argue that 
digital downloading has the potential to radically alter the current industry structure, and that artists would 
be unable to sell their music in such an environment without enforceable copyrights.  Our model assumes 
that the most important determinants of CD and copy demand are consumers’ tastes and transaction costs 
of copying, CD prices, and the substitutability between CDs and copies.  We hypothesize that Internet 
file-sharing has been undertaken by both consumers who were previously not in the market, and by those 
who decided to copy rather than buy.  In regard to firm strategy, the model suggests that labels could 
increase the sales of CDs by trying to increase consumers’ taste for music, perhaps by reducing the price 
of CDs.  Our model also predicts a positive relationship between artists’ optimal share of album sales and 
their bargaining power, as well as a negative relationship between artists’ optimal share and their risk 
aversion.  Since lowering the reliance on labels for distribution would increase artists’ bargaining power, 
our model predicts that artists’ share of profits should increase as legitimate digital distribution gains 
prominence.  We also provide empirical testing of our hypothesis that some music file-sharing has been 
done by consumers frequently not in the market.  After examining consumers’ expenditures and aggregate 
industry sales, we are unable to reject our hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1, Introduction 
 
The impact of Internet file-sharing on the music industry has been hotly debated since the launch 
of the first file-sharing software, Napster, in 1999.  Since anything that can be digitized – books, music, 
movies, photographs, etc. – has the potential to be simultaneously “shared” online, understanding the 
effects of file-sharing is important for other intellectual property related industries as well.  Although 
several researchers have examined the impact of copying on firms and consumers in other contexts, very 
little empirical work exists that considers the effect of copying in an industry where firms serve as 
intermediaries for the creators of intellectual property (“artists”).  This dissertation contributes to the 
literature by developing a simple theoretical model that describes the interactions of consumers, record 
labels and artists, and by providing an empirical analysis of the impact Internet file-sharing has had on the 
music industry. 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation surveys the professional literature on Hotelling-type location 
models in industrial organization and on the economics of copying.  By combining insights from both 
areas of existing work, we then develop an in-depth analysis of the music industry that is used to judge 
the practical assumptions of various models and the design of an original theoretical model.  The model is 
in three stages, where the last agents to act are consumers who choose between copying, purchasing, or 
staying out of the market for music.  Prior to the last stage, record labels choose a price for music 
(supplied in the form of CDs) so as to maximize profit.  The first stage of the model incorporates the 
bargaining agreement between the artist and label into a theoretical framework using the Nash 
cooperative bargaining solution.  Throughout, we relate our findings to the actual practices in the music 
industry. 
 
The current market structure of the music industry is a combination of the oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition models.  The market consists of five major labels and thousands of independent 
labels.  Major labels have a clear advantage over independents in the following two areas: (1) 
national/international distribution; and (2) national promotion on commercial radio.  Record labels can 
offer intermediary services to artists precisely because distribution and promotion currently require 
substantial real resources and entail the assumption of significant financial risk.  In addition to the 
statutory copyright that labels hold, these economic factors contribute to the pricing structure of the music 
market.  If digital downloading on the Internet does become the preferred method of distribution in the 
future, it is likely that the structure of the market will radically change, with lower prices and greater 
choices for consumers being the most obvious outcomes.  Still, even in this environment, it is unlikely 
that artists would be able to sell their music in the absence of enforceable copyrights. 
 
The Internet sharing platform essentially replaces the distribution function of the label, but this 
state of affairs appears unsustainable in the long run.  Since music legitimately offered for sale by artists 
and labels would be competing with copies that are nearly perfect substitutes available free of charge, 
artists and labels would not be able to charge positive prices for their music.  In the long-run, this problem 
becomes the familiar fallacy of composition.  When most consumers can copy music for free, the music 
that they hope to copy will eventually cease to exist.  To avoid this conundrum, one possible way to 
ensure the continuing existence of the market is to have a selectively enforceable copyright.  In other 
words, while labels and artists should not be overly concerned with consumers who give copies to one or 
two friends, they should invoke copyright law to prevent large-scale sharing on the Internet.  In the 
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presence of such enforceable copyrights, the new technologies would allow artists to distribute their 
music directly to consumers, increasing artists’ bargaining power with record labels.  As a result, the 
future structure of the industry will probably shift to a more competitive one, where record companies’ 
primary intermediary functions would center around marketing and promotional activities.  Formalizing 
the interactions between artists, labels and consumers is one of the primary goals of our theoretical model. 
 
Our model assumes that the most important determinants of the demand for CDs and copies are 
consumers’ tastes, transaction costs involved in copying, the price of CDs, and the degree of 
substitutability between CDs and copies.  Depending on the combination of these factors, consumers will 
choose to either buy CDs, copy music or stay out of the market completely.  Our model predicts that, as 
the transaction costs of copying fall and the relative quality of the copy rises, more consumers will enter 
the market (through copying); these are consumers who formerly stayed out of the market completely.  
Given the recent dramatic increase in copy quality and the significant reduction in the transaction costs of 
copying (provided by Napster and other file-sharing services), the model suggests that some Internet file-
sharing was undertaken by consumers who previously did not buy significant amounts of music.  
Similarly, the model implies that some consumers, with different tastes and transaction costs, decided to 
copy rather than buy.  In addition to those conclusions related to consumers’ choices, the model also 
provides several implications for the firms’ strategy. 
 
To increase CD sales, the model suggests that labels should try to increase consumers’ taste for 
music by either reducing the price of CDs, increasing the cost of copying (perhaps by altering its copy 
protection techniques), or increasing the difference in the quality of legitimate CDs and copies.  Since the 
firms may no longer be able to increase the quality difference between CDs and copies, they may have to 
focus on either increasing the cost of copying and/or lowering the prices of CDs.1  Not surprisingly, the 
model predicts that by increasing copy protection and raising CD prices, record labels can increase profits 
on CDs.  However, the model also demonstrates that the optimal price of a CD is negatively related to the 
relative quality of the copy, suggesting that some consumers may have viewed CD prices as too high once 
file-sharing services went online.  Another innovation of our model is that it formalizes the artist-label 
bargaining arrangement and then demonstrates the implications of this process for consumers. 
 
The model predicts a positive relationship between artists’ optimal share of album sales and their 
bargaining power, as well as a negative relationship between artists’ optimal share and their level of risk 
aversion.  According to the model, artists can also increase their optimal share of sales by improving their 
fallback position, perhaps by building a solid fan base and successfully selling albums as independent 
artists.  By improving artists’ ability to increase their fan base and sell their own music, the Internet and 
digital downloading could end up strengthening artists’ bargaining position, thus lowering their reliance 
on labels for distribution.  Since lowering the reliance on labels for distribution would greatly increase 
artists’ bargaining power, our model predicts that artists’ share of profits should increase as legitimate 
digital distribution on the internet gains prominence.  However, the model also predicts that, for any given 
distribution method, a label will respond to paying a higher share of album sales to artists by raising the 
price of CDs.  Naturally, the model predicts that labels will sign very few artists to contracts which give 
away a particularly high share of sales and, when they do, that the firms will charge a relatively higher 
price for these albums.  Though a direct test of this hypothesis is desirable, evidence suggests that only 
the “best” artists sign for a noticeably higher share of album sales, and that the suggested retail price of 
these CDs is relatively higher than those of lesser known artists.  The last chapter of this dissertation 
empirically tests our hypothesis that some of the music file-sharing since 1999 has been done by low-
valuation consumers, many of whom are frequently not in the market. 
 
1Since September 2003, at least one major label has announced plans to lower list prices on CDs and to litigate 
against file-sharers.  (Smith (2003)) 
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After examining both aggregate and micro-level consumer expenditure data, we are unable to 
reject our hypothesis that some of the music file-sharing was undertaken by consumers who previously 
did not buy significant amounts of music.  Our hypothesis requires consumers with heterogeneous tastes 
for music to be affected differently by the various factors of music demand, and our aggregate-level OLS 
results show that consumer heterogeneity exists across different types of consumers within three distinct 
entertainment expenditure categories.  In the micro-level data, we find a positive relationship between 
computer ownership and CD expenditures, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that this relationship was 
the same in 2001 as in 1998 (pre and post file-sharing).  Therefore, despite the downward trend in 
computer owning consumers’ real mean CD expenditures, we cannot report any evidence of a wide-
spread effect from file sharing on CD sales. 
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Chapter 2, Literature Survey 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This literature survey is divided into two subcategories: (1) the literature concerned with copying 
issues; and, (2) the industrial organization literature that was used to develop the theoretical model of the 
recording industry in Chapter 4.  In addition to the references below, several chapters of three textbooks – 
Cabral (2000), Shy (1995), and Tirole (2001) – were used in developing the model in Chapter 4.  These 
textbooks detail many of the concepts in the articles summarized below. 
 
2.1 Copying Literature 
 
 The initial copying literature was fairly diffuse, with references to copying mixed throughout 
various articles as subtopics.  For example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1979), while focusing mainly on the 
roles of uncertainty and information in economics, argued that increased copyright protection could both 
improve social welfare due to a larger supply of copyrighted works and reduce social welfare since the 
copyrighted works would be underutilized.  
   
The loss in social welfare from underproduction of (unprotected) works arises when firms 
produce below the socially optimal quantity (or quality) because some consumers copy the product 
without paying for it.  Since producers of copyrighted works typically price their goods above marginal 
cost, a welfare loss due to underutilization of copyrighted works arises.  The welfare loss from 
underutilization has two components.  The first is that some consumers are only willing to pay the (lower) 
marginal cost of production, and thus choose not to consume the good (a loss from allocative 
inefficiencies).  The second is that some consumers choose to copy but end up expending more real 
resources than the firm in producing and selling the original (a loss from productive inefficiencies).  Most 
of the early literature made reference to these two aspects of copyrights (social welfare loss caused by 
underproduction and social welfare loss due to underutilization) without challenge until the early 1980’s. 
 
 Novos and Waldman (1984) found “partial support” for the idea that increased copyright 
protection leads to a welfare loss from underproduction of unprotected works.  At the same time, Novos 
and Waldman argued that there is “little or no support” for the possibility of increased copyright 
protection causing a welfare loss from underutilization.  Constructing a formal model, they showed that 
differences in consumers’ reproduction costs could lead to increased copyright protection decreasing the 
social welfare loss from underutilization.  They demonstrated that when consumers were forced to return 
to the primary market because of increased copyright protection, there would be gains in productive 
efficiencies, a possibility not considered in earlier literature.  While these findings generally support 
increasing copyright protection, several authors later took the opposite stance. 
 
 Using empirical data from scholarly journal publishers, Liebowitz (1985) argued that 
unauthorized copying of intellectual properties could actually be beneficial to the sellers of these goods.  
Liebowitz introduced his “indirect appropriability” hypothesis, whereby copying allows sellers to charge 
a higher price to some consumers and, therefore, indirectly appropriate revenues from users who did not 
purchase the original goods.  In addition to his original theory, Liebowitz (1985) was the first to offer 
empirical evidence that unauthorized copying of intellectual properties could be beneficial to producers.  
Still, photocopying of journals in libraries is authorized copying, and the market is easily segregated to 
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facilitate price discrimination.  From this point forward, the literature has continued to produce 
conflicting points of view on the net benefits of copying. 
 
 For instance, Besen (1986) developed a model1 that essentially served as a formal statement of 
Liebowitz’s indirect appropriability hypothesis.  His model showed that copying would increase both 
consumer welfare and producer profits in the short run, provided copying technologies were efficient and 
producers could price discriminate.  Later, Besen and Kirby (1989) argued that most of the differing 
conclusions in the copying literature could be traced to various models’ dependence on the two mutually 
exclusive ideas of indirect and direct appropriability (where the cost of originals is borne entirely by 
direct purchasers and copiers pay only the cost of making copies).  They integrated both types of 
appropriability into one model and demonstrated that when originals and copies are perfect substitutes 
and the marginal cost of copying is rising, the effects from copying depend on the number of consumers 
sharing (the number of members in a “club”). 
 
In what appeared to be a key shift in the literature, Takeyama (1994) argued that previous models 
failed to consider demand network externalities, and that these externalities could generate additional 
surplus for the consumers of originals.  Takeyama demonstrated that the presence of the externalities 
allows the unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property goods to induce greater firm profits and 
leads to a Pareto improvement in social welfare.  Still, Takeyama’s model did depend on firms’ ability to 
price discriminate and, therefore, indirectly appropriate revenue from copying consumers.  In addition, 
the later findings in Takeyama (1997) conflicted with those presented in Takeyama (1994). 
 
Takeyama (1997), using an intertemporal theoretical framework, argued that since most of the 
models in the literature were static rather than dynamic, they had understated the harm suffered by firms 
from unauthorized reproduction of their products.  The dynamic framework Takeyama introduced was 
analogous to durable good monopolists’ time inconsistency problem, according to which consumers may 
be unwilling to purchase the durable good at the initial price because they know the monopolist will 
rationally reduce the price in the future.  Takeyama argued that copying therefore results in a greater 
reduction in future prices beyond that which would normally occur without copying, thus reducing the 
appropriable surplus from all consumers (even in the presence of indirect appropriability).  If Takeyama’s 
hypothesis is correct, the distinction between indirect and direct appropriability becomes even more 
difficult for empirical studies to observe because measuring these effects would require distinct estimates 
among buying and copying consumers through time. 
 
Focusing instead on the idea of “sharing clubs,” Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman (1999) 
extended Besen and Kirby’s (1989) work by focusing on small-scale sharing, the type that is present 
when family members share cable television or computer software.  The authors modeled two effects – an 
aggregation effect and a team diversity effect – and argued that sharing could increase producer profits 
even when copying is more inefficient than the firm producing the additional units, and that sharing could 
decrease profits even when net distribution costs are reduced by copying.  Under their aggregation effect, 
team formation makes consumer valuations more predictable, thus facilitating price discrimination, and 
copying tends to increase firm profits.  With the team diversity effect, on the other hand, team patterns are 
largely out of the firms’ control, so copying makes price discrimination more difficult and, therefore, 
tends to decrease profits.  Their finding that sharing can decrease profits even when net distribution costs 
are reduced is most relevant to the issues surrounding Internet file-sharing and, therefore, this dissertation. 
 
Even though digital distribution of intellectual property goods (any type that can be digitized) on 
the Internet is much more efficient than traditional distribution methods, digital distribution would not be 
 
1 Besen’s model was based on Benjamin and Kormendi’s (1974) durable goods model. 
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viable without some degree of copy protection.  In the absence of sufficient protection (in whichever 
form it takes), the peer-to-peer (P2P) networks replace the firms’ distribution function, and the firms fail 
to receive any compensation for their goods.  This idea is reflected in Bakos et al.’s team diversity effect; 
the Internet P2P networks introduce team patterns that are entirely out of the firm’s control, thus reducing 
firm profits.  Still, the theoretical approach most closely followed in this dissertation is that of Johnson 
(1985), which is itself a variation of a Hotelling-type model. 
 
2.2 Hotelling Model Literature  
 
 In the original article, which has spurred countless variations, Hotelling (1929) did not examine 
the copying/sharing of goods.  Instead, he was interested in explaining the fact that consumers buy similar 
commodities from different sellers despite moderate differences in prices.  Hotelling modeled consumers 
as being located along a line segment of length one (uniformly distributed), with two businesses 
occupying the two ends of the line (selling homogenous products).  Hotelling hypothesized that 
consumers would make their decisions on which business to frequent based on both the prices offered at 
the two locations and the cost of transportation that consumers would have to pay.  Hotelling argued that, 
as long as firms are free to choose their location, a long run equilibrium must involve the two firms fixing 
their location in the middle of the market.  This long run equilibrium, according to Hotelling, is less than 
socially optimal. 
 
As noted above, a large literature has grown around Hotelling’s original contribution.  For 
instance, D’Aspremont, Gabszewizc and Thisse (1979) pointed out that a pure strategy equilibrium may 
not always exist in the standard Hotelling model if, as usually assumed, consumers are distributed 
uniformly and transportation costs are linear.  This possible non-existence problem disappears, however, 
when transportation costs are quadratic.  Tabuchi (1994), using a two dimensional model, which allows 
commodities to be differentiated according to two characteristics, also found that a quadratic 
transportation cost function leads to the existence of an equilibrium solution. 
 
Hotelling used the concept of location in a very general sense, which implies that the notion of 
location can be used to describe virtually any dimension of a product or, as in our model, a person.  We 
will differentiate consumers of music according to the cost that digital copying of music would impose on 
them (location of consumers along a “geekness” axis).  As a second dimension of differentiation between 
consumers, we use their taste for music, represented by a separate parameter.  The theoretical work that 
comes closest to the model presented in this dissertation is by Johnson (1985).  Johnson used two 
variations of a Hotelling-type location model to examine the economics of copying.  Based on earlier 
work by Salop (1979) (a circular Hotelling model), Johnson modeled the diversity of creative works 
around a circle.  Rather than choosing to locate at a particular point on a line segment, in Johnson’s model 
firms locate at a particular point on a circle. 
 
Johnson’s first model variation regarded copying as household production activity, in which 
marginal reproduction costs vary across households.  Johnson showed that, in the short run, copying 
reduces the price and revenue generated from the sales of original products, while consumer surplus rises 
due to increased consumption and lower prices.  In the long run, Johnson argued that copying can reduce 
consumer surplus and social surplus depending on how many consumers decide to switch from 
purchasing to copying and on how much this decrease in revenue diminishes the supply of creative works 
(the number of firms will not remain fixed in the long run).  Because creative works are not perfect 
substitutes, the severity of this reduction in supply is positively related to consumers’ preferences for 
variety. 
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The second variation of Johnson’s model assumes that the marginal cost of copying is zero for 
all households, but requires that a large fixed cost of reproduction must be met before households can 
copy.  In the short run, this model demonstrates that if the fixed costs are large enough and if enough high 
demand consumers switch to copying, social welfare may decline.  In the long run, just as in the first 
model variation, copying can reduce consumer surplus and social surplus if the revenue decrease in sales 
of originals is large enough to reduce the supply of creative works. 
 
One complicating factor not considered by Johnson but considered in this dissertation, is that 
creative works are not simply produced by a firm.  Instead, these works are created by individuals (artists) 
who contract with firms as intermediaries.  We also respond to Johnson’s call for empirical studies in the 
area.  According to him, empirical work is needed to quantify (1) the degree to which copying reduces the 
demand for originals as opposed to increasing total consumption, (2) the elasticity of supply of creative 
works, and (3) the value consumers place on variety.  As of this writing, nearly twenty years after the 
publication of Johnson’s article, there is still a void in the literature in all three of these areas. 
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Chapter 3, A Case Study of the Music Industry 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
 The structure of the music industry does not neatly fit any one standard economic 
definition for market structure.  Basically, the industry is a combination of the oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition models.  The industry is comprised of five multi-national 
conglomerates (Sony, AOL Time-Warner, Bertelsmann, EMI, and Universal), known as the 
major labels, and several thousand smaller companies known as independent labels.  Both of 
these groups serve intermediary functions for artists –whether songwriters, musicians, vocalists, 
or individuals who perform all of these activities – by offering specialization at tasks such as 
recording and promoting records.  These groups also serve as intermediaries between the artists 
and the consumers by assisting in the task of distributing records. 
 
Although the major labels typically operate their own network of distributors, the 
independents rely on both the majors’ network and an independent network of distributors which, 
based on The Industry Yellow Pages, numbers at least 500 firms.  In essence, artists supply record 
companies with their talent (the raw materials) and record companies, in turn, supply consumers 
with music (the finished product).  This relationship, with the added consumer choice of copying, 
is illustrated in Figure 3-1.  As a supplier of raw material, artists currently have very little market 
power.  Not only are there many more artists than record labels (Census data shows 
approximately 161,000 employed musicians and composers as of year 2000), but artists are 
largely dependent on record companies for distribution.  As to the market power of record 
companies when selling to consumers, an important difference relates to the majors and 
independents. 
 
While both majors and independents typically own the exclusive right to manufacture and 
sell the sound recordings of their artists, the majors enjoy a much larger degree of control over the 
distribution chain than do the independents.  In fact, sales of music by the five major labels 
combined accounted for an 83% market share of world-wide album sales in 2001 (see Figure 3-
2).  Still, both the majors and the independents operate on nearly identical business principles, 
with the ultimate goal of selling records.  The forthcoming sections of this dissertation are 
intended to give a clear explanation of how the music industry functions and the issues that it now 
faces in the digital age.  While there is no section devoted solely to the artist, all of the sections 
are developed based on how their respective topics relate to the artist. 
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3.1 The Record Label 
 
 The foundation of the music industry is the relationship between the artist and the record 
company.  More specifically, an artist can be a person who writes music, plays an instrument, 
performs vocals, or carries out some combination of each – alone or in a group.  Likewise, the 
term “record company” can be used in several interrelated ways which also add to the complexity 
of this relationship. 
 
 Record companies can be viewed as belonging to one of two groups: the majors or the 
independents.  The majors are comprised of five multinational conglomerates, which collectively 
hold the rights to most of the world’s “hit” songs.  These firms achieve this all-inclusive nature by 
vertically integrating at various levels of the industry and, most importantly, by owning several 
companies known as record labels (Figure 3-3 shows the approximate number of labels owned by 
each major).  These labels are known in the industry as the “major labels,” and each one usually 
specializes in either a particular genre of music or group of similar genres.  For example, Sony 
owns more than 20 labels with several in the “pop-rock” genre, several in the “classical” genre, 
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etc.  So, while under contract with Sony, an artist could work with, for instance, Sony’s Epic 
Records label.  The Epic label would then work with any number of Sony’s manufacturers, 
promoters, and distributors (not necessarily exclusively) to sell copies of the artist’s album and to 
license the music for various uses.  To understand exactly how these functions are carried out, it 
is helpful to look at the other group of record companies, the independents. 
 
Not only do most artists never sign with a major label, but most independents operate in a 
very similar fashion to the major labels – just on a smaller scale and with less vertical integration.  
In fact, many of the major labels look to the independents for sources of new talent.  When a 
major signs an artist already under contract with an independent, some sort of sharing 
arrangement, usually a 50/50 split of revenues, is worked out between the two labels.1  When 
artists become well known by selling, for example, a multi-platinum album, they usually sign 
with a major – and the independent remains an independent.  The multi-platinum selling artist is, 
however, somewhat of an exception to the rule.  Most artists do not even sign with majors, 
whereby a comprehensive examination of the music industry would be incomplete without 
analyzing the independents.  Therefore, much of this chapter will examine the artist-label 
relationship based on the independent label.  Fortunately, this focus does not weaken the overall 
analysis since the intermediary functions performed by both independents and majors are very 
similar.  In both cases, the record company will either perform, or arrange to have performed, the 
following tasks: (1) managing, (2) recording, (3) manufacturing, (4) promoting and (5) 
distributing.  These interactions are represented graphically in Figure 3-4.  As will be seen below, 
the recording and promoting functions comprise the label’s total fixed cost, while the managing, 
manufacturing, and distributing functions comprise their total variable cost. 
 
Figure 3-3 
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10
14
17
27
13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
# of labels in each
Bertelsmann
Universal
Sony
EMI
AOL Time Warner
 
Source: Corporate Documents 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Artists cannot just walk away from the independent if they are under contract, so some sort of agreement 
is usually worked out.  If, however, the independent does not like the major’s offer, the artist can be stuck 
with the independent.  Instead of becoming a major label, the independent remains an independent – it is 
simply distributed by a major.  This information was gathered from an email interview with Daylle Deanna 
Schwartz. 
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Figure 3-4 
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Historically,  an artist who solely wrote songs depended on a music publisher to act as an 
agent, lawyer and promoter, as well as to find recording artists.  The publisher, in turn, usually 
relied on a record label for assistance with finding artists, recording the songs and promoting the 
finished product.  Through the years, however, fundamental changes have gradually altered this 
publisher-label relationship.  In the last decade or so, it has become a dominant characteristic of 
the industry that most artists who write music also perform their own material.  This sort of 
change, as well as what appears to be a natural confluence of operations between the two, has 
severely blurred the lines differentiating the label and the publisher.  In fact, while many 
publishers have taken on the responsibility of securing recording contracts with record labels, for 
both recording artists and songwriters, many record labels (as well as successful artists) have 
started their own publishing companies.  While the main differences will be explained in greater 
detail below, as the record labels and the publishing companies serve similar/identical functions, 
we will collectively refer to these entities as the label for the remainder of this section. 
 
 A useful starting point for examining the artist-label relationship can be found by 
answering the question “Why does an artist create music?”  Basically, an artist will create music 
because it is enjoyable and/or financially rewarding.  For now, we will assume that the artist 
creates music for both these reasons, or at least because it is financially rewarding to some 
minimal extent.  Initially, the artist either writes/memorizes an original composition and/or 
fashions some sort of self-made, rudimentary recording of it.  The typical unknown artist’s initial 
problem is that he or she possess nothing more than the raw material needed to create a finished 
product (a music CD). 
 
To create and sell the finished goods, the artist can either self-perform all the tasks of the 
label (see Figure 3-4), or work with a label to gain assistance with these functions.  Naturally, if 
the artist self-performs all of these tasks, there will be much less time available to create music.  
Furthermore, since substantial record sales for new/unknown artists usually do not occur for 
many months (perhaps years), the unknown artist really cannot depend on record sales as a main 
source of income.  Clearly, if the artist tries to perform all of these tasks while trying to hold 
down another job, the time to devote to creating music will be severely limited.  Scarcity of both 
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the artist’s time and financial resources, then, seems to be a key reason that the label can fulfill its 
intermediary role.  Still, the idea that an artist merely takes unfinished goods to the label that 
creates, promotes, distributes and sells the finished product is inaccurate.  In reality, some of the 
label’s tasks have to be self-performed by the artist at least initially.  Risk is a key reason for this 
sort of role-sharing.  A label who contracts with an artist takes on the risk of financing the 
recording, manufacturing, promoting and distributing of the artist’s material until sales are made.  
The label is also faced with the risk that the artist will not sell nearly enough to earn a profit.  
Consequently, depending on the situation, there are some fundamental tasks that an unknown 
artist has to perform before signing with a label. 
 
Typically, the artist has to have some sort of professional recording, some basic 
following from live performances and, preferably, some sort of notoriety in media publications.  
When approaching a label, artists have to be able to successfully argue that their product can be 
worked into a saleable album.  Daylle Deanna Schwartz, former owner/founder of independent 
label Revenge Records, says that she “…always tried signing artists with finished, or almost 
finished, products.  It obviously saves money on studio expenses, but that wasn’t my main 
concern.  If the material was at least close to its final state, I didn’t have to worry about whether 
the artist carried out his or her potential.  I don’t like gambling.” (Schwartz, 1998, p. 82)  The 
artist also has to start performing concerts in local venues to build a fan base.2  Most prudent label 
owners would rather sign an artist who has both a professional recording and a budding local fan 
base from live performances. 
 
These actions show the label owner that the artist is serious about developing a saleable 
finished product and, more importantly, that an audience exists for the music.  Once the artist 
completes these tasks and signs with a label, assistance is provided with the all important tasks of 
recording, promoting, distributing, advising and, ultimately, selling records.  Since specific 
legalities of the contract will be discussed in Section 3.2, we will now focus on the exact nature of 
each of the aforementioned tasks. 
 
3.1.1 Recording   
 
To obtain an initial recording, the artist will most likely have to go to a local studio and 
cover these expenses directly out of pocket.  Depending on the exact nature of the studio 
arrangement, these costs could range from being rather nominal to quite expensive.  For example, 
independently owned studios could charge anywhere from $35 to $95 per hour for use of the 
studio (with the best rates for larger blocks of time) and, perhaps, additional charges for working 
with a particular producer or engineer. 
 
                                                 
2 The extent of successful live performances necessary will partially depend on the music genre.  For 
example, if an artist is trying to sell dance music that is commonly played in clubs, it may be more 
important to focus on getting local DJ’s to play the music first as opposed to starting out with her own live 
performances.  In this case, the artist needs to be able to show that local DJ’s are actively playing her music 
in clubs.  For other genres, such as new age, classical/instrumental music, the level of live performance 
buzz probably does not need to be as high.  These genres will sell to a limited number of specifically 
targeted music consumers as opposed to appealing to the mass market.  The genre will also be a 
determining factor in how much material the artist needs to record.  For example, while the rock/pop genre 
practically necessitates that the artist creates a full-length album, artists in the dance genre can do just as 
well with only a single.  The genre also dictates the overall cost of the promotional campaign used to 
develop and promote the artist.  Again, the dance genre requires very little expense in this area relative to 
the rock/pop genre. 
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After signing with a label, however, the actual transforming of the artist’s music into an 
album takes on a new dimension.  The ensuing costs, which can range from approximately 
$40,000 to $150,000 for a new artist, are treated as an advance to the artist and are later recouped 
by the label from the artist’s royalty payments.  The recording costs should be viewed as part of 
the label’s fixed cost; all new artists in a particular genre will be allocated nearly the same 
amount for recording expenses, and the label will recoup these expenses before the artists receive 
royalties.  In fact, the typical recording contract calls for these expenses to be recouped not only 
from the album for which they were incurred, but from subsequent recordings as well.  Therefore, 
it is entirely possible, even somewhat likely, that an artist will not receive any royalty payments 
from the first album or, in many cases, the first few albums released. 
 
After artists gain more popularity and sell more albums, the label usually allocates a 
recording fund to them.  For example, the label could allow the artist a recording fund of 
$200,000 and then administer payments from the fund on an as needed basis.  If the recording 
were to come in under budget, the label would give the balance of the recording fund to the artist 
as an advance.  Of course, the label would view the entire fund as an advance and would recoup 
the total amount from the artist’s future royalties.  The exact amount of the recording expenses 
depends on several factors. 
   
Typically, the studio itself is an independently owned entity which offers a wide range of 
services.  The smallest of the labels, for example, would probably buy all of their own supplies 
(computer discs, DAT’s, tapes, etc…) from outside sources and then use the producer/engineer 
that works at the studio.  On the other hand, a more established label would probably arrange for 
a high quality recording team (producer, engineers, session musicians, etc.) to use a studio which 
provides all the needed equipment and supplies for the recording.3  The actual recording process 
can be very time consuming and the need for competent people working to get the best possible 
recording in the shortest amount of time is vital.  According to Schwartz, “…be careful about 
choosing your recording team.  Putting the right players together can mean the difference 
between a mediocre and a great recording.” (Schwartz, 1998, p. 96)  Once a high quality master is 
produced, the saleable copies can be manufactured. 
 
3.1.2 Manufacturing 
 
The manufacturing costs of the record are actually one of the largest expenses that the 
label and, therefore, the artist, will incur.  In a manner similar to the recouping of recording 
expenses, the label deducts the manufacturing costs from the artist’s royalty base.  This expense 
ranges from 15% to 25% of the suggested list price and varies depending on the status of the 
artist, the manufacturing company itself and the exact configuration used for packaging.  So, for 
example, if the suggested list price for an album is $20, 25% will be deducted from this amount 
and the artist’s royalties will be calculated based on $15 instead of $20.  These costs are part of 
the label’s variable costs – the more CDs manufactured, the greater the manufacturing costs 
incurred by the label. 
 
                                                 
3 This does not mean to imply that smaller studios do not have high quality sound engineers and/or 
producers.  Many small studios are owned and operated by extremely competent individuals.  The 
distinction here is being made only to point out where some of the differences in recording expenses could 
arise.  This is just like any other business in that there are expensive, “high-end,” firms which can provide a 
comprehensive array of services, and inexpensive, “low-end” firms which provide the customer with the 
basic necessities.  It is also important to point out that the type of music being recorded and the skills of the 
artist will also drive many of these studio decisions and, therefore, the overall recording expenses. 
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Tony van Veen, VP of Sales and Marketing for America’s largest CD manufacturer for 
independents (Disc Makers), gives valuable insight into the significance of these costs.  
According to van Veen, “CD and cassette manufacturing is both the easiest and the most difficult 
part of running a record label.  It’s easy because as long as you have a master tape and cash there 
are plenty of companies able to deliver CDs to you.  But it’s really tough to finance and manage a 
growing record label, and manufacturing costs figure to be the most significant consumer of your 
precious cash during the start up and growth phase of your label.” (Schwartz, 1998, p. 104)  It is 
not uncommon for the initial number of records pressed/CDs burned to be between 1,000 and 
5,000, depending on the situation.  Since the cost per item is usually between $3 and $5, artists 
trying to pay these expenses out of pocket would need to have considerable capital for the 
manufacturing process.  Assisting the artist by financing these expenses is a clear example of why 
the label can offer its intermediary services.  Of course, regardless of who is paying for it, simply 
manufacturing the CDs would be both costly and wasteful unless consumers are able to purchase 
them. 
 
3.1.3 Distribution 
  
The process of distributing the finished product so that sales can be made is just as vital 
as recording and manufacturing a quality product.  As the recording and manufacturing processes 
are being carried out, the label is simultaneously promoting the artist so that people will buy the 
records.  Since sales really are the goal of both the artist and the label, not having a record 
available for purchase when it is sought by the consumer could be a fatal mistake. 
 
While music is sold online and through mail order clubs, the overwhelming majority of 
record sales are still made in stores (these are now commonly referred to as “brick and mortar” 
stores as opposed to the “cyberstores” of the Internet).  Naturally, then, somebody has to get the 
finished product into these stores.  According to the Recording Industry Association of America’s 
(the RIAA) 2000 Consumer Profile, approximately 87% (see Figure 3-5) of all record sales in 
year 2000 were made in stores.4  While the complete RIAA profile will be examined in greater 
detail in Section 3.5, the report does exhibit some interesting trends which are relevant to this 
section. 
 
To begin, while the total percentage of industry sales in record stores has been declining 
over the last ten years, the portion of total sales in the category of other stores has been steadily 
increasing over the same period.  This category of other stores includes such places as Wal-Mart, 
Circuit City, Barnes and Noble, etc.  While record stores’ share has slipped from over 60% in 
1991 to about 42% in 2000, the share captured by other stores has risen from a low of 23% in 
1991 to just under 41% in 2000.  Since these mass merchants typically sell CDs at lower prices 
than record stores, it appears that many consumers like to pay less for their music.  Furthermore, 
the percentage sold through mail-order clubs has been steadily declining, from about 15% in 1994 
to just over 7% in 2000.  Finally, while total Internet sales increased 118% and 33% over the last 
two years, respectively, the net’s total share of the market still stood at less than 3.5% in 2000.  
Even though the Internet, especially through the downloading of music files, appears to pose a 
major threat to the future of the traditional methods of music distribution, the bulk of record sales 
are clearly still being made in actual stores rather than in cyberspace.  Aside from technological 
issues, which will be fully discussed in Section 3.4, there are at least two basic reasons that more 
artists do not distribute their own albums. 
                                                 
4 The category “record sales” includes full length CDs and cassettes, all types of singles, vinyl LPs, and 
even music videos. 
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Figure 3-5 
RIAA Profile - Sales by Type of Distribution
45%
42%
8% 3% 2% Record Store
Other Store
Tape/Record Club
Internet
TV, Newsp., Mag. AD
 
Source: 2000 RIAA Consumer Profile 
 
 
First, many stores will not buy directly from artists.  Not only do retailers have limited 
shelf space, but they do not want to be concerned with judging which artists will be popular.  
Secondly, as an artist’s music gains in popularity and starts to sell in larger markets, keeping up 
with distribution becomes increasingly complex.  In fact, this logistical aspect of record 
distribution is a key reason that the label can fulfill its intermediary role. 
 
To begin to understand how music distributors operate, one should first recognize that 
they too are concerned with making a profit.  It should also be realized that distributors are not 
promoters in any way; they are middlemen between labels and stores.  When distributors do not 
have faith in both the label’s ability to consistently promote the artist and in the artist’s talent, 
they simply will not carry the product.  While distributors do take records on consignment, they 
do not get paid unless the retail stores actually sell the records.  Therefore, the distribution costs 
can be viewed as part of the label’s variable costs – they will vary based on the quantity of sales.  
Once the retailers make sales, the distributors get paid and, in turn, pay the labels a pre-agreed 
upon price less all returns. 
 
Since music distributors decide on their own which records to carry, the label has to 
convincingly show the distributor that the product will sell.  Consequently, a label with a proven 
track record of signing and promoting successful artists will find this task easier.  According to 
Schwartz, “Distributors are looking for records that will sell, that already have a market, and that 
have a label behind them ready to work its butt off to promote them.” (Schwartz, 1998, p. 129)  
More pointedly, distributors mitigate their sales risk by carrying music backed by established 
labels.  According to Michael Koch, the president of distributor Koch International Corp., “The 
first ingredient for a new label is a great song and an artist to deliver the song.  But, without 
knowledgeable management and adequate financing, the chances for success are greatly 
diminished.  Do whatever is necessary to secure [those] requirements.” (Schwartz, 1998, p. 129)  
So, aside from the logistical concerns discussed earlier, there are also financial reasons which 
allow the label to function as an intermediary for the artist.  Another important aspect of the 
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traditional distribution chain is that there are significant differences between how independents 
and majors distribute there recordings. 
 
First, while some independents do distribute nationally, the vast majority of independent 
recordings are distributed locally and/or regionally, frequently into specialty music stores which 
are not part of a chain.5  Since most independents do not have the wherewithal to actively 
promote an artist nationwide, most national distributors will not distribute their recordings 
nationwide.  The majors, on the other hand, own their own network of national/international 
distributors and, consequently, are more easily able to place their own artists into the national 
retail chains.  Another advantage possessed by the majors is that they own a network of labels 
which consistently produces top-selling artists – a clear risk mitigating factor for retailers.  To see 
how much of an advantage the majors have in this area, it is helpful to closely examine the 
Billboard charts. 
 
The Billboard charts, commonly called the “pop charts,” are updated weekly and 
principally reflect the following two factors: (1) which albums are selling the most and, (2) which 
releases from those albums are getting the most airplay on radio stations.6 Based on these criteria, 
the 2001 year-end Billboard Top 200 compiles ratings across most genres.  Of the top 100 titles, 
exclusive of 3 soundtracks, only 27 were from an artist not signed to a major label.  However, six 
of these 27 titles were from the Zomba label which is recognized as the largest independent label 
in the world and represents artists such as Britney Spears, ‘N Sync, and the Backstreet Boys.   
 
Also, four of these titles were from the Dreamworks label which is aptly funded by 
Stephen Spielberg, Jeffery Katzenberg and David Geffen.  Out of the remaining 17 titles from 
artists not signed to major labels, 11 were distributed by a major label.  So, out of 97 titles on the 
Billboard Top 100, only 8 titles were not affiliated with one of the major labels (or with Zomba 
and Dreamworks). 
 
Even Billboard’s genre specific charts are dominated by the majors.  Figure 3-6, taken 
directly from the Billboard charts, lists these charts and their corresponding number of 
independent affiliated artists.  While the “Country” chart does list 8 non-major-affiliated artists, 6 
of these 8 are from the label Curb, which is recognized as the largest of all country music labels.  
Additionally, two of the four titles from the “Pop” chart are from the same artist, both of the titles 
on the “Jazz” chart are from the same label, and the lone title on the “Hot Dance” chart is from 
the Zomba label.  The next function to be discussed is that of promoting the artist – an area where 
the majors do not appear to have such a clear overall advantage on the independents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Many independents actually use a combination of distributors – those which sell regionally and those 
which are referred to as one-stops.  The one-stop distributors are the main suppliers for the mom & pop 
type music stores, and they typically specialize in one particular genre and/or geographical area. 
6 While they are not nearly as popular nor consolidated, independents also have charts.  In fact, although it 
is based solely on sales data (as opposed to radio play and sales data), even Billboard posts a weekly 
“Independent Music” chart.  There really is no one main source for independent music charts – college 
radio stations issue there own, various organizations issue there own, and IUMA issues several. 
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Figure 3-6
Billboard Chart # of Artists Not Affiliated With A Major
Top 20 R&B/Hip Hop 1
Top 20 Country 8
Top 20 Pop 4
Top 10 Electronic 4
Top 10 Classical 0
Top 10 Jazz 2
Top 10 Contemporary 2
Top 10 Hot Dance Club 1
 
ce: Billboard Charts 
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 a fan base from, among other things, successful live performances.  While artists c
their own, post flyers and give away promotional CDs to attract would be fans, it would be 
incorrect to think that a sustained marketing campaign can be orchestrated without any help.
Since the distributors want to see proof of a fan base, media coverage, radio play and the finan
backing needed to sustain a marketing campaign, much more than passing out flyers will be 
necessary.  Even if the music is terrific, if consumers do not hear it on the radio, read about it
publications, see it performed on videos and/or hear it at live performances, the chances of them 
finding out about it are greatly diminished.  By offering specialization in these promotional areas,
the label is able to provide intermediary services to artists. 
 
onals, advertising concerts, paying for radio commercials, giving away recordings, 
making videos, securing interviews, etc…, are all aimed at increasing sales.  Depending on 
size and expertise of the label, outside publicists and marketing experts are frequently hired to 
work with the label’s own people to promote the artist’s music.  Just as with the other expenses
examined above, these marketing/promotion costs are also usually treated as advances to artists 
and then recouped from their royalties.8  These costs, for any given genre, can be viewed as part 
of the label’s fixed costs.  For example, practically all new artists in the “pop” genre would be 
allocated $100,000 for promotional expenses, all those in the “instrumental” genre $30,000, etc
In all the various promotional tasks that are performed, the majors do have the financial resources
to easily promote an artist nationally/internationally.  Still, given their ability to use third-party 
 
7 This is not to say that no artists are capable of handling their own promotions.  In fact, some artists do 
handle some of their own promotions even after they are signed.  This statement is made only to show that 
this function, just as the others that have been discussed, requires an investment of both time and money.  
Additionally, the promotion function requires that a great deal of time be devoted to it on an ongoing basis.  
The scope of the marketing campaign will depend on the genre of the music.  For example, since 
instrumental music does not have as wide of an appeal as pop/rock, massive national campaigns and 
extensive artist development are not needed. 
8 More established artists are sometimes able to negotiate with the label so that only a portion (up to 50%) 
of these expenses will be recouped from royalty payments.  An unknown artist, however, usually does not 
have any leverage with which to bargain for such a deal. 
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publicists and marketing experts, it is not entirely clear that the independents suffer from an 
overall disadvantage in the marketing/promotion area.  Nonetheless, the majors do have a cle
promotional advantage over the independents in the area of commercial radio. 
 
ar 
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radio.  Commercial radio is dominated by the artists signed to majors and is much more 
difficult for an independent to break into.  One of the main reasons for this dominance is that 
commercial radio depends heavily on advertising revenue.  The stations get most of their reven
from advertisers who, naturally, want to know that the music being played on the station has a 
large audience.  A key indicator of this audience size is, of course, sales quantities.  Still, it is 
interesting to note the circularity of the relationship between distribution, radio play, the billbo
charts, and record sales.  For example, an artist makes it onto the charts through extensive sales 
and radio play, but commercial radio play is typically reserved for artists who sell extensively.  
Furthermore, the records which sell the most are those that are distributed by the majors and 
receive extensive commercial radio play.  As of December 2001, while only two titles on 
Billboard’s Top 20 Independent chart sold over 500,000 copies, 14 of the artists on Billboa
Top 20 Pop chart sold over 1 million copies.  Still, as will be discussed more fully in Section 3.5
there is not necessarily a direct correlation between radio play and sales.  In many cases, 
independents sell music which, relative to that of the majors, does not have a large fan bas
last major function that will be discussed is the managing of the artist’s career. 
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tists through the daily demands of their career.  While the size of this team is not 
necessarily too large at first, as the artist gains more exposure, sells more records and begi
touring on a regular basis, a larger group will be needed.  Therefore, these costs can be viewed
part of the label’s variable costs.  Additionally, when artists’ CDs start selling in large enough 
quantities, major labels are likely to become interested and will want their own specialists 
involved.  Since the artist is usually already signed to an independent, however, the specific
these arrangements will depend on the negotiations between the two labels.  Usually, the artist is
likely to have, at the very least, some input in these decisions.  So, exactly what is the role of a 
manager? 
 
ance, and planning the long-range direction of the artist’s career.” (Krasilovsky & 
Shemel, 2000, p. 352)  Depending on the relationship with the label, the manager performs t
such as choosing material, handling public relations and publicity matters, selecting booking 
agents, determining which engagements are best for the artist’s career, and selecting and 
supervising the artist’s attorneys and accountants.9  Typically, managers receive commiss
15% to 25% of the artist’s gross earnings plus expenses, all of which are usually recouped from 
the artist’s royalty payments.  Since very few people, much less unknown artists, can afford to 
have their own highly skilled attorney advising them on every important choice they make, it is
the utmost importance that an artist builds a good relationship with a reputable independent 
before signing.  The next section will describe some of the specifics of a recording contract a
how the artist actually receives money from the sales of records. 
 
 
9 In many cases, the independent may consist of an owner and one or two employees.  In this type of 
situation, the label owner would probably be responsible for most of these managerial tasks. 
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3.2 Recording Contracts and Royalties 
 In this section, to discuss exactly how artists are paid and what they are obliged to do 
 
Under the typical recording contract, the artist is legally bound to render services as a 
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under recording contracts, the record label and the publisher will be examined separately.  A 
distinction between the type of artist will consistently be made in this section.  Specifically, an
artist will now be referred to as either a songwriter, a recording artist or, in the cases where the 
artist performs both functions, as a songwriter/recording artist.   
 
g artist “…on an exclusive basis for the purpose of making recordings from which 
phonograph records can be manufactured.  The term phonograph records encompasses comp
discs, cassettes, and any and all other devices, including audiovisual devices that contain an 
artist’s recorded performances.  A device includes all technology, whether presently known o
invented in the future, that is capable of transmitting music through cyberspace, with the possib
exception of digital audio broadcasting.”10 (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 13)  The standard 
contract typically runs for a term based both on the recording artist delivering a minimum 
number of songs (usually enough for one album) and on some period of time thereafter (usu
months).  In most cases, the record company reserves the right to extend the contract by picking 
up options. While songwriters also sign exclusive contracts, they sign contracts with music 
publishers who, in turn, work out agreements with record labels to have the songs performed
recording artists.  In the end, the exact nature of these interrelationships determines how the 
royalties from music sales are divided. 
ro s, synchronization royalties, and performance royalties.  Mechanical royalties are those
paid to the songwriter by the record label – or, as will be explained shortly, by anyone else – for
the right to manufacture and sell recordings of the songwriter’s songs.  The publisher holding the 
copyright on a song issues the record label a license which gives it permission to manufacture and
distribute a recording of that song.  This license, called a mechanical license, provides that “If 
phonorecords of a non-dramatic composition have been distributed to the public with the 
authorization of the copyright owner, any other person may record and distribute phonorec
the work by giving a specified notice and paying a statutory royalty.  A record is considered 
distributed if it has been ‘voluntarily and permanently parted with’.”11 (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 
2000, p. 176)  Literally anyone, by virtue of giving notice and paying a statutory royalty, can re-
record and distribute a copyrighted work which has already been distributed. 
 
U
ng artists and favored by record companies. More pointedly, “While authors and music 
publishing groups have argued vehemently against the continuation of the compulsory 
mechanical license, record industry representatives have fought strongly and successful
retention.” (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 111)  Possible reasons for each group’s stance on 
compulsory licensing will be analyzed more completely in Section 3.4.  Notwithstanding the 
controversy, the statutory rate for a mechanical license is currently set at $0.0755 per 
composition.12  So, for every recording of a composition that is sold, the holder of the 
 
10 While it is still being debated, digital audio broadcasting appears to fall under the category of a public 
performance and, as such, is subject to the same licensing process as any other performance right. 
11 Until the Copyright Act of 1909, anyone could reproduce music through mechanical means and was not 
obligated to compensate the copyright owner. 
12 The Copyright Act of 1976 established the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT) to  
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paid $0.0755.  From this total, the songwriter is initially entitled to a 50% share and the publisher 
the other 50%.  However, in the case of a recording artist/songwriter, a co-publishing agreement 
is frequently signed which entitles the artist to 50% of  the publisher’s share as well – for a total 
of 75% of all mechanical royalties.13  
 
 Synchronization royalties are those which are paid to the songwriter for the use of a song 
in commercials, TV shows, movies, theatrical performances, etc.  The rates for synchronization 
licenses are not statutory, and the dollar amount negotiated tends to vary based on exactly what 
the song is being used for.  Still, the same sort of writer/publisher split used with mechanical 
royalties typically applies to synchronization royalties as well.  Incidentally, over 20,000 music 
publishers are represented by the Harry Fox Agency, an organization which issues and collects, 
on a commission basis, both synchronization and mechanical license fees for its members.  The 
agency’s gross collections have grown an average of 26% per year over the last decade and, in 
1997, they exceeded $400 million per year. (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 180)  The third type 
of royalty the songwriter receives is referred to as the performance royalty. 
 
 The performance royalty is collected when a musical composition is played or performed 
in public venues – at clubs, on the radio, in jukeboxes, etc.  “For most songwriters, background 
scorers, and music publishers, the performing rights area represents their greatest source of 
continuing royalty income.”  (Brabec & Brabec, 2000, p. 237)  Performance rights licenses are 
issued (and fees are collected) by, mainly, three organizations representing music publishers and 
composers.  While the fees charged by each group are similar, each determines its own fee 
schedule.  Also, while each organization is free to negotiate the type of license it issues, either a 
blanket license or a per-use license, blanket licenses are the most common.  As their name 
suggests, blanket licenses give the licensee unlimited use for one set fee.  For example, the 
organization will negotiate to allow a radio station unlimited use of its catalog for a fee of about 
2% of the station’s adjusted gross revenues.   
 
These membership organizations are The American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and the newest of the three, SESAC.14  Dual 
membership in either of these organizations is disallowed.  ASCAP is the oldest of the three 
organizations, has over 100,000 members, and collects the bulk of its license fees by issuing 
blanket licenses to TV and radio stations.  ASCAP’s annual gross receipts have been over $500 
million since 1998.  BMI, while much younger, claims to have approximately 200,000 members, 
                                                                                                                                                 
determine statutory rates.  In 1992, this tribunal was replaced by a three person ad hoc panel called the 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP).  Future rate adjustments were stipulated to be based on CPI 
changes from September to September every two years.  It was also stipulated that the rate could not fall 
below $0.05 per composition up to five minutes in duration nor rise more than 25% within any two year 
period regardless of the actual change in the CPI. 
13 In the case of the recording artist/songwriter, the record label frequently inserts a “controlled 
composition” clause into the contract.  A controlled composition refers to any composition written, owned 
or controlled, in whole or in part by the artist.  Under this clause, the record label reduces the amount of the 
mechanical royalty that it pays to the artist.  Typically, 75% of the statutory rate is paid as opposed to the 
full rate. 
14 The following quote is taken directly from the company’s web site (www.sesac.com), “SESAC is not 
an acronym for anything these days. For history’s sake, we can tell you the name originally stood for 
Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, a fitting moniker back in 1930 when the company was 
founded to serve European composers not adequately represented in the United States. Today, however, the 
company is known simply as SESAC. With an international reach and a vast repertory that spans virtually 
every genre of music, SESAC is the fastest growing and most technologically adept of the nation’s 
performing rights companies.” 
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and also collects the bulk of its fees under blanket license agreements with the broadcasting 
industry.  As of 1998, BMI’s annual gross receipts were over $450 million.  According to 
Krasilovsky and Shemel, “…the same licensees who use the music of both societies pay 
somewhat less to BMI than to ASCAP.” (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 154)  SESAC, which 
does not disclose its financial information, is a privately held corporation that represents only 
about 2,000 members.  According to published 1999 data, BMI and ASCAP distributed to their 
members 81.5% and 77.7% of their gross receipts, respectively.  Based on these figures, the 
average songwriter belonging to BMI and ASCAP received $1,850 and $4,350, respectively.15  
The royalty payments for a recording artist, however, are calculated and collected somewhat 
differently. 
 
 A typical royalty clause in a recording contract reads as follows: “The artist shall be paid 
a royalty of 15% of the applicable suggested retail list price in respect of all long-playing albums 
manufactured and sold for which payment has been received.”  (Brabec & Brabec, 2000, p. 71)  
The exact percentage of the album royalty rate is completely negotiable and depends mainly on 
the stature of the artist.  New artists typically receive between 10% and 12%, while the most 
successful artists can receive as much as 17% to 25%.  Alternatively, the record label will issue 
royalty payments on the wholesale price of the record and, since the wholesale price is roughly 
half of the retail list price, double the royalty percentage for the artist.  At least, the record 
company should double the royalty rate.16  This is just one of the many examples of why an artist 
has to be well informed about industry practices before signing a recording contract.  Careful 
negotiations are critical because album royalties (see Figure 3-7), for both a recording artist and a 
recording artist/songwriter, are the most lucrative source of income for an artist.17  While many 
of the deductions a record company makes from the artist’s royalties have already been discussed, 
there are several additional recoupable expenses that should be mentioned.  
 
To begin, even though the CD has been the widely accepted format in the market for 
many years, many labels still charge the artist a “new technology” fee by reducing royalties by 
roughly 10% of the applicable royalty rate.18  Because many U.S. record companies use some 
type of licensing agreement with foreign distributors, royalty rates are also reduced on album 
sales in foreign countries, sometimes by as much as 50%.  Additionally, in the case of a well-
                                                 
15 These are only averages - the exact formulas and rate schedules used by each of these organizations 
varies significantly as does, consequently, the amount collected by each artist.  Typically, the higher the 
number of “performances,” the higher the artist’s royalty payments.  The performance royalties from TV 
and radio play for a top-selling artist would, naturally, be much higher than average.  For more information 
on the specifics of their rate calculations and payment formulas, the reader should go to their respective 
web sites: www.sesac.com and www.bmi.com. 
16 Many new artists are also able to negotiate escalating royalty clauses so that the royalty rate paid on sales 
of albums escalates with the number of sales or that the rate increases when a record company picks up its 
option to extend the contract with the artist.  On the other hand, the record company often inserts clauses 
which lower the artist’s royalty rate if it decides to reduce the price of the album and/or sell the album 
through TV/mail order record clubs – frequently by as much as 50%.   
17 Many record labels only pay royalties on 90% of the albums sold and hold a portion of the artist’s 
royalties in reserve to guard against excessive returns.  Typically 25% to 30% is held in reserve for long 
play albums and 30% to 40% for singles.  In some cases, however, as much as 50% will be held pending a 
final accounting.  These figures are completely negotiable and depend largely on the stature of the artist.  
The record company usually remits mechanical and album royalties due its artist twice per year. 
18 Some artists, especially more recently, have been able to negotiate that this reduction only apply to the 
newest of mediums (such as mini-discs and downloads).  Additionally, many artists negotiate a cutoff date 
for this lower payment so that it will not reduce their royalty payment for more than, for example, two 
years.  Also, some artists may negotiate a rate lower than 10%. 
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funded independent and/or a major label, cash advances are commonly given to the artist upon 
signing a record deal, with further advances made when certain milestones are reached.  For 
example, advances would be made when the recording of the album actually begins and when 
certain sales plateaus are reached.  Additionally, the record label typically provides separate funds 
to support the recording artist on a live tour and to create videos for the singles released off an 
album.19  These accounts, as is the case with the other disbursements discussed above, are treated 
as advances and are recouped from the artist’s royalties.  Of course, a key reason that the record 
companies are able to sell artists’ recordings in the first place is that they have copyright 
protection. 
 
3.3 The Music Industry and Copyright Law  
 
The origin of the copyright can be traced to the late 1400’s, shortly after the invention of 
the printing press.  Initially, copying was regulated by monarchs in that certain individuals were 
granted the monopoly right to copy certain books or classes of books.  Eventually, copiers began 
paying authors lump sums for the right to reprint their works (for a more complete analysis, see 
Plant, (1934)). 
 
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, states that “The Congress shall have 
Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  The 
first two major revisions/refinements to copyright law came in the Copyright Act of 1909 and the 
Copyright Act of 1976.  Until the 1909 act, anyone could freely reproduce musical compositions.  
The Copyright Act of 1976 still forms the basis of today’s copyright law.  The copyright is an 
intangible property right which “…refers to that body of exclusive rights granted by law to 
authors for the protection of their writings [and] includes the exclusive right to reproduce, 
publish, and sell copies of the copyrighted work, to make other versions of the work, and, with 
certain limitations, to make recordings of and perform the work in public.” (Krasilovsky & 
Shemel, 2000, pg. 95) 
 
While it protects the expression of ideas rather than ideas themselves, the right is 
intangible in that it exists separate and apart from the physical expression.  For example, when a 
consumer buys a TLC album, the physical product is owned, but the right to reproduce and sell 
that album still belongs to TLC’s record label, Arista.  With only rare exceptions, the record label 
is the copyright owner of all recorded performances throughout the term of a recording contract.  
Labels retain the copyright because nearly all recording contracts stipulate that “sound recordings 
are created for the company as works for-hire.” (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 72)  Section 101 
of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the following definitions for sound recordings, 
phonorecords, and works for-hire. 
 
Sound recordings: “…works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken,  
or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or 
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” 
 
                                                 
19 Another practice that an artist has to watch carefully is one called cross collateralization.  This practice 
allows the record company to, for example, withhold album and mechanical royalties from the artist to 
recoup video production expenses.  The artist and the label usually negotiate that only a certain percentage 
of the royalties can be cross collateralized, but there is no set rule other than that a more established artist 
has more bargaining power. 
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Figure 3-7 
 
Adopted From Brabec & Brabec, 2000, pp. 374-377 
 
 
Phonorecords: “…material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a  
n or later 
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motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now know
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  The term 
‘phonorecords’ includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed…” 
 
or her employment,” or, “(2) A work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con
to a collective work, as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a 
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test, or as an atlas, provided that the parties expressly agree in writing that the work shall be 
considered a work for-hire.” 
 
 Recently, the works for-hire provision has become somewhat controversial.  Recording 
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artist Don Henley leads a group called the Recording Artist Coalition (RAC) which is actively 
lobbying Congress to change the laws, and even Bertlesmann’s BMI unit has come out in favor
the RAC’s position.  According to their statement, “BMI believes strongly in the rights of 
composers, songwriters, and publishers to own the copyright in their works.” (Holland, 200
While the issue is still unresolved, there is definitely an organized movement among recording 
artists to regain the ownership of their copyrights from past recordings and to keep copyright 
ownership of future recordings.  Possible reasons for this newly organized movement will be 
discussed further in Section 3.4. 
 
 
writers’ compositions.  Incidentally, while the copyright notice – for example, © NJM 
Publishing, Inc. – is required for copies of written works to maintain their copyright protection, 
since sound recordings are actually not considered copies of written compositions, a copyright 
notice is not required to maintain protection on sound recordings.20  Basically, “Two factors 
affect the copyright status of a sound recording: when and whether it is published.” (Krasilov
& Shemel, 2000, p. 96)  According to the Copyright Act of 1976, publication is defined as “the 
distribution of copies of phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease or lending….”  Any and all sound recordings published on o
February 15, 1972, and all those published or unpublished on or after January 1, 1978 are covered
by federal copyright law.  Any sound recordings published prior to February 15, 1972, and any 
unpublished by January 1, 1978, are covered by state common law until February 15, 2047, at 
which time they fall into the public domain – which is the status of any work for which copyrig
protection has expired.  Since the passage of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, all federally covered works are protected for the life of the author plus 70 years after the 
author’s death.  Nonetheless, recording contracts actually give record labels a slightly longer 
duration of copyright protection.  In the case of works for-hire written on or after January 1, 1
copyright protection lasts for 95 years from the date of first publication or 100 years from 
creation, whichever is shorter.  Since most recording contracts stipulate that sound recordin
made during its term are regarded as works for-hire, the record label usually has this extended 
protection for its albums (those recorded after January 1, 1978).  Infringement on the copyright 
falls into three distinct categories – bootlegging, piracy, and counterfeiting. 
 
 
are slightly different.  Bootlegging is the unauthorized recording of a live or broadcast 
performance.  For example, bootlegged copies of U.S. artists’ overseas performances ar
popular.  Piracy, on the other hand, is the unauthorized duplication of the actual sound recordin
and counterfeiting is the duplication of the entire good – the artwork, the packaging and the sound 
recording.  Prior to Napster, which allowed users to make pirated copies of songs (in many 
cases), the more common understanding of piracy was when a foreign record company made
unauthorized copy of, for example, a Rage Against the Machine CD (copyright held by Epic 
Records) and sold copies of the record under its own name.  If, however, the foreign company
had copied the recording and the packaging, and then surreptitiously sold the CD under the Epi
 
20 Even though failure to register the copyright does not cause the copyright holder to lose copyright 
protection, a copyright holder wishing to make an infringement claim cannot do so until the copyright has 
been registered.  Still, even if the alleged infringement takes place before the copyright was registered, once 
registration has taken place the claim can be made. 
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label, it would have been guilty of counterfeiting.  Due to increased bootlegging, piracy, 
counterfeiting and, in part, to the widespread popularity of home recording devices, there 
been several recent attempts to update copyright law with new legislation. 
 
have 
One such attempt is the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA).  While it has been 
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considered a failure by the music industry due to both its lack of financial returns and its failure to 
truly clarify the propriety of home recording,21 this Act “…attempts to shield the consumer 
against copyright infringement liability for home copying for noncommercial use and protec
hardware manufacturers, sellers of digital equipment, and blank-tape marketers from 
infringement liability…”  (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 78)  This act requires the a
mentioned companies to pay a blanket license fee which is collected by means of a 3% surch
on the transfer price of the device.  The RIAA formed a non-profit organization named the 
Alliance of Artists and Recording Companies to collect these fees which, as of 1997, had no
surpassed $900,000 in any given year.  Next, mainly in response to the coming digital 
transmission of music over the Internet, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Record
of 1995 was passed. 
 
 
protection would be preserved in the digital age.  According to this act, digital transmissions fall 
into one of the three following categories: (1) non-subscription services, (2) interactive services, 
or (3) subscription services.  A non-subscription service is the type of transmission which has 
come to be called “Internet radio” and it is not subject to a licensing fee under this act.  This type 
of service allows users to log onto the Internet and listen to songs almost as if they had turned on 
a radio (the process is referred to as “streaming”).  Next, while the service is free to the user, 
interactive services allow the user to download digital files free of charge.  Subscription servi
on the other hand, are those which allow users to download digital files for some pre-determined 
charge.  While licenses for interactive services are determined solely through negotiations 
between the service company and the record label, with no statutory requirements, licenses 
subscription services are subject to a statutory rate of 7.0% (for subscription services operating 
of July 31, 1998, the rate of 7.25% will apply from January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2007).  
Of course, even in the case of subscription services, the parties involved are free to negotiate 
payment of a percentage of the statutory rate instead of the full rate.  Later, after the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) was passed, performance license fees were requ
to be paid to record companies (and artists) for performances on digital radio – the non-
subscription services referred to above.  Currently, these fees are solely based on negotia
are not subject to statutory rates.  So far, fees from all three types of services have mostly been 
collected by the record labels themselves.   
 
 
21 The propriety of home audio recording is largely unsettled because of the ambiguity of case law 
surrounding the fair use doctrine.  This doctrine “has been applied for many years as a judicial exception to 
the exclusive rights of a copyright owner to print, publish, copy, and vend a copyrighted work.” 
(Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 109)  In fact, the doctrine is even included in the Copyright Act of 1976.  
The problem, however, is that the language is vague and allows for interpretation by the courts.  While the 
applicability of the doctrine depends on, among other things, the purpose of the use and its effect on the 
market for the copyrighted work, the current body of case law does not offer a clear guide.  A further 
complication arises from the Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971.  During hearings for this 
amendment, the House Judiciary Committee went on record saying “It is not the intention of the Committee 
to restrain the home recording from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances where 
the home recording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it.”  Again, this issue is largely unsettled – especially now that the Internet has become a 
tool in home recording. 
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The DMCA was actually passed by the U.S. Congress to implement two World 
Intellect w the 
 
gress 
) compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software applications; 
) literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by access 
 
nless incorporated into the DMCA (or some other law) however, these exemptions are set to 
3.4 Technology and The Future of the Industry 
  
chnological advances have had major effects on the music industry, a complete 
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ual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties.22  These treaties are an example of ho
U.S. government is becoming more involved in the movement to legislate intellectual property 
laws which are enforceable throughout the world.23  One of the more controversial provisions of
the DMCA is that it outlaws the deleting or circumventing of digital encryption and/or 
watermarking techniques.  Shortly after the passage of the DMCA, the Librarian of Con
announced the following two exemptions to this provision:  
 
(1
and  
 
(2
control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage, or 
obsolescence.   
U
expire in the fall of 2003.  The technology for which these more recent acts were passed, along 
with some of the controversies stirred by it, will be discussed in the next section. 
 
While te
on of all these advances is beyond the scope of this paper.  For example, while recording 
equipment has advanced to the point where virtually anyone can purchase the tools needed to 
record music out of their home, a discussion of the differences in ¼ inch tape and Digital Audi
Tape (DAT) specifications is not needed here.  Given the complexities of making master 
recordings, it seems unlikely that a massive influx of home recording studios will supplan
existing studios in the near future.  The most immediate technological threat to the current 
structure of the music industry, however, is actually a combination of two interrelated 
technologies – the Internet and digital downloading.   
  
In its ow
onsumers, with very low transaction costs, to easily purchase pre-packaged CDs from 
nearly any label’s catalog, even those of independents.  For consumers, this method has another 
advantage over traditional mail order sales because it allows consumers to hear samples of music
before purchasing it.  Additionally, the cyberstore has been beneficial to independent artists who, 
 
22 WIPO has been in existence since 1967 and is an intergovernmental agency based in Geneva.  In 
December 1996, WIPO drafted two treaties with the intent of establishing minimum standards of copyright 
protection in the digital environment.  While the U.S. is one of only 11 countries to have ratified the 
treaties, a minimum of 30 countries are required to sign before the treaties can be implemented by statute in 
all countries. 
23 The effort to protect copyrights of American works in foreign countries has mostly centered around the 
treaties of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works – commonly called the 
Berne Convention.  After over 50 years of squabbling, the U.S. Congress voted in 1988 to ratify the Berne 
Copyright Convention which actually amended the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.  According to Krasilovsky 
& Shemel (2000), the Berne Copyright Convention is “the world’s oldest, most comprehensive…most 
protective…most important…reciprocal copyright treaty…” in existence.  Signatories of the Berne 
Convention agree to treat nationals of other member countries as if they were their own nationals for 
purposes of copyright protection – an agreement which actually increases the rights granted to American 
authors in some foreign countries.  As of this writing, the Convention included at least 128 countries as 
signatories. (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, pp. 225-229 & 497-507) 
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historically, have had the most difficulty getting their music into stores.  To facilitate sales of 
their CDs, many independent bands have joined sites which target fans of their type of music, 
regardless of where these fans live.  Typically, these sites link to the band’s home page and/or 
commercial cyberstores where, in either “place,” consumers can buy pre-packaged CDs and/or 
download digital copies.  One of the best known sites for independent music was started in 1993 
and is called the Internet Underground Music Archive (IUMA).  By 1998, IUMA was receiving 
approximately 250,000 hits per day and claimed to be indirectly responsible for gross sales of 
approximately $1 million per year. (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 449)  Interestingly, one of
the main tools that IUMA uses to promote bands is the same tool that made Napster a household
term – the music compression format known as the MP3 file. 
 
to 
 
 
.4.1 The Technology 
Although many are commonly referred to as MP3’s, there are actually several digital 
music fi , 
y an 
 
ctual 
, 
int 
 
3
 
le formats currently in use, with new ones bound to surface in the future.  Nonetheless
the MP3 format, which was originally intended for video, was the first of the compression 
formats to gain extensive use, and is really nothing more than an algorithm.  MP3 is actuall
abbreviation for MPEG-3, which is an acronym for Moving Picture Experts Group, Audio Layer
3.  This group, MPEG, works under the joint direction of the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and the International Electro-Technical Commission (IEC).  The a
algorithm, however, was developed by a German company named Fraunhofer IIS-A in 1987
within the framework of the EUREKA project EU147, Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB), a jo
project with the University of Erlangen.  While the algorithm itself is not proprietary, it is clear 
from Fraunhofer’s website that the company has used its development of MP3 to market itself as
a premier software developer; the company offers a wide range of technical support and 
consulting services for users of the MP3 algorithm.  Interestingly, Fraunhofer’s website 
(http://www.iis.fhg.de/amm/index.html) claims that, in 1995, the company “devised one 
w
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orld's first IP protection schemes, the Multimedia Protection Protocol (MMP).”  The company
also remains heavily involved in developing new copy protection technologies, and was involved
in the development of the recording industry’s ill-fated SDMI project. 
 
T
aded, stored and, therefore, posted on a website and transferred to others– all reasons th
the “file-sharing” service Napster became so popular and controversial.  While the MP3 still 
seems to be the most popular format in use, there are several other compression technologies 
which are currently being used on commercial websites and/or being developed. 
  
One popu
 the file so that only one copy can be made through the user’s CD burner.  Consumers 
go directly to Liquid Audio’s website and download songs for as little as $0.99 each and create 
their own custom discs.24  AT&T has a format called a2b, which prevents any copies from being
made, and Microsoft introduced Windows Media™ Technologies 4.0, which it claims has double 
the compression ratio of MP3 with equal sound quality and an embedded rights manager to 
protect encoded files.  Another company, VQF, has developed a format which it claims 
compresses files to two-thirds the size of MP3 and offers better sound quality.  Also, wit
support of the five major labels, IBM has undertaken a program to test its Electronic Music 
 
24 The cost per song does vary depending on the artist and the label.  For example,  
the band Linkin Park, from the Warner Brothers label, sells its most recent single for $0.99, while Lenny 
Kravitz of Virgin Records (EMI Group) sells his most recent single for $3.49.  Liquid Audio also licenses 
its technology to other sites. 
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Management System (EMMS).  According to IBM, this secure format will eventually allow 
consumers to download a full-length CD in about three minutes.  With the exception of MP3, t
security measures that all of these formats employ include either one or some combination of the 
following three tools: (1) encryption; (2) watermarking; or (3) the Serial Copy Management 
System (SCMS). 
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Waterma
 damaging the file.  A digital watermark can be “…likened to a digital fingerprint and can 
contain copyright ownership information, customer identification, and royalty tracking 
information.”  (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 452)  Consequently, watermarking is a 
tool for tracking piracy.  Encryption, on the other hand, involves encoding data into a file that 
only the intended recipient can understand.  This technique allows an authorized user to decode
the file with, for example, a password.  The third tool, the SCMS, actually encompasses any 
technique specifically designed to prevent a user from making multiple copies of a protected 
work.  These technologies, as well as those still being developed, can be used to prevent peop
from downloading copyrighted material and making it available to the whole world on the 
Internet.  Many in the music industry fear that this sort of file-sharing displaces sales of sou
recordings.   
 
It
ically would not pay for them (this issue will be examined more completely in Section 
3.5).  Not only would this sort of large scale sharing be harmful to labels, but artists could also 
receive greatly reduced royalty payments.  Still, the potential for this occurrence, even when 
secure formats are used, depends largely on consumers’ trustworthiness.  According to David
Leibowitz of Aris Technologies, “Encryption is like building a better mouse-trap: what you oft
get is better-educated mice.” (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 453)  In fact, hackers commonly 
post instructions to websites so that consumers can learn how to defeat copy protection.25  Still, if 
most individuals are honest and/or consider defeating copy protection technologies too 
burdensome, perhaps Internet piracy will remain small enough so that digital distributio
profitable.  Regardless, the potential for large-scale digital music downloading – legal or 
otherwise – likely depends on the pervasiveness of the Internet and, more directly, broadb
connections. 
  
The 2000 Census reports that alm
 – a hefty increase from 1997 when only 18% were connected.  By this count, about 50
million American households have an Internet connection, and about 50 million do not.  Still, th
Wall Street Journal reports that “…only about 7 million [of these households] today enjoy high-
speed access.” (Kahn, 2001)  Furthermore, it doesn’t appear that lack of access to high-speed 
connections is the reason for this low subscriber rate.  According to an estimate by the FCC, 
“Anywhere from 70% to 80% of U.S. households can already sign up for high-speed Internet
access if they want it.” (Weber, 2002)  While reading and sending email over a dial-up modem
no problem, downloading meaningful amounts of music without a broadband connection is 
 
25 In the fall semester of 2000, a research team at Princeton led by Professor Edward Felten participated in a 
public event called the “Hack Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).”  SDMI was a consortia of recording 
industry and technology companies which sponsored this event - one which invited people to try to defeat 
their copy protection.  Professor Felton’s team found that SDMI was insecure and they planned to present a 
technical paper on their findings.  This action invited the threat of legal action from the RIAA.  Eventually, 
after the team filed suit seeking protection under the first amendment [Felten v. RIAA, US DC NJ Case 
#CV-01-2669], the RIAA withdrew its threat of legal action and the scientists presented their paper. (Gross, 
2001) 
 
 29
painfully slow.  Nevertheless, it appears that most consumers still view high-speed access, w
currently costs about $20-$30 per month more than a dial-up connection, as a luxury item.  Based 
on the above information, approximately 90 million American households still do not have a 
high-speed connection. 
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E
ze estimated there were as many as 40 million Napster users per month at the service’s 
peak (Washington Post, 12/20/00) - there is clearly still room for tremendous growth in the digit
music download market.  A prudent view of this market potential is reflected in the following 
statement by Marc Geiger, CEO of online music company Artist Direct: “When the world goes
toward digital delivery, which I believe is about ten years away, the next thing that will really 
happen is that you’ll take the manufacturing and physical being of the CD potentially out of the
picture…People think that it’s right around the corner but it’s not…The mail order and direct 
marketing revolution is the [area] to focus on for now.” (Schwartz, 1998, p. 266)  Nonetheless
early success stories have prompted sizeable investments by companies looking to stake out thei
territory on the web. 
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Aside fro
d sales on the Internet is David Bowie’s 1996 release of the single “Telling Lies.”
September of ‘96, Bowie’s label made the song available for download, free of charge, for one
week, and the song was downloaded over 450,000 times by users in 87 countries. (Krasilovsky &
Shemel, 2000, p. 447)  While the potential for sales is clear in this example, these downloads 
were used as a promotional tool; they were given away to promote sales of pre-packaged album
Furthermore, as of this writing, we have been unable to produce one example of a profitable 
digital music store (one whose main focus is on selling digital music downloads).26  Most 
recently, this section of the industry has been consolidating as the major labels have bough
of the initial providers. 
  
One exam
 the market and were promptly bought by EMusic- a firm which was also founded in the 
late 90’s.  In June of 2001, Vivendi Universal SA acquired EMusic.  Then, in August of 2001, 
Vivendi paid $372 million in cash and stock for the company MP3.com, a firm which had built a 
reputation of being somewhat anti-establishment.  One of the main reasons sited by Vivendi for 
acquiring MP3.com was that it wanted to use their technology to power its forthcoming site Duet
a joint venture with Sony for online music distribution.  Additionally, this acquisition sets up 
Sony and Vivendi to compete directly with the other three major labels. 
 
 
26 Two such examples include Liquid Audio and MP3.com.  Liquid Audio, which not only operates a cyber 
store but also licenses its technology, reported total net revenues for the third quarter of ’01 of  $1.3 
million, compared with $1.0 million for the second quarter of 2001 and with $3.4 million for the third 
quarter of 2000.  However, they also reported a net loss for the third quarter of  $6.1 million, compared 
sequentially with a net loss of $14.0 million, and year-over-year with a net loss of $8.9 million.  In June of 
2001, MP3.com reported second quarter ’01 revenues of $17.5 million with a loss of $1.6 million – 
although the second quarter loss was not as bad as their first quarter loss of $2.2 million (on sales of $21.8 
million).  Offering a ray of hope, they did report positive pro-forma EBITDA of $662,000 for the fourth 
quarter of 2001.  However, before these results could be borne out, they were purchased by one of the 
industry’s big 5 - Vivendi-Universal.  As a consequence, the world will never know for sure if those 
projections would have been met (even if they had, it still would not have been a positive net income). 
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Duet will be competing with a service called MusicNet, a joint venture between AOL 
Time Warner, Bertelsmann, and EMI.27  In the meantime, MusicNet and MP3.com are competing 
by offering digital downloads for a monthly fee.  Aside from differences in the catalogs of music, 
there are clear differences between the two services in both their flexibility and pricing structure.  
For instance, MP3.com, for about $3.00 per month, allows consumers to download all the songs 
they want and even burn one copy onto a CD, while MusicNet, for about $10.00 per month, 
allows consumers to download up to 100 songs and stream up to 100 songs per month without 
allowing any sort of transfer to another device (such as a CD burner).  Simultaneously, Vivendi is 
running EMusic as if it were an independent site, one which, at first glance, seems to be 
competing with its MP3.com site.  However, EMusic is actually quite different than MP3.com.   
 
Not only is EMusic focusing on major artists and charging consumers a lower price than 
MP3.com, but once consumers download a file from EMusic, they are free to do whatever they 
wish with it – even send it to a friend.28  One of the most recent, and, perhaps most interesting, 
entries into the digital download music industry is Apple Computer.  On April 28, 2003, Apple 
launched its iTunes service for Macintosh users. 
 
The iTunes service allows consumers to download songs for $0.99 each and restricts 
users in that it does not allow songs to be transferred online.  While the service is currently 
available only to Macintosh users, Apple does have plans to launch a Windows version soon.  
Most importantly, Apple currently has all of the major labels on board.  The service was launched 
with 200,000 songs, and Apple hopes to eventually offer millions of songs for downloads.  
According to Leonard (2003), Apple is paying record labels an average of $0.65 for each song 
that it sells.  Still, to date, the only site (from those listed above) which makes its platform 
available to all independent artist, signed or unsigned, is MP3.com.  Consequently, we have only 
been able to verify the terms offered to artists on MP3.com. 
 
The exact terms offered to an artist by MP3.com, while always on a nonexclusive basis, 
depend on which of the company’s services are used.  For instance, an artist using MP3.com can 
elect to choose any of the following services: (1) selling their own CDs through MP3.com (those 
manufactured by someone other than MP3.com); (2) allowing MP3.com to serve as the their CD 
manufacturing facility; (3) creating net CDs (so the consumer can download the entire CD with 
one click); (4) taking advantage of various sales and marketing services; or (5) using “pay for 
play” services for digital downloads.  The CDs that MP3.com manufactures end up looking 
similar to those distributed by a typical record label; they are enclosed in a jewel case and they 
include a four page insert – for which artists can supply their own artwork.  Once artists upload 
their files, MP3.com, on a per-order basis, manufactures and ships the CDs to the customer.  To 
allow for maximum versatility, the CD is encoded with both the standard CD format and the MP3 
                                                 
27 The three majors are also partnered with Napster and Real Networks for this venture.  In May of 2003, 
Real Networks announced it would launch its own download service to compete with Apple’s iTunes 
(discussed above).  For a current listing (April 2003) of downloading services and their features, see the 
following Business Week chart at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2003/tc20030422_0928.html 
28 The sites are very different.  To begin, EMusic charges consumers between $9.99 per month (for those 
customers who subscribe for one year) and $14.99 per month (for those who commit to only 3 months).  
Also, MP3.com caters directly to the independent artists, allowing anyone to post their songs, while 
EMusic only works with established labels – they will not even review an unsigned artist’s material.  As a 
result, there are many more artists on the MP3.com site.  For example, for artists whose names start with 
the letter ‘a,’ in the Alternative/Punk genre, MP3.com has approximately 2,700 artist while has only 112.  
Furthermore, out of this 112, only 7 artists are listed on both sites.  MP3.com also offers its artists many 
services which are not available on EMusic, such as CD manufacturing and posting “Net CDs.” 
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format.  MP3.com charges a $3.99 production fee and allows artists to charge any retail price they 
wish - and keep 50% of the net revenue.  This split certainly appears to be a better deal for artists 
than those secured under the typical recording contract.  For example, by earning 15% royalties 
on a $16 CD, before any of the standard deductions (see Section 3.2), the artist keeps $2.40.  
Under the MP3.com contract, however, artists could sell their CDs for less money and keep a 
higher dollar amount from each sale.  For example, by selling a CD for $12, the artist under 
contract with MP3.com would keep $4.  The terms MP3.com offers to artists for digital download 
sales, however, do not make it clear that artists will enjoy this same sort of monetary benefit from 
the new technology. 
 
To earn fees for each downloaded song, the artist has to pay MP3.com $20 per month to 
be in their “Premium Artist” group.  By joining this club, artists earn ½ cent per qualified play 
(all downloads or streams lasting at least 30 seconds).  Under these terms, an artist would have to 
sell 200 million downloads to earn $1 million, a feat which could be accomplished by selling a bit 
more than 400,000 albums under the terms of a typical recording contract (see Figure 3-8).  
MP3.com’s premium artists are also allowed to purchase their own CDs at a discounted price of 
$3.75. 
 
Regardless, negotiations over statutory licensing fees has been a main stumbling block 
for entrepreneurs wishing to open these types of cyberstores.  As of this writing, none of the sites 
currently operating are able to offer complete catalogs from all the labels.  Since consumers 
currently have to join several sites to find all the titles they want, this obstacle has almost surely 
attributed to the sluggish starts for these firms.  Consequently, exactly how the licensing issues 
get resolved could be a key determinant in how the industry evolves with these new technologies. 
 
Figure 3-8 
Old Regime*:
Album Royalties (per album sold) $2.40
Albums Sold 416,667
Total: 1,000,001
New Regime**:
Download Royalties (per qualified play) $0.005
Downloads 200,000,000
Total: 1,000,000
* Based on 15% album royalty rate for a $16 CD, does not include any standard deductions
** Based on 1/2 cent per download or stream lasting at least 30 seconds, 
   does not include $20 monthly fee to MP3.com
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3.4.3 The Technology’s Implications for the Future 
 
 In Senate hearings on April 3, 2001, the rift between the majors and their artists became 
quite clear.  As reported in Business Week, “Musical artists represented by RAC want to be able 
to sell their music on the Internet without going through the bureaucracy of record labels.  While 
many artists supported the copyright-infringement lawsuit the RIAA brought against Napster, 
they now want labels to aggressively award licensing deals to legitimate independent music Web 
sites in addition to the labels’ own online services.  That’s something that isn’t happening as fast 
as artists hoped….RAC says that if labels don’t voluntarily license their music to independent 
Web sites, Congress should consider compulsory licenses.” (St. Pierre, 2001)  So, a noteworthy 
occurrence surrounding these new technologies has been that artists and labels have practically 
switched sides on a key issue (see Section 3.2).  In fact, if the artists’ switch to favoring 
compulsory licensing is any indication of what digital distribution will mean for the industry’s 
future structure, the balance of power in the industry is destined to shift.  It appears that digital 
downloading on the Internet is threatening to empower both the consumer and the artist at the 
labels’ expense. 
 
The new technology has already started to pay dividends for artists in terms of their 
ability to secure a more flexible, and perhaps more profitable, recording contract.  According to 
Brabec and Brabec (2000), “Unlike the traditional record company contract, these new forms can 
take any number of forms including a sharing of all income from sales 50/50…a sharing of 
monies from subscription fees based on the number of downloads; an offer to owners of masters a 
higher percentage for downloads than would be made under a normal record company contract, 
etc…Many of the arrangements are non-exclusive or are exclusive for only a short period of time 
[and]…Practically none of these arrangements transfer ownership in the master recording or the 
song away from the artist or writer.” (pg. 414)  The following three developments in this 
quotation deserve careful scrutiny: (1) the better overall percentage of monies to the artist; (2) the 
shorter time period of exclusivity (or lack thereof); and (3) the artist retaining copyright 
ownership of the recordings. 
 
 As noted above, the RAC is now actively fighting to have the works for-hire clause 
removed from recording contracts specifically because recording artists want to retain copyright 
ownership of their master recordings.  While it could just be a coincidence that artists are getting 
organized to fight this issue at the same time the potential for digital downloading is surfacing, 
one could easily make the argument that this confluence of events is no accident.  In fact, when a 
main cost advantage of downloading is examined, a clearer picture begins to develop. 
   
Aside from providing a clear advantage in terms of productive efficiency, digital 
downloading eliminates the costs which are the most severe charge against the artist’s royalties – 
manufacturing and packaging.  Downloading also eliminates the need for the traditional 
distribution chain, a possible benefit to the artist for several reasons.  First, downloading removes 
respective markups at the wholesale and retail level, which means that the consumer’s price 
should be lower.  Of course, this lower price suggests that a larger quantity of records will be 
sold.  Next, compared to the traditional distribution method, the digital method practically 
removes physical limitations on the quantity of music that can be “stocked” in the “store.”  This 
development should make it easier for unknown artists to get their music distributed.  Of course, 
digital downloading benefits consumers because it lowers the price they pay, lowers their 
transaction costs and increases the flexibility they have when buying music.  For example, on 
MP3.com, consumers can buy all the individual songs they want for one price (only $3.00 per 
month) and make custom CDs – without ever leaving their homes.  While these developments 
certainly appear to benefit the artists and the consumer, they do not bode well for either the record 
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store or the record distributor.  Should licensing become compulsory for subscription services, a 
major hindrance to digital distribution will vanish. 
 
Consequently, by meaningfully reducing the label’s control over distribution, the 
technology would also erode the record companies’ main source of leverage in contract 
negotiations with the artists.  The following quote from Marc Geiger illustrates the importance of 
this lower reliance on traditional distribution: “The Internet provides the first radical change in a 
distribution system since the music business started….Prior to the Internet, all [record 
companies], whether majors or independents, had to go through the same steps [to sell their 
product] – manufacture a record and try to get it into record stores; if [the stores] took it, try to get 
[them] to prioritize it.  This meant using a ‘push’ economy, that is, pushing the record into the 
market all over the world, marketing it as best you could, and hoping the consumer would find 
and purchase that record…The Internet is the first medium that has allowed a radical change in 
that…It’s potentially transitioning into a ‘pull’ mechanism where the consumers can find what 
they want whether it’s in a big record store or directly from the artist or label…” (Schwartz, 1998, 
p. 260)  Because of the technology’s likely impact on distribution, the artist may finally have a 
credible threat in the area of distribution.  Artists who do not like the terms being offered by a 
label could, for the first time, credibly threaten to distribute the records on their own. 
 
Given that labels have already started offering larger shares of sales, shorter periods of 
exclusivity (in some cases none) and retention of the copyright to artists for digital downloads, it 
appears that this credible threat may already be having an effect.  In fact, some are predicting that 
the relationship between the artist and the label may evolve into more of a partnering arrangement 
– one where the artist depends on the record company mainly for promotional needs.  Krasilovsky 
& Shemel have made the following observation: “This downloading and uploading technology, 
coupled with the availability and low cost of high quality recording equipment, seems to 
minimize the need for record companies…Of course, the artist would still need promotion and 
marketing.  However, with the increased use of the Internet, one wonders how these processes 
will evolve as well.” (Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 462)  Still, regardless of how artists’ music 
is distributed, they are faced with, in essence, an information problem. 
 
For instance, before buying music, a consumer first has to be able to find a song from 
among hundreds of thousands of other songs.  Until artists becomes popular, therefore, getting 
more consumers to find their music is vital to making sales.  While all consumers surely will not 
like all the music that they hear, it is likely that most consumers will not buy music from artists 
without first hearing it.  So, in the future, marketing should remain a key function for a label 
and/or an artist.  At the very least, using a third party marketing specialist will always provide the 
artist with more time to create music.  Regardless of the nature of the intermediary functions, 
enforceable copyrights will be essential to the success of both artists and labels.  Still, in spite of 
the clear desire of many artists to retain copyrights in the digital age, some individuals are 
arguing that the new technologies make copyrights obsolete. 
 
3.4.4 The Technology and Copyright Opponents 
 
 An understanding of this position can be taken from the writings of John P. Barlow.  Mr. 
Barlow is a former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, the co-founder and current Vice-Chairman of 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and a Fellow at Harvard Law School's Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society.  His discourse, quoted below, has appeared in The Atlantic Monthly’s 
website (www.theatlantic.com) over the last few years.  Barlow posits that copyrights are no 
longer necessary because “A new means of distributing creative spirit has arisen that does not 
require its being embedded into objects.”  More pointedly, he says that copyrights “…are 
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designed almost entirely to perpetuate the moribund publishing and distribution industries, which 
are desperately seeking to preserve by law what they can no longer sustain by 
necessity…Through an amplifying cascade of mouse clicks [ideas] reproduce until they have 
reached sufficient mind-share to change politics.”  Apparently opposed to both the U.S. 
Constitution and the body of case law (not to mention laws in other countries) which support the 
existence of the copyright, Mr. Barlow acts as though the copyright is meant to protect the idea 
itself, not the expression of the idea. 
 
Indeed, as has been clearly demonstrated in Section 3.3, the copyright itself only depends 
on the work being “embedded into objects” for its legal definition; the intent of the right is much 
more expansive.  Still, even if one were to accept Mr. Barlow’s conclusions at face value, the 
notion that the Internet allows ideas to be transferred apart from any physical means is untrue.  
The computer hardware and the miles of cable (or tons of wireless equipment) needed to transmit 
information over the Internet are no less physical objects than books.  Even though the Internet 
can greatly enhance the dissemination of ideas, the ideas themselves do not travel between two 
individuals’ crania without first being expressed through at least one type of physical object.  
Unless those investing in this equipment are reasonably assured of earning a return on their 
capital, the equipment will, eventually, cease to exist. 
 
Furthermore, as was demonstrated in Section 3.4, the current publishing and distribution 
structures may very well be altered because of changes brought on by the technology itself, not 
by the copyright being ignored.  Barlow’s type of argument also ignores the fact that he, just like 
any other person, is completely free to forgo the copyright and, rather than sell, give away the 
expression of his ideas.  While it is true that artists under contract with record labels do not have 
this type of freedom, nearly all of these artists freely chose to enter into those agreements.  For 
any artists who did sign their contracts under duress, the legal system offers them a way to 
remedy that situation.  While the Internet offers artists an enhanced means with which to 
disseminate their music, the technology itself is neutral toward the copyright; it is equally capable 
of benefiting artists who want copyright protection as it is artists who wish to forgo it. 
 
A main reason businesses are investing in these technologies is that they allow consumers 
to find what they are looking for with much lower transaction costs, not that the investment will 
make them rich at the expense of consumers.  Therefore, to argue that large record and publishing 
companies want to use copyrights in the digital age to “preserve by law what they can no longer 
sustain by necessity,” is a misstatement.  Additionally, Barlow’s argument overlooks that the 
technology enhances artists’ freedom to choose whether they want copyright protection.  In fact, 
many artists already understand that they will never become a top-selling artist and they create 
music for enjoyment – irrespective of a copyright.  One independent artist on IUMA posted the 
following message: “…many bands are not main stream, and will never get ‘commercial success’ 
(and may not even be looking for it!).  I post my music on the Internet, not to be the next big 
‘band’, but because I like to make music…Most likely out of the 100,000 plus independent artists 
with music on the net, most of us will never go anywhere with our music. This does not make me 
unhappy, because most of the music I like best (on the Internet), (or off the net) is the non-
commercial stuff.”  If Barlow and like-minded individuals do not want to take advantage of 
copyright protection, they do not have to.  But in choosing to forgo this right, they should not also 
infringe on the rights of other individuals to utilize this protection.  While it may be impossible to 
determine how many artists would still create music in the absence of copyrights, history has 
proven that many artists, as well as those investing in them, do want this protection. 
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3.5 The Industry’s Consumers 
 
No discussion of the music industry would be complete without analyzing what sustains 
the industry – its consumers.  As Figure 3-9 shows, since 1993 consumers in the U.S. have spent 
over $10 billion per year on sound recordings, with CDs being the overwhelmingly favored 
format since 1992 (since 1999, CDs have accounted for over 80% of all formats sold each year).  
In fact, since 1991, with the exceptions of a 2.37% decrease from ’96-’97 and a 1.8% decrease 
from ’00-’01, consumers have spent more on sound recordings each year.  While nearly all 
formats other than the full-length CD have fallen out of favor since 1997, the fall of the CD single 
has added to the controversy stirred by Napster.  The RIAA points to the 38.8% drop in CD 
singles sold from ’99-’00 as evidence that record sales have been displaced by file sharing on the 
Internet.  However, based on several key trends, this complaint seems to oversimplify the 
situation.  To begin, from ’99-’00, the number of full length CD units sold actually rose by just 
under 1%, and the number of full-length cassettes sold fell by nearly the same percentage as CD 
singles (about 38%).  Additionally, throughout the 90’s, the CD single has never reached the 
same popularity as the cassette single; more than 80 million cassette singles were sold each year 
from ’92-’94, while the highest ever annual total for CD singles was 66.7 million in ’97.  
Therefore, following the RIAA’s logic of a direct correlation between the drop in CD singles and 
the proliferation of Internet file sharing seems a bit questionable.  These trends could simply 
show that consumers have never become endeared to the single in the CD format.  Regardless of 
favoring the full-length CD format, evidence seems to suggest that the consumers of the 
independents’ music and of the majors’ music possess some very different characteristics. 
 
In fact, many consumers of independent music seem to eschew commercial radio and the 
popular music charts.  To demonstrate these differences, the following two quotes have been 
taken from chat rooms of IUMA: 
 
(1) “Distant Sun has a new experimental industrial/dance track called "Blinding Sun", 
download at http://distantsun.iuma.com ” 
 
(2) “I've [been] looking for true Lo-fi musicians for a long time. By that I mean recorded 
on a 4-track, limited equipment and money, etc. I don't want to hear perfect little songs 
that all sound the same. I want to listen to songs with character, emotion and mistakes. 
YES, mistakes - we are not perfect so why should our music be. Help me bring back 
human characteristics in the monotonous world today. http://www.joshwilton.com” 
  
The genre referred to in the first quote, for example, does not even warrant a listing on the 
popular music charts.  Most popular music fans do not also listen to “experimental 
industrial/dance” music.  In many cases similar to this one, independent music serves only niche 
markets for which, by definition, smaller numbers of consumers exist than for popular music.  As 
for the second quotation, while many independent fans may enjoy it, sales data clearly show that 
most music fans do not want to hear “songs with mistakes.”  If most consumers did enjoy music 
with mistakes, it seems unlikely that the majors would have been able to garner an 83% market 
share by selling music without mistakes – especially given that consumers typically pay $4 to $9 
more for majors’ CDs than independents’.   While the majors’ large market share can be partially 
attributed to their control throughout the distribution chain (see Section 2.3), a key reason for 
their impressive market share is because they sell music that most people want to hear.  Still, 
while a great deal of independent music has a smaller audience, the market does have a way of 
“finding” independent artists with mass appeal. 
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Bands such as “The Dave Matthews Band” and “R.E.M.” are just two examples of artists 
who started out with independents and ended up signing with majors.  Because none of the 
majors thought they had a wide enough audience, these bands initially had no choice but to play 
college campus concerts and secure air time on college radio.  However, since these artists were 
able to use these venues to prove their music appealed to many consumers rather than to a very 
narrow audience, they were eventually able to sign with major labels.  While the majors are 
serving as intermediaries for the artists to reach a wide audience, large investments by labels 
would not be necessary without such mass appeal.  It seems likely that one of the reasons judging 
this appeal is difficult is that consumers’ tastes change.  Even though many of the genres on the 
IUMA charts are not even listed in the study, the RIAA Consumer Profile, available in its entirety 
at www.riaa.org, provides data which supports this idea.29  
 
 While consumers’ most preferred genre over the last decade has been Rock, its share of 
total sales has been slipping (see Figure 3-10).  In 2000, the Rock genre represented just under 
25% of all music sales – considerably lower than its decade high in 1994 of 35%.  The second 
most popular genre in 2000 was Rap/Hip Hop, which captured just under 13% of total sales.  
Since 1991, the genres Rap/Hip Hop, Pop and Country have each bounced back and forth as the 
second most popular genre.  Country rose from a 9.6% share in 1990 to a high of 18.7% in 1993, 
and ended the decade with a 10.8% share.  Pop, on the other hand, had steadily declined from a 
high of 13.7% in 1990 to 9.3% in 1996 only to rise successively over the last few years of the 
decade to claim 10.3% share.  Exhibiting even more volatility, the Rap/Hip Hop genre has 
alternated between increasing and decreasing its market share in almost every year of the ‘90’s.  
The next tier of the genres includes three groups, Religious, Jazz, and Classical, with a 4.8%, 
2.9%, and 2.7% share, respectively.  While Religious music’s slightly higher share seems to be a 
phenomenon of the second half of the decade, the share captured by Jazz and Classical has 
fluctuated around 3% to 4% for the entire decade.  Nonetheless, the trends among consumers’ 
gender and age do exhibit some stability. 
 
Across genres, there has been a fairly even split between male and female purchasers for, 
at least, the last five years.  As for age groups, younger people have accounted for most of the 
purchases for all of the last decade.  For instance, in 2000 almost half of all purchases (44.9%) 
were made by consumers between the ages of 10 and 29, with the heaviest percentage of that 
group being in the 15 to 24 year old range (see www.riaa.org).  The heavy buying from these 
younger age groups is one of the reasons that the industry has been so concerned about the effects 
file sharing is having on their sales.30  
 
Even though the Napster-like services garner most of the publicity, there is actually more 
than one type of “copying” that has the music industry worried.  To begin, copying can be done 
directly by “burning” a CD to a blank CD-R, from either a legitimately purchased CD or from a 
copied version of that CD.  Another form of copying is know as “ripping.”  This process entails 
                                                 
29 Some examples of genres on the IUMA charts which do not appear on the RIAA study (not even in the 
“other” category) are as follows: Progressive Rock, Funk, Surf, Thrash, Rockabilly, and Bluegrass. 
30It is widely held that students on college campuses are heavy users of the Internet and were the principal 
group of Napster users – so much so that much of the statistical evidence in the Napster case involves 
studies of music retailers near college campuses.  Also, a study by CyberAtlas shows that the 67% of 
Internet users are between the ages of 18 and 44.  This study can be found at: 
http://cyberatlas.Internet.com/. 
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copying tracks from legitimately purchased CDs onto the user’s hard drive.  From there, the files 
can be converted to the MP3 format and used in several ways.  Finally, there are the Napster-like 
services where Internet users can download copies of songs directly to their hard drives (for a 
more expansive discussion of copying, see Appendix A). 
 
The direct copying of CDs seems very similar to the once popular act of “dubbing” 
legitimately purchased audio cassette tapes onto blank cassette tapes.  This form of copying, 
when it became widespread in the 70’s/80’s, also resulted in the music industry crying foul.  
However, in addition to this form of home copying being deemed legal under the “fair-use” 
doctrine, the music industry continued to prosper as this form of copying became widespread.  It 
seems likely, therefore, that this form of direct copying – in either its earlier, cassette tape version 
or its newer, CD version – is not harmful to record companies.  In fact, the “indirect 
appropriability” explanation, put forth by Liebowitz (1981), suggests that this form of copying 
actually benefits record companies because it allows them to charge a higher price to those 
consumers actually buying the goods (the high valuation consumers).  Many of the consumers 
performing direct copying, according to this hypothesis, are likely to have been (or still are) low 
valuation consumers who were not going to buy the CDs (or tapes) in the first place.  This 
reasoning shows why it may be difficult to prove/disprove the effect of sharing services on record 
sales – many of the individuals sharing on these services may be those not buying CDs in the first 
place. 
The act of “ripping” also seems to be somewhat innocuous, provided the ripped files are 
not uploaded and shared on the Internet.  By ripping files, consumers can take single tracks from 
legitimately purchased CDs, convert them into the MP3 format, and use them in a variety of 
ways.  For example, the converted files can be used for any of the following reasons: (1) to create 
custom CDs (with only the user’s favorite songs) on a CD burner; (2) to be used as a sort of PC 
jukebox; or (3) to be used in an MP3 player.  While these other forms of copying have received 
added attention lately, the lion’s share of the publicity is still given to Internet file sharing.   
 
Figure 3-9 
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Total Dollar Value: 7,834 9,024 10,047 12,068 12,320 12,534 12,237 13,724 14,585 14,323
in millions (net of returns)
Formats (%):
Full Length CD 38.9 46.5 51.1 58.4 65 68.4 70.2 74.8 83.2 89.3
F.L. Cassettes 49.8 43.6 38 32.1 25.1 19.3 18.2 14.8 8 4.9
Singles (all types) 8.8 7.5 9.2 7.4 7.5 9.3 9.3 6.8 5.4 2.5
Total Units Shipped
in millions (net of returns)
CD 333.3 407.5 495.4 662.1 722.9 778.9 753.1 847 938.9 942.5
CD Single 5.7 7.3 7.8 9.3 21.5 43.2 66.7 56 55.9 34.2
Cassette 360.1 366.4 339.5 345.4 272.6 225.3 172.6 158.5 123.6 76
Cassette Single 69 84.6 85.6 81.1 70.7 59.9 42.2 26.4 14.2 1.3
 
From RIAA 2000 Consumer Profile 
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Figure 3-10  
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Adopted from the 2000 RIAA Consumer Profile 
 
 
3.5.1 Consumers and Internet File Sharing 
 
File sharing on the Internet has stirred controversy throughout the world and, in many 
cases, embittered people against “the music industry.”  When I told one of my junior-level 
students that I was working on digital copyrights in the music industry, his response was 
something akin to “Yeah! Napster rules! Metallica is a bunch of sellouts!”  Metallica is the band 
which named, in a lawsuit, over 335,000 Napster users as illegally copying their songs.  Many 
individuals argue that file sharing services such as Napster are just a more efficient method for 
sharing music than what existed previously.  There is no difference, they argue, between using an 
Internet sharing service and making copies of friends’ cassette tapes and CDs.  These sharing 
proponents are overlooking a major difference, however, because the Internet allows anonymous 
sharing with, theoretically, an unlimited number of people.  The labels argue that allowing 
consumers to share digital files on such a large scale is piracy which negatively affects their sales 
of albums.  Sharing proponents counter by saying that file sharing actually promotes the sales of 
albums because it is tantamount to providing free samples.  These samples, it is argued, allow 
artists to sell more music at higher prices because consumers have more information about the 
music.  In economic terms, the demand curve shifts outward, resulting in both a higher 
equilibrium quantity and price.  While this argument may seem plausible at first, it loses much of 
its credibility when examined more closely. 
 
To begin, the fact that a potential consumer is able to preview the music on an album 
does not guarantee that it will be bought.  In fact, the ability to preview the album may result in 
the opposite outcome.  If, for example, a large number of consumers do not like the samples they 
hear, the demand curve for the album could shift dramatically inward, resulting in a lower 
equilibrium price and quantity.  Consequently, the mere threat of this occurrence could cause 
more resources to be used when creating an album to ensure a “better” finished product, causing 
 
 39
the label’s supply curve to shift inward (a lower equilibrium quantity and a higher equilibrium 
price).  Given the recent trends in consumer buying habits, it is unlikely that a higher equilibrium 
price is an outcome that most record labels and/or artists would welcome.  Still, even if the 
sharing results in a higher price caused by a demand shift (as is normally argued by sharing 
proponents), depending on the degree of substitutability between the shared and the pre-packaged 
goods, the artist may not benefit from the higher price of the pre-packaged good. 
 
If users of file sharing services could only download one or two songs from any given 
album (or clips from songs) before deciding whether to purchase it, perhaps sharing proponents 
would have a solid argument.  In reality, however, users of these services can download each 
song from an album and copy all of them onto a CD – with nearly identical sound quality as the 
pre-packaged CD.  While some music fans would surely want the pre-packaged version of the CD 
as a collectible good, most consumers would probably consider the “home-made” version to be a 
near-perfect substitute.  This situation is analogous to that of hardback vs. paperback books; far 
fewer hardback versions of books are even printed by publishers because of the lower demand for 
the higher priced hardback versions.31  Similarly, it seems unlikely that most individuals 
downloading all the songs from an album would also buy the pre-packaged CD.  Once 
technology advances to the point where most people have broadband connections and can 
download entire albums in only a few minutes, it seems likely that most people would opt for a 
free copy of an album before buying it, especially when the market price for the album is near 
$20.  Similarly, it seems highly unlikely, at best, that individuals would download one digital 
copy of a song for free and then pay for another digital copy of the same song; these two goods 
may be the best example ever of perfect substitutes.  While countless websites have surfaced 
vilifying bands like Metallica and professing the legitimacy of Napster and its successors, I have 
not found any which strengthen their case by directly addressing this issue of substitutability. 
 
In fact, even the pro-Napster site www.verticalgerbil.com lists arguments which weaken 
its position.  In one section, after pointing out how restrictive record labels’ recording contracts 
are, the website says that well known rap artist Chuck D “…believes that Napster can help an 
artist bypass this all, and he calls it direct-to-consumer marketing. There are no hassles of record 
company contracts or fees for marketing, and artists can share their music directly with the public 
at their own discretion.”  While the Internet certainly seems to be on the cusp of providing this 
sort of freedom to artists, these quotations clearly show that not even Chuck D is advocating that 
artists should not be able to sell their music.  Chuck D’s support of Napster-like services is based 
on the technology giving artists more control over their careers.  In fact, a careful read of Chuck 
D’s argument shows that he believes artists should be allowed to share at their own discretion.  
However, since Napster and its successors do not give artists any choice in the matter, bands 
should not be vilified for choosing against sharing their music.  Furthermore, none of these 
arguments offer any suggestions as to why consumers would pay for a digital copy of a song that 
they could also get for free.  Regardless, the idea that top-selling artists would whole-heartedly 
embrace a technology which would prevent them from ever selling their music seems somewhat 
dubious.  Indeed, even some of the artists in IUMA’s chat rooms, where one is likely to find anti-
industry rhetoric, profess that unknown artists do not shun the opportunity to make money.  For 
example, one independent artist posted the following comment on IUMA: 
 
“I guess the goal of many independent music artists is to do both, make  
money, and keep their artistic integrity. There are many successful artists that do this.  
These artists may not be making a million dollars a year, but they do make a living.”   
                                                 
31 Madden (2000). 
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By proliferating free digital copies of artists’ songs, sharing services could, if digital distribution 
becomes widespread, prevent artists from making a living selling their music.  The implication of 
this sort of market, where both free and market priced copies of the same goods exist, is that 
copyrights are unnecessary. 
 
While pro-Napster artists surely would like to have more control over their careers, they 
are not rushing to abolish copyrights.  In fact, as described in Section 3.4.3, artists are actually 
trying to regain control of their copyrights from the labels.  A very important question to be 
answered, then, is at what price would consumers buy music once digital downloading becomes 
the preferred method of purchase (assuming that it does).  Before this new system’s pricing 
structure can be estimated, however, a complete understanding of why file sharing is so popular is 
needed.  While these issues will be studied further in another chapter of this thesis, one reason 
that so many consumers have openly embraced file sharing appears to be because of high CD 
prices. 
 
 Modern consumers are cost conscious; they understand that blank CDs cost less than 
$0.50 each, and they find it hard to believe that record companies need to sell CDs for as much as 
$15 to $18.  Incidentally, one of the main benefits to consumers using the online sharing services 
is that they avoid paying these high prices – a factor which has not received much attention in 
academic journals.32  This price factor is not, however, overlooked by the entrepreneurs starting 
sharing services.  For example, the CEO of FastTrack, the parent company of one of Napster’s 
successors (KaZaA), leaves no doubt about why he thinks these services are so popular.  In a 
recent Wall Street Journal article, he says that “Consumers are making a statement that paying 
$18 for a CD is not the right price.  But the record companies aren’t giving them any alternative.” 
(Weber, 2001)  Even those consumers who purchase pre-packaged CDs seem to be making some 
sort of statement about high prices.  As discussed in Section 3.1, the total percentage of CD sales 
in record stores has been declining over the last ten years, while the portion sold in other stores 
has been steadily increasing.  This category of other stores, interestingly, includes mainly large 
retailers such as Circuit City and Wal-Mart, stores which sell CDs at lower prices than record 
stores.  These retailers frequently use CDs as loss leaders and, in some cases, sell popular CDs for 
just under $10.00.  In fact, the major labels recently suffered a publicity setback after the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) completed its investigation into how the labels tried to discourage such 
pricing. 
 
In response to the lower CD prices at the large retailers, it was alleged, major labels 
pressured record stores to keep prices on certain CDs above a set minimum – thus overcharging 
consumers.  Specifically, the FTC found that the majors threatened to withhold advertising 
dollars from the record stores if they refused to comply with the minimum advertised price 
policies.33  While they admitted no wrongdoing in the settlement, the majors agreed to stop the 
practice.  Regardless, the negative publicity from this FTC investigation surely added to the 
                                                 
32 Instead of formally examining the reasons for the popularity of sharing, nearly all scholarly articles focus 
on whether sharing will benefit or harm the public and/or the company that holds the copyright.  
Incidentally, many of the articles find that small scale sharing could benefit the copyright holders and the 
public.  These articles are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
33 The practice of withholding advertising dollars, in and of itself, is not illegal.  Had the record labels also 
refused to allow record stores to carry CDs as a punishment for non-compliance, however, then they would 
have been committing an anti-trust violation.  Not only was this sort of refusal never alleged by the FTC, 
but the majors did not admit any wrongdoing in their settlement with the government.  Instead, they agreed 
to stop the practice. 
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public perception that the major labels were “overcharging” for CDs.  Furthermore, the fact that 
the industry itself claims to be very inefficient certainly does not help to alleviate this negative 
view of the majors.  For example, according to Cary Sherman, general counsel for RIAA, “It’s 
the rare successes that finance the 90% that fail to make it.  Having the ability to capitalize on the 
catalog of survivors…is what makes the system continue to work.” (Harris, 2002)  While I have 
found very little data to support claims like these, they appear to be widely accepted by industry 
professionals.34  This sort of inefficiency, most likely, adds to the perception that labels are 
charging “artificially” high prices on popular CDs. 
 
While it is difficult to use one figure to represent the price of “a CD,” an examination of 
Figure 3-11 reveals that average prices for full-length CDs have been on a fairly steady upward 
trend over the last ten years; since a small decline in 1996 (to just over $11.00), the average CD 
price has risen annually through year 2000 (to $13.57).  Still, there are several caveats that should 
be adhered to when examining these figures.  For example, while different genres are priced 
differently and different stores price their CDs differently, these averages consist of all CDs 
shipped to all types of stores.  Nonetheless, the widespread popularity of sharing services, as well 
as the increased number of purchases made in discount retail stores,  certainly seems to suggest 
that consumers would like to pay less for CDs.  The implications of these developments for the 
music industry’s future pricing structure will be examined in a separate chapter to this thesis. 
 
Figure 3-11
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Total Dollar Value (All) 7,834 9,024 10,047 12,068 12,320 12,534 12,237 13,724 14,585 14,323
millions (net of returns)
% of Full Length CDs 38.90% 46.50% 51.10% 58.40% 65.00% 68.40% 70.20% 74.80% 83.20% 89.30%
Dollar Value of FL CDs 3047.5 4196.16 5133.81 7047.71 8008.2 8573.1 8590.2 10265 12134.3 12790.4
CDs Shipped (net) 333.3 407.5 495.4 662.1 722.9 778.9 753.1 847 938.9 942.5
Average CD Price $9.14 $10.30 $10.36 $10.64 $11.08 $11.01 $11.41 $12.12 $12.92 $13.57
 
 2000 Consumer Profile 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
The current structure of the music industry is a combination of the oligopoly and 
monopo s of 
 
 national 
r 
                                                
Source: RIAA
 
listic competition models.  The industry consists of five major labels and thousand
independent labels (known as independents).  While both the majors and the independents offer
the same intermediary functions to artists, the majors have a clear advantage over the 
independents in the following two areas: (1) national/international distribution; and (2)
promotion on commercial radio.  While these advantages may contribute to a higher degree of 
monopoly power for the majors than the independents, the situation is much more complex.  Fo
 
34 An example of the acceptance of this idea is found in the Krasilovsky & Shemel, 2000, p. 81: “…85% of 
recordings released in the U.S. annually that, according to the RIAA, fail to make a profit.”  While they do 
not site any data, they also accept that this is a reasonable proposition.  The context of Krasilovsky & 
Shemel’s use was in reference to counterfeiters not having to carry the burden of 85% of the records that 
fail to make a profit.  This same sort of sentiment is even seen in the chat room postings of websites like 
IUMA.  Also, Billboard Magazine’s Market Watch reports do, occasionally, list annual sales by “current, 
catalog, and deep catalog,” but the data is solely based on Soundscan data and is not available (from 
Billboard) as an historical data set. 
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instance, since nationwide distribution requires more resources than local distribution, it should 
be expected that nationally distributed CDs cost more than locally distributed CDs.  Furthermore
national distribution is inherently riskier than local distribution; all of the companies in the 
distribution chain are investing more funds because they are betting that many more consum
will find and buy the CDs. 
 
, 
ers 
ince this larger risk requires a greater return for all of the companies involved, 
national while a 
, as predicted, digital downloading on the Internet does become the preferred method of 
distribu
ghts 
ue 
t wish to 
wo additional important copyright issues for the future of the industry are as follows: 
(1) whe
 
on 
made 
 is certainly possible, therefore, that these technologies could dramatically change the 
structur
rs 
S
ly distributed CDs should be priced higher than locally distributed CDs.  In fact, 
more complete analysis is needed, it appears that CD prices are quite similar for both top-selling 
independent artists and top-selling major artists.  This evidence would also support the idea that 
how much consumers “like” the music, measured (ex-post) by how many albums are sold, is an 
important factor in determining the price that can be charged for a CD.  Another factor which 
cannot be ignored is that most niche markets in the music industry are served by independent 
labels.  Since fewer consumers buy these CDs in the first place, it is not surprising that many of 
these CDs sell for less.  In addition to the copyright, the economic factors discussed above are 
key contributors to the pricing structure of CDs.  Still, contrary to what some have argued, the 
technological changes the industry faces make the copyright an essential tool for this market to 
continue functioning properly. 
 
If
tion, it appears unlikely that artists would be able to sell their music in the absence of 
enforceable copyrights.  Since digital copies of songs on sharing services and digital copies 
offered for sale by artists and/or record labels are near perfect substitutes, enforceable copyri
could be necessary for this market to exist.  Furthermore, given that consumers have continued to 
buy larger numbers of CDs year after year (goods which are not considered necessities), it seems 
clear that there is a thriving market for sound recordings.  In the year 2000, for example, 
consumers spent over $13 billion on nearly 1 billion CDs.  Therefore, it is specious to arg
either of the following positions: (1) the copyright has harmed music consumers; or (2) 
copyrights cannot benefit artists.  If artists selling digital copies of their own music do no
use copyright protection, then they do not have to.  However, if they expect any third party to 
invest in their music, then it is essential that they use copyright protection in the digital 
environment. 
 
T
ther artists will be able to retain the copyright for their works; and (2)  whether record 
labels will be forced to license digital copies of their current catalogs to independent websites. 
Evidence suggests that the new technologies are already allowing artists to retain their copyrights, 
and artist groups are already pressuring Congress to implement compulsory licensing for digital 
download services.  Compulsory licensing, along with the proliferation of high-speed Internet 
connections, appear to be two of the most important factors in how quickly the digital distributi
method will overtake the traditional method.  Provided that secure formats for digital downloads 
can be utilized, it appears that the tremendous gains in productive efficiency from switching to 
digital distribution all but ensure that this change in methods will, eventually, take place.  
Incidentally, as long as laws against illegal copying are strictly enforced and/or copying is 
bothersome for the average consumer, utilizing secure formats may not be an insurmountable 
hurdle for the new distribution method. 
 
It
e of the music industry.  Since practically anyone, even the artists themselves, would be 
able to distribute their music directly to consumers, the future structure of the industry will 
probably shift to a more competitive one.  As a result, neither the independents nor the majo
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would have an inherent advantage by being able to offer an artist nationwide distribution; artist
could distribute nationwide on their own. 
 
s 
onsequently, one possible scenario for the future is that record companies will form 
more of
portant 
 for 
efit 
C
 a partner-type relationship with artists, focusing mainly on the marketing and 
promotional aspects of the artists’ careers.  While the Internet may yet prove to be an im
tool for self promotion by artists, it appears that helping consumers “find” artists’ music will 
remain a significant task for the record company of the future.  Still, as long as secure formats
digital copies can be utilized, it appears that the artists and the consumers will reap most of the 
benefits of the new technologies.  Artists will benefit by gaining more control over how their 
recordings get distributed and, therefore, a larger share of sales revenues.  Consumers will ben
by paying lower prices and being able to purchase only the songs they like.  Figure 3-12 
summarizes the major conclusions of this analysis. 
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igure 3-12F  
 
Compulsory licensing for digital downloads
Enforceable copyrights
Secure music file formats
Proliferation of broadband Internet connections
Less concentration in the industry; artists may distribute on their own
Record companies serve as promotional intermediaries
Retail music prices should fall as industry becomes less concentrated
Keys to the Realization of This Future Market Structure
Majors' distribution advantage will disappear
Artists gain more control over their careers
Consumers gain the ability to purchase only the songs they li
Resulting Likely Future Market Structure
Majors have advantage in nationwide distribution and commercial 
Price differences between top-selling independent and major artists 
Financial risk and other economic factors account for the pricing 
Most Significant Effects of Digital Download Technology
Current Market Structure
Five major labels and thousands of 
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Chapter 4, Consumer Demand and Firm Profit Maximization 
 
4.0 Introduction to Model and Basic Assumptions 
 
 
                                                
The derivation of the model is divided into two chapters (Ch. 4 and 5).  Chapter 4 focuses 
on the relationship between the consumer and the label, and chapter 5 examines the interactions 
between the label and the artist.  Accordingly, the revenue-sharing arrangement between the firm 
and the artist is taken as exogenously given in Chapter 4, and then endogenized in Chapter 5.  
 
4.1  The Firm 
 
The firm in this model is assumed to be a major label, and the product supplied to 
consumers is viewed as “music,” a homogenous product without any references to a particular 
genre.  Not only do both independent and major labels carry out the various functions of the label 
in a similar fashion, but independents are comparable to the majors’ individual labels in that they 
both sell music in a fairly small number of genres.1  By assuming the firm sells a homogenous 
product, we are implying that consumers of each music genre typically buy only from within that 
genre.  Consequently, this assumption implies that changes in the prices of other types of music 
do not affect the demand for this particular type of music.  Since most consumers of a particular 
style of music do tend to buy from within that particular genre, we take this to be a reasonable 
simplifying assumption.2 
 
The firm is taken to be a profit maximizing monopolist.  Given the current structure of 
the music industry, treating the firm as a monopolist may seem like an oversimplification.  
However, since we are examining one firm which sells one type of music to a set of consumers, 
this monopoly assumption is reasonable.3 
 
The firm’s cost structure consists of fixed costs (recording and promotional costs) and 
variable costs (managing, manufacturing, and distributing costs).  Given the demand curve for 
music CDs, denoted by y(p), the firm is assumed to choose the price p (of a CD) so as to 
maximize the following profit expression.  
 
π = (1-µA)(py(p)) – cy(p) – F     (1) 
 
In (1), µA denotes the artist’s negotiated share of album sales (taken exogenously in (1)), p is the 
price of the CD, y is the quantity of CDs sold, c represents the manufacturing, managing and 
 
1 While there are minor differences across genres, these differences are quite similar whether a major or an 
independent is producing the music (see Chapter 3). 
2 Furthermore, most consumers purchase music in the same format, the CD.  Since the “single” in the CD 
format has never really gained widespread acceptance in the market, and is basically being phased out, the 
product sold to consumers in this model is assumed to be in the format of the full-length CD. 
3 Regardless of the industry’s structure, each label, through copyrights, always has a monopoly on, at the 
very least, a particular version of a song/album.  This idea is generalized in the model such that the firm has 
a monopoly on the homogenous product “music.”  
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distribution expenses per unit produced, and F represents the promotional and recording 
expenses.   
 
The firm is faced with a given copy technology: instead of purchasing music as CDs 
supplied by the firm, a fraction of the market may copy instead.  Some individuals may also 
choose neither to buy or copy – this will be examined further below.    
 
4.2  The Consumer 
 
Consumers are able to satisfy their taste for music through both purchasing CDs and 
obtaining copies.  While there are several forms of copying (see Appendix A), all of these are 
assumed to fall into one category of “copying,” with copyright compliance costs treated as part of 
transaction costs.4  This assumption is reasonable because the consumer’s choice to buy or copy 
will depend on the value that the consumer places on the CD and the transaction costs incurred by 
making the copy.  Regardless of which form of copying takes place, the higher the price of the 
CD relative to a consumer’s transaction costs, the more likely that consumer is to copy, and vice 
versa.  In our model, transaction costs include all marginal opportunity costs associated with 
copying.5  For instance, the transaction costs for copying include both the opportunity cost of 
time for making the copy and of learning about the copy technology.6   
 
Based on the above assumptions, a Hotelling-type model of spatial differentiation is used 
to illustrate the consumer’s choice and to derive demand functions.  In this model, consumers are 
distributed uniformly along a line segment of length one, with each consumer identified by the 
consumer’s cost type, x ∈[0,1].  At the extremes, the consumer of type x = 0 is one who has no 
ability to grasp the copy technology, while a consumer of type x = 1 is one who grasps the 
technology perfectly.7  Consumers can buy music as CDs at price p or they may copy at 
transaction cost t(1-x) (>0), which reflects the “distance” of the consumer of type x from those 
who grasp the copying technology perfectly (x = 1)8.  Additionally, a taste parameter, θ, is used 
to show that consumers with high preferences for music will consume large quantities of music, 
and those with low preferences for music will consume relatively smaller quantities.  The 
parameter θ is distributed uniformly between zero and one.   
 
The parameters qCD and qCOPY are introduced to denote the quality of the CD and the 
copy, respectively.  Both qCD and qCOPY are assumed to be along the interval from zero to one.  In 
the case of qCD, quality represents any set of characteristics which only the firm can include with 
the CD, with a value of one being the highest quality and a value of zero being the lowest 
                                                 
4 As will be seen below, this assumption works well in the current state of the music market but becomes 
troublesome when digital copying on the Internet is the dominant mode of copying. 
5 Since adding a fixed component to the transaction cost of copying does not change any of the implications 
of the model, they are taken to be zero to make the model more tractable.  Appendix B demonstrates that 
the alternate model, with these fixed costs included, results in identical implications.  
6 Naturally, these costs would vary across consumers.  E.g., a freshman in college would have a much 
lower opportunity cost of time than an executive. 
7 In reality, we could expect these numbers to be very close to zero or one, but not exactly equal to either of 
the “perfect” categories.  For example, even a consumer with “perfect” knowledge of the copy technology 
will still have a small opportunity cost associated with making the copy. 
8 Baake and Oechssler (1997) show that equilibrium solutions in Hotelling-type models may not exist even 
when consumers have quadratic transaction costs.  The issue of quadratic transaction costs of copying is 
addressed further in Appendix C. 
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quality.9  In the case of qCOPY, quality represents the degree of substitutability between the original 
and the copy.  For this parameter, a value of one represents a perfect substitute for a CD (a “high” 
quality copy) and a value of zero represents a poor substitute for a CD (a “low” quality copy).  
Additionally, the parameter q will be used (without superscripts) to denote the difference in the 
quality between the CD and the copy, i.e., q =  (qCD - qCOPY), with q > 0.10  It is assumed that all 
consumers would place a lower value on a “bad” copy (one that hisses, for example) and all place 
a higher value on a “good” copy.  Quality thus serves to vertically differentiate CD’s from copies 
and “good” copies from “bad” copies. 
  
Given the above assumptions, the consumer’s utility function from choosing to buy, 
copy, or stay out of the market is taken to be of the form11 
 
   
neither  doesconsumer   theif                                0
 copies,consumer   theif      )1(
 CD,  thebuysconsumer   theif                 



−−
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= xtq
pq
U COPYx
CD
x
x θ
θ
  (2) 
 
In the first case, the consumer whose cost type and taste parameter are x and θx pays the 
price p for any CD purchased.  By purchasing the CD, the consumer obtains the surplus utility 
, which is affected by the quality of the CD, qpqCDx −θ CD.  If qCD = 1, then the consumer’s 
utility is only reduced by the price of the CD.  In the case of the consumer who copies, the 
consumer incurs the cost t(1-x), which depends on the consumer’s cost type.  When x approaches 
one the consumer’s copying costs shrink, and when x approaches zero they rise.12  The 
consumer’s utility when copying is reduced by any lack of quality of the copy, with qCOPY = 1 
when the copy is a perfect substitute for the CD and qCOPY = 0 when the two are completely 
different. 
 
When the consumer maximizes the utility function (2) so as to decide whether to 
purchase a CD or copy the music, the choice will depend on the price of the CD, p (taken 
exogenously by the consumer), and the (exogenous) parameters t(1-x), θx , qCD, and qCOPY, 
representing the level of transaction costs incurred when copying, the consumer’s taste for music, 
the quality of the CD and the quality of the copy, respectively.13 
 
                                                 
9 E.g., the firm can include the original artwork of the artists and, perhaps, include dual formats on the 
original CD.  While omitting dual formats or using “bad” artwork would give the CD lower quality, we 
would not expect the CD quality to be zero.  In fact, the assumption is made (see above) that qCD >qCOPY. 
10 If q = 0, the two goods are perfect substitutes.  However, even in the case of two identical digital goods, 
one offered by the firm and one obtained through copying, we could expect some small, positive difference, 
perhaps from some nominal feeling of guilt from consuming an illegal copy.  Since both qCD and qCOPY are 
between zero and one, and since we are restricting q to being positive, we are also requiring that qCD > 
qCOPY . 
11 The utility function in (2) is a modified version of the one found in the basic vertical differentiation 
model of Tirole (2001), p. 96.  Analogous versions of this utility function are also discussed in Shy (1995), 
pp. 150-163. 
12 This notion is analogous to distance in the original Hotelling (1929) model.  Instead of representing the 
distance from a store, x now represents the cost type of the consumer, with x=0 representing someone who 
cannot grasp the copy technology, and x=1 representing someone who grasps it perfectly. 
13 All variables and parameters represent a per unit cost distance from zero or one.   
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If the quality difference between the CD and the copy, q, is close to zero (the CD and the 
copy are very close substitutes), then the consumer’s choice will depend largely on which cost, p 
or t(1-x), is smaller.  This notion corresponds to the standard interpretation of the (linear) 
Hotelling model in which the consumer buys from the least cost supplier of a (homogenous) 
product.  In this case, those consumers whose cost type is close to zero are likely to buy, and 
those whose cost type is close to one are likely to copy.   
 
When qCOPY = 0 (the goods are completely different) the utility from copying is negative, 
and the consumer buys a CD instead of copying.  The copy would not, in this case, supply the 
consumer with the “music” that the consumer wishes to consume.  We can also expect that some 
consumers will neither buy nor copy; these cases will be fully explored below. 
 
 
4.3  Critical values of θ and x 
 
By setting the utilities of the buying and copying consumers equal, the following critical 
value of the taste parameter, θ, is obtained for a given x, 
 
q
xtp
x
)1(ˆ −−=θ      (3) 
 
where q = qCD - qCOPY (q > 0).  All consumers of type x whose taste parameter is larger than this 
critical value will buy a CD, and those whose θ  is smaller than but larger than  t(1-x)/qxθˆ COPY 
will copy.  That is, consumers will not copy if their taste parameter is less than the quality 
adjusted cost of copying; for these consumers, music is not worth even the cost of acquiring the 
copy.   
 
If the critical value increases, more consumers of type x have a taste parameter less 
than , so more will choose to copy and fewer will buy CDs.  An examination of equation (3) 
reveals that  will increase if the price of the CD ( p) increases, the cost of copying (t) 
decreases, or the difference in the CD and copy quality (q) decreases.
xθˆ
xθˆ
xθˆ
θˆ
14  Alternatively, if the 
critical value  decreases, more consumers have a taste parameter greater than , and CD 
buying will increase.  When the price of the CD ( p) decreases, the cost of copying (t) increases, 
or the difference in the CD and copy quality (q) increases,  will decrease.  This suggests that, 
in order to increase the number of consumers who will buy CDs across consumer types, the firm 
should attempt to reduce the critical taste parameter, , by either reducing the price of the CD, 
increasing the cost of copying (perhaps by altering its copy protection techniques), or increasing 
the difference in the quality of the CD and the copy. 
x xθˆ
xθˆ
xθˆ
  
Similarly, the utilities of the copying and buying consumers can be set equal to each other 
so as to solve for a critical value of x, the cost type of the consumer, given the taste parameter θ.  
The resulting point of indifference, x*, is as follows 
 
t
tpq
x x
+−= θ*      (4) 
                                                 
14 All partial derivates not in the main text are included in a derivation section, Appendix D. 
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where q = qCD - qCOPY.  All consumers whose cost type exceeds x* will copy, and those whose 
cost type parameter is smaller than x* will buy (x* represents the cost type where the utility from 
buying a CD is equal to the utility from copying).  Therefore, as x* decreases, more consumers 
will have a cost type greater than x*, so more will copy.  On the other hand, when x* increases, 
more consumers will have a cost type less than x*, so more will buy CDs.  An examination of 
equation (4) shows that, for a given θ ,  copying will increase if the price of the CD increases or if 
the quality difference between the CD and the copy, q, decreases.  Also, if there is no difference 
in the quality of the CD and the copy (q = 0), x* increases as the transaction cost of copying ( t ) 
is increased; consumers will then buy more and copy less.  This point of indifference is 
represented graphically in Figure 4-1A. 
 
Figure 4-1A 
 
     Utility   
              
                                                                           θqCOPY 
                                                                            
 
                                                                           θqCD - p 
                                                      
           θqCOPY - t 
    x*      x  
  0          Buy CD        Copy       1 
 
 
 Figure 4-1A illustrates the choice of consumers whose taste parameter is equal to a given 
θ.  The vertical axis represents utility and the horizontal axis represents the cost type x∈[0,1].  
The solid horizontal line shows the utility surplus that a consumer of type x receives from buying 
a CD, given by θqCD - p.  The solid upward sloping line shows the utility surplus a consumer of 
type x receives from copying.  This line has an intercept of θqCOPY - t when x = 0, and of θqCOPY 
when x = 1.  In other words, consumers completely unable to grasp the copy technology have 
their surplus from copying reduced by the full transaction cots, t, and those able to perfectly grasp 
the copy technology are able to enjoy the full surplus of the copy, θqCOPY.  All consumers whose 
cost type x is smaller than the critical value x* receive more surplus from buying than copying, 
and those whose cost type x is larger than x* receive more surplus from copying than buying.  
 
The effect of an increase in the taste parameter θ is illustrated by the dotted lines in 
Figure 4-1A.  When θ increases, both of the lines depicting the consumer surplus shift upward.  
These upward shifts reflect the increase in consumer surplus from both buying and copying when 
consumers’ taste for music rises.  However, given the assumption that the quality of the CD 
remains higher than the quality of the copy, i.e., qCD > qCOPY, the utility from buying a CD will 
increase more than the utility from copying, which means that the intersection of the dotted lines, 
defining the new critical value x*, will be higher, indicating that more CDs would be bought 
when θ is higher.15 
  
 
                                                 
15 Thus, we would expect that the firm would try to increase the taste parameter by, perhaps, increasing its 
amount of advertising and promoting or finding better artists. 
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However, if the taste parameter, θ,  is low enough, the horizontal line (representing the 
buy utility, θqCD - p) lies below the horizontal axis.  In this case, consumers choose between not 
consuming music at all and copying.  Here, by setting the utility of copying equal to zero (the 
utility from the choice of neither buying nor copying), a new critical value for the taste parameter, 
θ, is found to be  
COPYx q
xt )1(ˆ −=θ .      (5) 
This new critical value, , splits the consumers into those who neither buy nor copy and 
those who copy (for a given cost type, x).  Those consumers of a given cost type, x, whose taste 
parameter, θ, exceeds this critical value (5) will copy, and those with θ  less than this critical 
value (5) will neither buy nor copy.  Equation (5) is positively related to the transaction cost of 
copying, t, and negatively related to the quality of the copy, q
xθˆ
COPY.  So, as either the transaction 
cost of copying rises or the quality of the copy falls, the critical taste parameter (5) will rise, 
indicating that fewer consumers will copy and more will stay out of the market altogether.  We 
can figuratively express consumers’ choices with this lower θ value in Figure 4-1B, a modified 
version of Figure 4-1A. 
 
Figure 4-1B 
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 θqCOPY - t          x*    
            
      θqCD – p, <0 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 4-1B, the copy utility (represented by θqCOPY - t when x =0 and θqCOPY when x 
=1) is expressed as an upward sloping line and the utility from buying a CD (represented by θqCD 
– p) is the horizontal line below the x axis (the utility from buying a CD is negative).  The new 
point of indifference, x*, is found by setting the utility of the copying consumers equal to the 
utility of those choosing to neither buy nor copy, i.e., θqCOPY - t(1-x) = 0.  Therefore, this point of 
indifference represents the consumers who are indifferent toward copying and staying completely 
out of the market (for a given θ) and is represented by the following expression. 
 
  
t
qtx
COPYθ−=*      (6) 
 
Consumers whose cost type, x, exceeds this critical value will copy, and those whose cost 
type is less than x* will stay out of the market completely.  This point of indifference (6) is 
positively related to the transaction cost of copying, t, and negatively related to the quality of the 
copy, qCOPY.  Therefore, if the transaction cost of copying rises, x* will increase, indicating that 
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fewer consumers will copy.  Alternatively, if the quality of the copy rises, x* will decrease, 
indicating that more consumers will copy. 
 
4.4 Illustration of Market Demands 
 
We can use the utility expressions of the three groups of consumers (those who buy, 
those who copy, and those who do neither) to illustrate the market demands for CDs and copying 
for all pairs of taste parameter, θ, and cost type, x.  Figure 4-2A shows the regions of CD 
purchasing, copying, and no consumption of music in any form, corresponding to Figures 4-1A 
and 4-1B. 
 
The upward sloping line in Figure 4-2A is obtained by setting the utility of buying and 
copying equal to each other (equation (3)); this line separates the choices of buying and copying 
music from each other for the complete range of cost types, x.  When the taste parameter θ  is 
greater than the critical value identified by the upward sloping line, for any cost type x, the 
consumer will buy the CD rather than copy. On the other hand, below this line, consumers will 
choose to copy, unless their taste for music is so low that they forgo consumption altogether. 
 
By setting the utility of copying equal to zero (the utility of neither buying nor copying), 
as in equation (5), we obtain the downward sloping line in Figure 4-2A. This line divides the 
consumers, for any cost type x, into those who will copy music (located above the downward 
sloping line) and those will not consume music at all (below the line).  
 
As is clear from Figure 4-2A, the size of the regions in which consumers buy or copy 
music or do not consume music at all depends on the magnitude of the ratios t / qCOPY  and ( p – t ) 
/ q.  These magnitudes determine the intercepts of the two lines on the vertical axis. This 
observation indicates that the demand for copying depends on the quality adjusted cost of 
copying, , i.e., whether this quality adjusted cost of copying is greater than, equal to, or 
less than the quality adjusted cost difference of buying over copying, (
/ COPYt q
) /p t q− .  Figure 4-2A is 
drawn assuming that  is less than / COPYt q ( ) /p t q− . 
 
 
Figure 4-2A 
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4.4.1  Market Demand When  = ( )/ COPYt q /p t q−  
 
When t q  = (/ COPY ) /p t q− , the two lines in Figure 4-2A cut each other on the (vertical) 
θ axis.  This means that a consumer of cost type x = 0 is indifferent between buying, copying, and 
doing neither.  Figure 4-2B illustrates the resulting demand pattern. 
 
Figure 4-2B 
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2.4.2  Market Demand When    > ( )/ COPYt q /p t q−  
 
If t q   > / COPY ( ) /p t q−  the difference in the quality of the CD and the copy is such that 
consumers get so much less quality (per cost unit) from copying that they will either buy or stay 
out of the market all together. 
 
This case seems rather unrealistic because for it to occur the quality of copies (per cost 
unit) must be grossly inferior to the quality of CDs, a condition which is no longer present in the 
market today.  One of the main reasons that copying has become so popular is that music of 
nearly identical quality to originally produced CDs can be obtained for a much lower cost than 
the originals.16   
 
Therefore, it seems plausible that many consumers copying music files on the internet in 
recent years may have been from the group of consumers in the “neither buy or copy” region.  
The drastic improvement in copying technology may have been sufficiently large to bring these 
consumers into the market as copiers, but their taste for music may not have been high enough for 
them to become music buyers.  Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, Figure 4-2C illustrates 
the case where t q   > / COPY ( ) /p t q− . 
  
In Figure 4-2C the point of indifference (point A) is such that consumers are indifferent 
between buying, copying, and doing neither; i.e., the utility from each choice is zero.  Since the 
lines representing the buy and copy utilities cross at some cost type between 0 and 1, there is an 
additional demand region to examine (the triangle adjacent to the θ axis).  By setting the buy 
utility equal to zero, we find that this region is separated by a horizontal line equal to p / qCD.  In 
 
                                                 
16 Some may even argue that the quality of the copies is greater than that of the original because the copy 
can be used to create new CDs with individual songs specifically picked by the consumer. 
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this region, consumers with a taste parameter, θ, above this horizontal line will buy CDs, and 
those with a taste parameter below the line will choose to stay out of the market.  
 
 
Figure 4-2C 
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By using the information in Figures 4-2A and 4-2B, the market demands for music CD’s 
and copying can be derived (we will not consider the case in Figure 4-2C).  
 
4.5  Formal Equations for Demand for CDs  
 
Since any consumer with a cost type below the critical value  x* defined in equation (4) 
will buy a CD rather than copy, equation (4) represents the proportion of consumers that will buy 
a CD for a given price, p, quality difference, q, transaction cost, t, and taste parameter, θ (as long 
as θ  > ( p – t ) / q).17  Therefore, we obtain the following individual demand function for buying 
CDs, given θ : 
  Demand for CDs = 
t
qpt θ+−
.     (7) 
    
An examination of equation (7) shows that the demand for CDs is negatively related to the price 
of the CD, p,  positively related to the difference in quality of the CD and the copy, q, and, as 
long as q= 0, positively related to the transaction cost of copying, t.     
 
Since θ is a random variable uniformly distributed from zero to one, in order to obtain the 
market demand for CDs, equation (7) must be integrated with respect to θ.  It has already been 
shown that consumers with a very low θ will not buy music at all.  Therefore, the lower 
integration limit for equation (7) is found from the requirement that the demand for CDs is 
nonnegative (i.e., the taste parameter, θ, must be at least as large as( p – t ) / q).  Thus, the 
following market demand function for CDs is obtained. 
 
                                                 
17 When the buy utility and copy utility in equation (2) are set equal to each other and solved for a critical 
taste parameter, θ, we learn that the minimum value for θ is p-t/q (by setting x=0) instead of zero.  If the 
value of θ were less than p-t/q, the demand for CDs would be negative. 
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 Market Demand for CDs = ( )21
2
1 tpq
qt
d
t
qpt
q
tp
+−=+−∫
−
θθ ≡ yCD  (8) 
 
Since the upper integration limit for equation (8) is one, we now have the restriction that 
the quality adjusted difference between the price and the transaction cost is less than one, i.e.,  p – 
t /q < 1.  Stated differently, this restriction says that the difference between the price and the 
transaction cost is less than or equal to the difference in quality between the CD and the copy, i.e., 
p – t  q.≤ 18  Equation (8) is represented graphically in Figures 4-2A and 4-2B, and equation (8) 
sums up all of the individual demands for buying CDs.  
 
4.6 Market Demand for Copies  
 
 Since any consumer with a cost type above the critical value  x* derived from Figure 4-
1B will copy rather than stay out of the market, the complement of equation (6) represents the 
proportion of consumers that will copy for a given copy quality, qCOPY, transaction cost, t, and 
taste parameter, θ .  So, for a given θ, the following individual demand is obtained for those who 
choose copying over staying out of the market. 
 
  Demand for copies 
t
qCOPYθ−−1 t=       (9) 
 
In the cases illustrated on Figures 4-2A and 4-2B, demand for copies results from those 
values of the taste parameter, θ, between the two straight lines (whose intersection with the 
vertical axis depends on the magnitudes of t / qCOPY  and ( p – t ) / q). There are thus multiple 
regions to consider when summing the individual demands.   
 
First, so as to separate those who choose copying over staying out of the market, we 
integrate the lowest region from zero to .  Then, we have to account for θ values 
between t q  and 
/ COPYt q
/ COPY ( ) /p t q− , as well as those between ( ) /p t q−  and one.  Integrating all 
these regions, we obtain the following market demand function.  
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t
qptdd
t
qt
q
tp
q
tp
q
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2
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However, we still have to consider the case illustrated in Figure 4-2B, where the quality 
adjusted cost of the copy is equal to the quality adjusted cost difference between buying and 
                                                 
18 In the model, the variable for price, p, and the parameters for transaction costs of copying, t, and quality 
difference between the CD and the copy, q, each represent a per unit cost distance from 1, the cost type 
(location) of a consumer who perfectly understands the copy technology.  Therefore, this restriction does 
not detract from the model’s usefulness. 
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copying; i.e., t q  = / COPY ( ) /p t q−
) /
.  Again, we start by separating those who choose copying 
over staying out of the market by integrating the lowest region from zero to .  Now, 
however, we can account for all other copying consumers by integrating from  to one 
(since  = 
/ COPYt q
/ COt q PY
/ COt q PY ( p t q− ).  Therefore, the following market demand function is obtained 
Market Demand for copies = θθθθ d
t
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4.7 Partial Derivatives of the Demand Functions 
  
The demand for CDs given in equation (8) responds negatively to a change in the price of 
the CD, p, positively to a change in the quality difference of the copy and the CD, q, and 
positively to a change in the transaction cost of copying, t (assuming that q >0 and p – t  q).  
These changes can be seen below in equations (12), (13) and (14), respectively. 
≤
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The negative relationship between the price of CDs, p, and the demand for CDs, yCD, 
corresponds with the standard relationship between the price of a good and its quantity 
demanded.  Given the assumption that the quality of the CD remains higher than the quality of the 
copy, i.e.,  qCD > qCOPY, the positive relationship between the quality difference of the copy and 
the CD, q , and the demand for CDs, yCD, is as expected.  As the quality difference, q, rises, the 
goods become less substitutable because the quality of the CD improves relative to the quality of 
the copy, and vice versa.  Given the additional assumption that the difference between the price 
and the transaction cost is less than the difference in quality between the CD and the copy ( p – t 
 q), equation (14) exhibits a positive relationship between the transaction cost of copying, t, and 
the demand for CDs, y
≤
CD. 
 
 While the same inferences can be drawn from the copy demands in both equations (10) 
and (11), when t q  is either less than or equal to (/ COPY ) /p t q− , respectively, the partial 
derivatives for both cases are derived.  First, equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) show the partial 
derivatives of the demand for copies, yCOPY, from equation (10), when t q  < (/ COPY ) /p t q− .  
Assuming that p – t  q, these equations show that the demand for copies, y≤ COPY, is positively 
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related to the price of the CD, p, and the quality of the copy, qCOPY, and negatively related to the 
quality difference of the CD and the copy, q and the transaction cost of copying, t. 
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Equation (15) shows that the demand for copies, yCOPY, is positively related to the price of 
the CD, p, and equation (18) demonstrates that the demand for copies, yCOPY, is negatively related 
to the transaction cost of copying, t.  Since the CD and the copy serve as substitute goods, the 
positive relationship between the price of the CD, p, and the demand for copies, yCOPY, is as 
expected.  Likewise, since the transaction cost of copying, t, represents the “price” of a copy, the 
negative relationship between t and the demand for copies, yCOPY, is as expected. 
 
Equation (16) shows the positive relationship between the demand for copies, yCOPY, and 
the quality of the copy, qCOPY, and equation (17) gives the negative relationship between the 
demand for copies and the quality difference of the copy and the CD, q.  These relationships are 
also as expected since an increase in the quality of the copy, qCOPY , would make the copy a better 
substitute for the CD, and an increase in the quality difference of the copy and the CD, q, means 
that the CD has a higher quality relative to the copy. 
 
Next, equations (19), (20), (21) and (22) show the partial derivatives of the demand for 
copies, yCOPY, from equation (11), when t q  = (/ COPY ) /p t q− .  Assuming that 0 , 
these equations show that the demand for copies, y
1/ ≤≤ COPYqt
COPY, is positively related to the price of the 
CD, p, and the quality of the copy, qCOPY, and negatively related to the quality difference of the 
CD and the copy, q and the transaction cost of copying, t. 
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Equation (19) shows that the demand for copies, yCOPY, is positively related to the price of 
the CD, p, and equation (22) demonstrates that the demand for copies, yCOPY, is negatively related 
to the transaction cost of copying, t.  Again, since the CD and the copy serve as substitute goods, 
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and since the transaction cost of copying, t, represents the “price” of a copy, these relationships 
are as expected. 
 
Equation (20) shows the positive relationship between the demand for copies, yCOPY, and 
the quality of the copy, qCOPY, and equation (21) demonstrates the negative relationship between 
the demand for copies and the quality difference of the copy and the CD, q.  Just as in equations 
(16) and (17), since an increase in the quality of the copy, qCOPY , would make the copy a better 
substitute for the CD, and since an increase in the quality difference of the copy and the CD, q, 
means that the CD has a higher quality relative to the copy, these relationships are as expected.  
All of the key assumptions used to derive the demand equations are listed below in Table 4-1.  
We will now use the demand for CDs in (8) to derive the firm’s profit maximizing condition. 
 
Table 4-1   Key Assumptions 
 
General:   
• qCD > qCOPY, i.e., q >0 
• To buy CDs θ >
q
tp −  
•  p – t  q ≤
 
Case Specific:  
Demand for copies when  
COPYq
t  = 
q
tp − , we require 10 ≤≤
COPYq
t  
 
 
 
4.8 The Firm’s Choice of p  
 
The label observes the demand for CDs, yCD, derived in equation (8), and chooses the 
price of CDs so as to maximize the profit expression  
 
π = (1-µA)(pyCD(p)) – cyCD(p)– F    (23) 
 
where µA is the artist’s negotiated share of album sales (taken exogenously), p is the price of the 
CD, yCD is the demand for CDs, c is the variable cost (manufacturing, managing and distribution 
expenses) per unit, and F is the fixed cost (promotional and recording expenses).  Substituting 
equation (8) into (23) and maximizing with respect to price p results in the following two 
solutions for the optimal price.19 
 
 
                                                 
19We maximized with respect to price rather than quantity because the music industry is better described 
this way.  For example, record labels regularly price CDs differently across genres and within genres based 
on the record sales they project for the artist.  Furthermore, since consumers are comparing the price of the 
CD to the “price” of the copy, this approach seems reasonable.  The calculations are provided in Appendix 
D. 
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Which of the two price solutions is actually profit maximizing depends on the values of 
model parameters, and this has interesting implications for firm behavior.  It turns out that when q 
+ t is less than )1/( Ac µ− , solution (25) is the true maximum, i.e., the label chooses the price 
 = q + t.  This pricing rule does not respond to changes in either the marginal cost, c, or the 
artist’s share of album sales, µ
*2p
A.  On the other hand, when q + t is larger than )1/( Ac µ− , solution 
(24) is the maximum.  In this case, labels’ pricing decisions are responsive to marginal costs and 
to the share paid to artists. 
 
These two observations imply that as the transaction cost of copying (t) and the quality 
difference between copies and CDs decline (q + t declines), the firm’s pricing policy (i.e., p*) 
becomes less responsive to the firm’s variable costs and the artist’s compensation.  This 
apparently counterintuitive conclusion can be explained by observing that the reductions in 
copying costs and quality differences are likely to coincide with a significant increase in actual 
copying of music, thereby forcing the firm to price its product lower, irrespective of its cost 
factors c and µA.  The comparative statics for the pricing equations are as follows. 
  
Starting with the optimal price (24), optimal price p1* responds positively to changes in 
the artist’s negotiated share of album sales, µA, the transaction costs of copying, t, and the quality 
difference between the CD and the copy, q.  Additionally, we show the comparative statics on the 
expanded version of equation (24), where the quality difference between the CD and the copy, q, 
is decomposed into its two parts – the quality of the CD, qCD, and the quality of the copy, qCOPY.   
These comparative statics are given below. 
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 Equation (26) shows that the optimal price (24), is positively related to the artist’s 
negotiated share of album sales, µA.  That is, the larger the share of album sales given to the artist, 
the higher the optimal price.  The positive relationships between the optimal price, p*, and both 
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the transaction cost of copying, t, as well as the quality difference of the CD and the copy, q, as 
seen in equations (27) and (28), respectively, are as expected.  The more difficult it is for 
consumers to obtain a copy due to higher transaction costs, the more the profit maximizing 
monopolist should charge.   
 
Likewise, the greater the difference in quality between the CD and the copy, assuming 
qCD > qCOPY, the higher the optimal price the firm should charge.  Equation (29) shows that the 
optimal price (24) is positively related to the monopolists’ marginal cost – the typical relationship 
for a monopolist.  Then, equations (30) and (31) show that the optimal price (24) is positively 
related to the quality of the CD, qCD, and negatively related to the quality of the copy, qCOPY, 
respectively. 
  
The comparative statics on the optimal price (25) are as follows. 
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Equations (32) and (33) show that the optimal price (25) responds positively to changes 
in the transaction costs of copying, t, and the quality difference between the CD and the copy, q, 
respectively.  Finally, equations (34) and (35) show that the optimal price is positively related to 
the quality of the CD and negatively related to the quality of the copy, respectively.  So, using 
either solution (24) or (25), the firm’s optimal price is negatively related to the quality of the 
copy, qCOPY, and positively related to the difference in the quality of the CD and copy, q.  
However, it is clear that the optimal price (25) implies labels’ pricing decisions are not responsive 
to either their marginal cost or the share of sales they pay to artists, an implication that does not 
hold for the optimal price (24). 
 
4.9 Copyright Assumptions 
 
 In the previous sections, all forms of copying were assumed to be included in one general 
type of “copying,” and any copyright compliance costs were included in the transaction costs of 
copying, t.  In the current state of the market for CDs, the above model and its implications hold 
up well under this assumption.  For instance, consumers can currently choose between various 
methods of purchasing music (traditional stores, on-line mail order, etc.) and copying music 
(borrowing from a friend, on-line sharing, etc.).  
 
As such, copying by consumers under the “fair-use” aspects of copyright law easily fit 
into the framework of the above model.20  Based on the price of the CD, p, the transaction costs 
of copying, t, taste, θ, how well they grasp the copy technology, x, and the substitutability of the 
CD and the copy, q, consumers will either buy, copy, or stay out of the market.  Furthermore, as 
has been shown by Besen and Kirby (1989) and Liebowitz (1985), such copying can lead to both 
                                                 
20 For more on the specifics of copyright law, see Chapter 3. 
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higher profits for firms and increased consumer welfare.  In general, firms are able to extract 
more surplus from some consumers by raising prices (knowing that some copying will take 
place), while the copying consumers have a higher surplus because they do not pay the sales 
price. 
 
The impact of copying on profits, therefore, depends on how much the label can raise the 
price of the CD relative to how the number of copies sold decreases.  For example, when the label 
is unable to raise its price to compensate for lost sales, total surplus does not rise.  Therefore, our 
model implies that when digital copying on the Internet is the dominant mode of copying, and 
digital delivery on the Internet is the dominant mode of distribution for the label, total surplus 
would not rise from copying unless copyrights can be enforced.21  An examination of the 
determinants of demand for CDs and copies in this digital environment illustrates this point.  
 
The only portion of the marginal transaction costs, t, remaining would be those arising 
from copyright compliance costs.  The learning portion of the marginal transaction costs, as well 
as any opportunity costs, would be identical whether purchasing from the label or copying from a 
sharing platform.  Similarly, for the label to rely on digital distribution, the cost type of 
consumers, x, would have to be quite uniform (and low).22  More importantly, in this 
environment, the label’s digital music files are perfect substitutes (or as close as possible) for the 
digital copies being “shared” on the Internet.  In other words, the difference in quality of the 
original and the copy, q, is very close to 0.  Naturally, these factors, especially the degree of 
substitutability, have important implications for the price of the originals, p. 
 
In the absence of copyright compliance costs, consumers of all tastes, θ, would choose 
between buying and copying perfect substitutes.  Since the “price” of the copy in this case is 
effectively zero, it follows that labels would not be able to charge very much for their digital files.  
The long-term implications of this effect can be clearly seen by re-examining equation (23), the 
label’s profit expression.  
 
When the price of the original, p, is effectively zero, the label’s revenue collapses to zero.  
In this case, there is no reason for the label to expend any fixed costs, F, to record and promote 
artists.  Just as important, even if artists forgo the intermediary services of the label, they will face 
the same problem as the label: they will not be able to recover any of their costs.  While some 
artists would surely still record music for their own enjoyment, it is clear that there would be no 
incentive for anyone to invest in the resources needed for a market to exist. 
  
This problem is the familiar fallacy of composition.  When most consumers can copy 
music for free, the music that they hope to copy in the future will, eventually, cease to exist.  One 
possible way to ensure the existence of the market is to have a selectively enforceable copyright.  
In other words, while labels and artists should not be overly concerned with consumers who give 
copies to one or two friends, they should invoke copyright law to prevent large-scale sharing on 
the Internet.  In a sense, the Internet sharing platform replaces the distribution function of the 
label, but is unsustainable in the long run because artists will not be able to charge for their music. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 As will be explained shortly, this does not suggest that no copying can take place. 
22 This cost type scenario does not seem unreasonable.  For example, when college students of 2000 reach 
retirement age, it is quite reasonable to assume that most consumers will easily grasp the copy/download 
technology. 
 
 61
4.10 Conclusions and Implications  
  
We assume the most important determinants of the demand for CDs and for copies are 
the consumers’ tastes and transaction costs of copying (including their understanding of the copy 
technology), the price of the CDs, and the degree of substitutability between the CDs and the 
copies.  Depending on the combination of these factors, consumers will choose to either buy CDs, 
copy music or stay out of the market completely. 
 
Our model formalizes the notion that, as the transaction costs of copying fall and the 
quality of the copy rises relative to the quality of the CD, more consumers will enter the market 
(through copying) who, formerly, stayed out of the market completely.  The model suggests that 
this group of consumers’ taste for music, given the relative costs and quality of CDs and copies, 
was lower than that of the consumers buying CDs.  It also shows that consumers with a low 
enough taste parameter will choose to either copy or stay out of the market based on their costs of 
copying relative to the quality of the copy. 
 
Given the dramatic increase in copy quality and reduction in the transaction costs of 
copying, the model suggests that some of the increased copying on the Internet in recent years 
was undertaken by consumers who were previously staying out of the market.  The drastic 
improvement in copy technology and reduction in cost was enough to bring these consumers into 
the market to copy, but their taste for music was not high enough to induce them to buy CDs at 
the market prices.  Still, the same implications hold true for consumers previously buying CDs.  
The model suggests that some of these consumers, given the lower quality difference between the 
copy and the CD as well as the lower relative cost of the copy, decided to copy rather than buy. 
  
While we have taken the bargaining solution between the artist and the label as 
exogenous, the pricing rules derived above still provide several implications as to the firm’s 
strategy.  For instance, the model predicts that we should see labels becoming less sensitive to the 
share they pay artists as copying becomes more widespread, and vice versa.  To increase the sales 
of CDs, the model shows that the firm should try to increase consumers’ taste for music by either 
reducing the price of the CD, increasing the cost of copying (perhaps by altering its copy 
protection techniques or increasing litigation), or increasing the difference in the quality of the 
CD and the copy.  Given the current state of copying technology, however, the firm may not be 
able to increase the quality difference between the CD and the copy.  Therefore, the firm may 
have to focus on either increasing the cost of copying and/or lowering the prices of CDs.23 
 
The model demonstrates that the optimal price charged for CDs is positively related to 
the quality of the CD and negatively related to the quality of the copy.  Furthermore, the model 
formally shows that the optimal price for CDs is positively related to the difference between the 
quality of the CD and the copy.  These factors suggest that labels should charge a lower price for 
CDs relative to the price they charged before this quality difference decreased.   
  
The model also has a key implication for copyright law in a market where both originals 
and copies are distributed (predominantly) digitally over the Internet.  Since the degree of 
substitutability between originals and copies is becoming ever higher, and since the other factors 
of demand may equalize for both copies and originals, the only way to ensure a viable market for 
                                                 
23 In September 2003, Vivendi Universal SA’s Universal Music Group cut the suggested retail price of 
nearly all its CDs to $12.98, a decrease of as much as 32 percent.  The decision was pitched as part of a 
broad strategy that included aggressive legal action against online piracy.  (Smith, (2003)) 
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music may be to have selectively enforceable copyrights.  Thus, the copyright should be used to 
prevent large-scale sharing on the Internet. 
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Chapter 5, Endogenous Artist-Label Bargaining 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
 In Chapter 4, the bargaining agreement between the firm and the artist was exogenously 
given, with µA representing the artist’s negotiated share of album sales.  We now examine this 
relationship further by endogenizing the bargaining agreement between the firm and the artist.  
After presenting a brief analysis of the typical bargaining arrangement by artists and labels, we 
incorporate these ideas into a theoretical framework using the Nash cooperative bargaining model 
to obtain the profit sharing solution (see Nash (1950) and Muthoo (1999)). 
 
5.1 Discussion of Artist-Label Bargaining 
  
As in chapter 4, the firm in this model is assumed to be a major label which functions 
similarly to independent labels.  As a result, the arrangement discussed here is typical of most 
recording contracts offered to artists.  While independent labels may offer a less standardized 
contract to artists, both the majors and the independents do offer similar contracts in that the 
label’s expenses are recouped before the artist receives royalties on album sales.  For 
simplification, the artist in this chapter is taken to be a recording artist who is paid a royalty rate 
on album sales.1 
  
While the exact percentage of the album royalty rate is negotiable, depending mostly on 
the stature of the artist, most new artists can expect to receive (gross) between 10% and 12% of 
the retail price of the album, while the most successful artists can receive as much as 17% to 
25%.2  The net royalty rate the artist receives, however, can be significantly smaller than the 
negotiated gross rate.   
 
The typical recording contract is designed so that nearly all of the label’s expenses (called 
recoupable expenses) are deducted from the artist’s royalties.3  For example, all new artists in a 
particular genre are allocated a similar amount for recording expenses, usually in the form of an 
advance.  These costs, representing a portion of the label’s fixed costs, are then fully recouped 
from the artist’s gross royalties before the artist receives any net royalties. 
 
The label’s other fixed costs (mainly promotional expenses) and variable costs 
(managing, manufacturing, and distributing) are all typically treated as recoupable expenses.  
                                                     
1 This simplification does not harm our analysis.  As discussed in chapter 3, there are differences in the 
royalties recording artists, songwriters and recording artist/songwriters receive.  For example, a recording 
artist /songwriter would be entitled to different types of royalties than a recording artist or a songwriter, and 
so on.  For more details on the different royalties available to each type of artist, see chapter 3. 
2 Alternatively, the record label will issue royalty payments on the wholesale price of the album and, since 
the wholesale price is roughly half of the retail list price, double the artist’s royalty percentage. 
3 In addition to recoupable expenses, many record labels only pay royalties on 90% of the albums sold and 
hold a portion of the artist’s royalties in reserve to guard against excessive returns.  For more details on 
these types of contract features, see chapter 3. 
 
 64
Basically, the label finances the development of the artist and, provided the artist is successful, 
recoups its investment before the artist is paid.  So, while a royalty rate on album sales is 
negotiated, the artist actually receives a share of the profit, provided there is any.  Therefore, the 
bargaining arrangement is really about sharing profits, not revenues.  Unfortunately, for those 
who may dislike this arrangement, artists enter contract negotiations with very little bargaining 
power. 
Aside from the fact that there are many more aspiring artists than well-established labels, 
the label’s have several key advantages which increase their bargaining power.4  Historically, the 
most significant of these have been in the areas of promotion and distribution.  Because of the 
significant investment needed to promote and distribute an artist’s material nationwide, labels 
have been able to provide these intermediary services to artists.  Without such help, artists have 
had very little hope of ever being nationally (or even regionally) recognized. 
 
One of the interesting paradoxes of digital downloading on the Internet is that the 
technology both threatens to eliminate the distributional advantage held by the labels and to make 
selling music less profitable for artists.5  Regardless, artists currently have to win the attention 
and respect of a label through a great deal of hard work, and enter the negotiating process with 
very little bargaining power.  Of course, both parties usually have attorneys to actually negotiate 
the contract.6  The following excerpt from Brabec & Brabec (2000) illustrates a typical exchange 
between lawyers representing the respective parties: 
 
Record Label Attorney:  Hello ________.  As you know, our A&R people are  
very interested in signing your client to a recording artist agreement.   
Before I send you a summary deal memo of our proposal, I’d like to go  
over the main points of the offer so we know whether or not we have a  
deal. 
Artist’s Attorney: That sounds good to me.  The more issues and areas we can  
define and agree to before you draft a deal memo, the better for everyone. 
Record Label Attorney:  We’d like to sign the artist for 1 album, and we need to  
have options for 6 more albums after the first.  We’d also like to have the right to 
issue a “greatest hits” album over and above the option albums.  The royalty rate 
will be 15% of retail for albums and 14% for singles.  We’ll pay on 90% of all 
recordings sold and will reduce the artist royalties by 50% for sales outside the 
U.S.  There will be a guarantee that one video will be produced per album, the 
cost of which will be cross-collateralized with both the artist’s audiovisual 
royalties and audio, CD, and tape income. We’ll advance your client $150,000 on 
signing the agreement, with an escalating advance payable for each new album 
that is recorded and released.  The amount of each option album advance will be 
based on 662/3% of the earnings from the most recent past album.  As your client 
is a songwriter, there will also be a 75% of statutory mechanical rate, with a 10-
song cap payable as songwriter and publisher royalties for sales of each album 
released, and with a 2-song cap on singles.  The mechanical rate will be the one 
in effect when the artist starts to record the album.  Those are the basic terms, 
what do you think? 
Artist’s Attorney:  I’ll discuss the offer with my client and get back to you  
                                                     
4 It is true that all aspiring artists’ products vary considerably in quality.  Therefore, it could be argued that 
all aspiring artists should not be counted in the supply of artists.  This possibility will be considered in 
future research which looks more closely at the supply of artists. 
5 For more on this issue, see Chapter 3. 
6For more specifics on this issue, and on how artists attract the attention of labels, see Chapter 3. 
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with our counterproposal.  I do want you to know that, in its present form, the 
proposal is unacceptable.  However, if we can get a 16% album rate with 
percentage escalators based on the achievement of sales plateaus as well as 
option years, increased royalties in at least the major foreign territories, a release 
guarantee for each album in not only the U.S. and Canada but also in the United 
Kingdom, an understanding that only 50% of the video costs will be recouped 
from the artist’s audio recording royalties, guaranteed tour support, minimum 
guarantees as to album advances regardless of the earnings from the most 
recently released album, either a 12-times-statutory mechanical rate cap or, in the 
alternative, a 13-song-times75% rate cap for albums and an effective mechanical 
rate determined by the U.S. release date of each album, we’ll at least have 
something to talk about. 
 
After a certain degree of haggling, the artist will either opt to sign with the label or walk 
away from the negotiations.  By the time a label makes an offer to an artist, the label is fairly 
satisfied that the artist’s potential is sufficient to make a profit.  As a result, the typical artist-label 
contract is on an exclusive basis for a given number of albums.  Usually, this arrangement 
consists of the label having the option to pick up three to seven albums based on the success of 
the first album.  The artist, however, does not have the option to choose against recording those 
additional albums.  While there are exceptions, most artists and labels settle on fairly similar 
contracts and do not renege. 
 
5.2 Justification for using the Nash bargaining solution 
 
 In general, a bargaining solution is a formula that determines a unique outcome for each 
situation in a given class of bargaining situations.  The Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950)) 
has been widely used because it can be easily applied to many bargaining problems.  As long as a 
clear theoretical justification exists for doing so, using the Nash solution makes studying these 
situations more tractable.  To see how the Nash solution can be justified for the artist-label 
arrangement, we first provide a brief discussion of the Rubinstein alternating offers game (see 
Rubinstein (1982)).  The Rubinstein model can provide a very realistic representation of real-life 
negotiations, and its solution coincides with that of the Nash model. 
 
5.2.1 The Rubinstein alternating offers game 
 
 The Rubinstein alternating offers game is a realistic representation of a bargaining 
process for several reasons.  To begin, as its name suggests, the model allows players to offer and 
counteroffer until an agreement is reached.  Further, the model accounts for friction in 
negotiations by introducing an element of time.  In many bargaining situations, prolonging the 
negotiations imposes real costs on both sides – perhaps disproportionately.  Since it addresses 
these issues, the alternating offers game appears a fairly good stylized description of the actual 
artist-label negotiations. 
 
In the Rubinstein game, two players, A and B, bargain over the partition of a surplus of 
size π, where π > 0.  At discrete points in time, the players propose to each other shares of the 
surplus.  For example, at time zero, player A proposes to player B that they share the surplus in a 
seventy-thirty ratio.  Player B may accept this offer at time ∆ > 0, at which time an agreement 
would be reached and the surplus divided in this ratio.  Alternatively, at time ∆ > 0, player B 
could make a counteroffer to share the surplus, for example, in a fifty-fifty ratio.  If player A does 
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not accept this counteroffer, player A makes a new counteroffer at time 2 ∆, and so on until an 
agreement is reached. 
  
If the players reach agreement at time t∆, t = 0,1,2…, on a partition that gives player i, i = 
A,B, a share xi ( )π≤≤ ix0 of the surplus, then player i’s payoff is xi exp(-rit∆), where ri > 0 is 
player i’s discount rate.  In other words, each players’ payoff is discounted for the time that 
elapses between the start of the bargaining process and the final agreement.  In the event that the 
players perpetually disagree, each player’s payoff is taken to be zero; the negotiation never ends 
and neither player receives a share of the surplus.  If both parties are allowed to haggle 
indefinitely at no cost (rA = 0 and rB = 0), the solution to the alternating offers game is 
indeterminate, however unlikely this may be. 
  
In the Rubinstein model, the players’ discount rates, ri > 0, and the time lag parameter, ∆, 
represent friction in the bargaining process.  For example, when a player decides to counter-offer, 
rather than accepting an offer, then that player has to wait ∆ time units.  Further, the cost of 
waiting ∆ time units is increasing in a player’s discount rate, ri > 0.  The player’s discount rate 
can be thought of as the rate at which the surplus shrinks during the negotiating, thus capturing 
the magnitude of the friction in the bargaining process.  Naturally, rational players would make 
counter-offers immediately after rejecting an opponent’s offer, thus minimizing the cost of 
waiting.   
 
This observation suggests that using very small values of ∆ provides the most realistic 
representation of a bargaining process, thus implying the need for a limiting condition, where 
.  Incidentally, this observation also provides a connection to using the Nash solution as a 
shortcut to the alternating offers game.  To fully describe this link to the Nash solution, it is 
helpful to review the key reason for the widespread use of the Rubinstein alternating offers game, 
namely that it provides a unique solution to the bargaining problem. 
0→∆
 
In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game, agreement is reached at 
time zero and the partitioning of the surplus is Pareto efficient when rA > 0 and rB > 0.  In the 
limit, as , the shares obtained by players A and B, respectively, converge to η0→∆
BA /r=
Aπ and ηBπ, 
where BA rr +η  and BAAB rr/r +=η .  In the limit, as 0→∆ , the equilibrium share of 
each player depends on the ratio of rA/rB, not the absolute magnitude of the players’ discount 
rates.  Thus, each player’s payoff is decreasing in his own discount rate, and increasing in the 
opponent’s discount rate.  In other words, the smaller a player’s discount rate (the more patient 
the player is), the lower the player’s cost of haggling and, therefore, the greater the player’s 
bargaining power. 
 
 The link between the Rubinstein and Nash model is that, under certain conditions, the 
subgame perfect equilibrium payoff shares of the Rubinstein model, ηAπ and ηBπ, are identical to 
the payoff shares derived when using the asymmetric (or weighted) Nash bargaining solution that 
accounts for players’ unequal bargaining powers.7  In his original framework, Nash (1950) treated 
both players as having the same bargaining power.  However, the weighted Nash solution is a 
more general version which coincides with the symmetric solution when both players have the 
same bargaining power. 
                                                     
7 These conditions will be fully discussed below.  For a formal proof that, in the limit, as , the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in the Rubinstein model converges to the asymmetric Nash 
solution, see Muthoo (1999), p. 66.  For more on the relationship between the Nash and Rubinstein models, 
see Binmore (1994), pp. 122-135. 
0→∆
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The bargaining powers do not represent the players’ negotiation skills.  As Nash (1953) 
pointed out, any perfectly rational player can be expected to bargain just as skillfully as any other 
perfectly rational player.8  Instead, the bargaining powers in the weighted Nash solution are used 
to account for external factors which could affect the outcome of negotiations.  In general, the 
bargaining powers represent each player’s position of bargaining strength as determined by the 
circumstances under which the negotiations occur.  For example, if a struggling artist has been 
hoping to sign with a label for many years, a well-established label will have greater bargaining 
power in any negotiations between the two; the label will be bargaining from a stronger position 
than the artist.  Since the artist and the label typically have different levels of bargaining power, it 
appears natural to apply the weighted Nash solution to their bargaining problem. 
 
5.2.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution 
 
The Nash bargaining arrangement is defined by specifying the players, a set of possible 
agreements (the bargaining set) and a status quo point (also known as the disagreement or threat 
point).9  The disagreement point represents one of Nash’s key innovations in that it allows 
agreements to be affected depending on what would happen if negotiations were to fail.  So, in 
addition to a set of possible agreements, X, the Nash solution requires that a status quo point, ε, 
inside of X be specified.  The status quo point, ε, is the pair of payoffs the players will receive if 
they are unable to reach an agreement.  The following is a brief description of the Nash 
bargaining solution. 
 
Two players, A and B, negotiate to divide a surplus of size π, where π >0.  The set of the 
players’ possible agreements is X = { }ABABA xxxxx −=≤≤ ππ  , 0:),( , where xi is the share of 
the surplus to player i (i = A, B) and [ ]π,0∈ix .  The set X includes the players’ disagreement 
points and, by definition, both players will receive some positive share xi of the surplus.  For each 
share xi of the surplus, Ui(xi) is player i’s utility from obtaining a share xi of the surplus, and 
player i’s utility function [ ] ℜ→π,0 :iU  is strictly increasing and concave in xi.  The strictly 
increasing and concave utility function ensures that each player will be risk averse and each 
player will be better off the larger the share of the surplus they receive. 
 
When the players cannot reach an agreement, each player obtains a payoff with at least as 
much utility as would be derived from receiving none of the surplus.  Formally, when an 
agreement cannot be reached, player i obtains a utility of di, where di < Ui(xi).  Nash ensures that a 
mutually beneficial agreement exists by theorizing that each player has a level of utility from 
some share of the surplus which is greater than the utility from  their disagreement payoffs.  
Formally, xi∈X: UA(xA) > dA and UB(xB) > dB.  The utility pair d = (dA, dB) is the utility associated 
with Nash’s status quo point, ε.  We now define the set Ω  of possible utility pairs obtainable 
through agreement, utility pairs which represent each player’s utility from their respective shares 
of the surplus.  Formally defined,  = {(uΩ A, uB) : ∃ x ∈ X : UA(xA) = uA, UB(xB) = uB}.   
 
                                                     
8 This reference to Nash (1953) is pointed out in Binmore (1994), p. 78. 
9As will be discussed below, the players’ deadlock and breakdown points have to be the same to justify 
generalizing the problem with a disagreement point.  Binmore (1994) provides a detailed explanation of 
this issue. 
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We can now define the Nash bargaining soluti n.  The Nash bargaining solution for the 
above scenario is the unique pair of utilities, 
o( )NBNA uu , , that solves the following maximization 
problem 
( ) ( ) BA
BA
BBAAuu
dudu αα −−
Θ∈
max
),(
, 
 
where , and α{ BBAABA duduuu ≥≥Ω∈≡Θ  , :),(
≥ ≥
} A and αB represent the bargaining powers of 
the respective players, αA 0 and αB 0.  The term ( ) ( ) BA BBAA dudu αα −−  is referred to as the 
Nash product; the terms of the product represent each player’s net utility from agreeing to a share 
of the surplus (the utility from a share xi of the surplus, Ui(xi) = ui, less the utility from the 
disagreement payoff, di).  The maximization problem has a unique solution because the Nash 
product, ( ) ( ) BA BBAA dudu αα −− , is continuous and strictly quasiconcave, and the set Θ  is non-
empty. 
 
The symbol is used to denote the set of utility pairs because of the importance of the 
Nash disagreement points.  We maximize with respect to each player’s utility contained in the set 
, but we also account for the condition that, for each player, there is some share of the surplus 
with a utility at least as large as the utility from their disagreement point.  Consequently, since a 
mutually beneficial agreement can only exist when u
Θ
Ω
N
Bu
A > dA and uB > dB, each player’s utility in the 
Nash solution must be greater than the utility from their disagreement point, i.e.,  and 
.  Regardless, the players’ bargaining powers are a key to the solution of the bargaining 
problem.   
A
N
A du >
Bd>
 
The relative bargaining powers determine the position of the equilibrium shares of the 
surplus within the Pareto efficient bargaining set.  Thus, for example, when αA = 0, player A has 
no bargaining power and receives only the utility from the status quo payoff, dA.  If, on the other 
hand, αB = 0, player B has no bargaining power and receives only the utility from the status quo 
payoff, dB.  Alternatively, when each player’s bargaining power is the same ( 1/ =BA αα ), the 
weighted Nash solution coincides with the symmetric Nash solution, and the Nash product 
simplifies to the expression ( )( )BBAA dudu −− .10  A graphical representation of the Nash 
solution can be seen on Figure 5-1. 
 
 
5.2.3 Graphical Representation of the Nash Solution 
 
 The following is a graphical depiction of the Nash bargaining solution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 See Binmore (1994) and Muthoo (1999). 
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Figure 5-1 
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In Figure 5-1, the intersection of the dashed lines, dB and dA, represents the utility pair d 
(the status quo point).  The status quo point is contained within the set of all possible utility 
pairs, Ω , which is depicted by the concave set Ω  in Figure 5-1.  The three convex arcs in Figure 
5-1, labeled N1, N2, N3, represent level curves of the Nash product, ( ) ( ) BA BBAA dudu αα −− , and 
correspond to different relative values of the bargaining power parameters, αA and αB.  
 
The point of tangency represented by curve N1 represents the utility pairs in the Nash 
bargaining solution, ( )NBNA uu ,  = uN, when the players’ bargaining powers, αA and αB, are the 
same.  When the players’ bargaining powers are not the same, the position of the Nash solution’s 
utility pair, uN, shifts along the frontier of the set of all possible utility pairs, Ω .  For instance, 
when αA = 0, player A has no bargaining power and receives only the status quo payoff, dA, 
resulting in the point of tangency represented by curve N2.  If, on the other hand, αB = 0, player B 
has no bargaining power and receives only the status quo payoff, dB, resulting in the point of 
tangency represented by curve N3.   
 
Alternatively, if player B’s bargaining power, αB, is slightly above zero, and player A’s 
bargaining power, αA, is slightly higher than player B’s, a point of tangency to the set of possible 
utility pairs would occur somewhere between N1 and N3.  Thus, for the weighted Nash solution, 
the location of the point of tangency (the utility pairs in the Nash bargaining solution) depends 
only on the ratio of the weights, αA and αB.  The utility pair uN, therefore, represents the 
maximum obtainable utility for both players given their disagreement points (subject to xi > di, i = 
A, B) and relative bargaining powers, αA and αB.  Still, before applying the Nash solution, the 
bargaining situation’s characteristics should be checked against several axioms.  
 
Specifically, there are several axioms that characterize the Nash product which, if 
satisfied, allow us to use the maximization of the Nash product to determine the bargaining 
solution.  Only after demonstrating that the axioms hold for a particular bargaining situation can it 
be argued that the agents will act as if they are maximizing the Nash product. The next section 
describes each of these axioms.  
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5.2.4 Axioms for the Nash Solution 
 
The axioms that need to be satisfied before applying the weighted Nash solution are as 
follows:11 
  
• Independence of utility calibration  
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
• Pareto efficiency 
 
The independence of utility calibration axiom states that the players’ preferences 
determine the real outcome of the bargaining solution, not the particular utility functions used to 
represent these preferences.  In particular, it is assumed that the outcome of the bargaining 
arrangement will not change if the players’ utility functions are replaced by increasing, linear 
transforms of the functions.  As such, applying the Nash solution to the same bargaining problem, 
using two different utility scales, would result in the same real outcome because the players’ 
preferences would be unaffected.  The independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is less 
straightforward. 
 
This axiom ensures that increasing the risk aversion of one player will be strategically 
advantageous to the other player.  The players may perceive, for example, there is a risk that 
negotiations will break down.  The idea is generally expressed as a requirement that if the players 
sometimes agree on s when t is feasible, then they will never agree on t when s is feasible.  More 
formally, the idea is expressed as a sort of opposite to an individual monotonicity axiom which 
violates the above risk aversion idea. (Binmore (1994))  If this axiom were violated, increasing a 
player’s risk aversion would never make that player worse off, a situation which would be 
implausible. 
 
The Pareto efficiency axiom requires that the solution for the bargaining problem be 
Pareto efficient.  In other words, there can be no other utility pair that makes both players better 
off without making at least one player less well-off.  In terms of the Nash solution’s graphical 
representation in Figure 5-1, the optimal utility pair, uN, never lies below the set of possible utility 
pairs, Ω , such that no mutual gains are left unexploited.  The applicability of these axioms to the 
artist-label arrangement will be discussed more fully below.  
 
5.2.5 Applicability of the Nash Solution to the Artist-Label Arrangement 
 
When the actual bargaining environment approximates a non-cooperative game, such as 
the Rubinstein alternating offers game, using the weighted Nash bargaining solution is justified 
as a “shortcut” to the non-cooperative solution. (Binmore (1994))  This shortcut can be used 
because, when certain conditions are met, any outcome of the alternating offers game corresponds 
to the Nash bargaining solution of the appropriately defined Nash bargaining problem.  Since the 
actual bargaining between the artist and the label can be regarded as an alternating offers game 
(the label makes an offer, the artist’s attorney makes a counter offer, and so on), applying the 
Nash bargaining solution to the artist-label arrangement does pass the first test. 
 
Another aspect of the artist-label arrangement which needs further justification for using 
the Nash solution deals with the status quo point.  Binmore (1994) shows that Nash’s original 
                                                     
11 The symmetric Nash bargaining problem requires a symmetry axiom, which states that the set of feasible 
agreements, X, and the status quo, ε, look exactly the same to both sides. (See Binmore (1994), p. 91)  
Since we are implementing the weighted Nash solution, this axiom is omitted from the above discussion.   
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formulation of the status quo point will not necessarily hold in all cases. In particular, the 
deadlock point and the breakdown point have to be the same to justify generalizing the problem 
with a disagreement point. 
 
The deadlock point is the payoff pair that would result if the players were to negotiate 
indefinitely without ever reaching an agreement.  The breakdown point is the payoff pair that 
would result if the negotiations were broken off at the outset.  In the case of the label-artist 
relationship, the breakdown and deadlock points coincide.  In either situation, the artist would be 
left with only the payoff attainable without signing with a label, and the label would be left with 
only the payoff attainable without signing the artist.  Therefore, in our case, the use of only a 
disagreement point is justified.  Still, before we can be completely justified in using the weighted 
Nash solution, the artist-label bargaining arrangement must be checked against several axioms (as 
stated above).   
  
The independence of utility calibration axiom states that using linear transformations of 
the players’ utility functions will not alter the real outcome of the bargaining solution.  A linear 
shift in the utility scale would require only that the solution be rewritten using new “utils” and, 
therefore, that the label and the artist would be in the same economic position as before the 
change.  For example, whether we describe utility using dollars or millions of dollars, the actual 
wealth of the artist and the label will be the same because their preferences will remain 
unchanged.  There is no reason to believe that this axiom will not hold for the artist-label 
bargaining problem.  The most vital axiom for the Nash bargaining problem is the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives axiom.  This axiom ensures that increasing the risk aversion of one 
player will be strategically advantageous to the other player. 
 
In the artist-label relationship, it is plausible to suggest that increasing the risk aversion of 
the artist, who clearly has less bargaining power than the label, would make the label better off.  
If artists are afraid that negotiations will break down, for example, they will be more risk averse 
to any strategy which prolongs negotiations and, therefore, more likely to reach a less favorable 
agreement if one can be reached quickly.  It is true that some artists may feel they have nothing to 
lose by taking more chances, perhaps by holding out for a higher royalty rate, but this strategy 
does not appear likely to always improve the outcome for the artist.  In most cases, the label 
would likely break off negotiations and move on to the next artist.  In our model, increasing the 
risk aversion of the artist will increase the strategic advantage of the label.  The one remaining 
Nash axiom, the requirement that the bargaining solution be Pareto-efficient, is somewhat 
irrelevant. (Binmore (1994)) 
 
Given the assumption that a share of the surplus exists such that each player is at least as 
well off as receiving their status quo utility, bargaining solutions lie in the Pareto efficient 
bargaining set.12  The Pareto-efficiency axiom requires that the bargaining solution be one which 
makes one player strictly better off without making the other player worse off.  While it is 
possible that some sort of unusual contract could be agreed upon which would violate the Pareto-
efficient axiom, this does not appear to be the typical case.  Artists currently have a wealth of 
resources available to help ensure that they do not sign contracts that will harm them, and labels 
                                                     
12 Binmore (1994) makes the point that the requirement is actually weak Pareto-efficiency, but that most 
authors have replaced this requirement with Pareto-efficiency.  However, Binmore argues that this issue is 
of no great importance and that it is acceptable to follow convention and use the requirement of Pareto-
efficiency. 
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are careful to structure deals so that album sales will pay for their costs.13  After an agreement is 
reached, if the artist’s music is well-received by its audience (an expectation of both the artist and 
the label), both parties are better off.  Furthermore, experience shows that both parties are willing 
to risk their respective resources in the hope that higher album sales will make them better off.  
The last aspect of the arrangement to be discussed is the relative bargaining power of the artist 
and the label. 
 
In the artist-label relationship, the label currently appears to have a relatively stronger 
bargaining position (more bargaining power).  Historically speaking, the most significant source 
of the labels’ higher bargaining power has been in the areas of promotion and distribution.  
Because of the significant investment needed to promote and distribute an artist’s material 
nationwide, labels offer a service which artists cannot easily provide on their own.  Since both 
parties have full knowledge of this issue, the artist enters the bargaining process at a relatively 
weaker position (the label is offering the chance to sell many more albums than would be possible 
without its services).  Furthermore, since distributing music through digital downloading 
threatens to change the artists’ bargaining position, modeling the bargaining process with the 
weighted Nash solution allows us to more fully explore these implications.  We can now present 
the bargaining model for the artist-label relationship. 
  
5.3 The Bargaining Model  
 
We now formulate the first stage of our three stage game.  Chapter 4 formalized the 
second and the third stages, where the label chooses an optimal price, p*, to maximize its profits 
given the consumer demand as a function of the optimal price,  y(p*).  The consumer demand, 
y(p*), is solved in the third stage, and the optimal price, p*, is solved in the second stage.  In the 
second stage (Ch. 4), we saw that, depending on model parameters, the label actually chooses 
between the following two optimal price solutions. 
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When the label chooses the optimal price (25), the price does not respond to either the 
marginal cost or to changes in the share the firm pays to artists.  So, while the label’s profit share 
depends on the share it pays to artists (µA), the label’s gross profit will not respond to a change in 
µA because the label’s price will not respond to a change in µA.  In other words, choosing the 
optimal price (25) requires that the artist and label bargain over a fixed profit.  Incidentally, even 
when the optimal price (24) is chosen, the label and artist could, in theory, bargain over a fixed 
profit by “ignoring” the effect that either the artist’s share or marginal cost has on future profits.   
 
Since the choice of either optimal price (24) or (25) would not change the bargaining 
outcome when bargaining over a fixed profit, and since the choice of (25) requires that the two 
parties bargain over a fixed profit, we formulate each player’s payoffs by using expression (25) 
for the optimal price, given consumer demand.  We then use these payoff functions to obtain the 
                                                     
13 In practice, both sides use attorneys to iron out the details.  Since all rational agents would hire 
experienced attorneys, and since failing to reach agreement would leave both sides with their status quo 
payoff, the Pareto-efficiency axiom would typically not be violated by the agreement reached by the two 
sides. 
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shares of profit that each party will obtain from the bargaining process.  First, we derive the 
payoff functions and profit shares for the case where bargaining is done over a fixed profit, and 
we then relax this assumption to examine the effect that negotiating over a variable profit has on 
the bargaining solution.  The next step, therefore, is to substitute the optimal price, p*, and the 
consumer demand, y(p*), into the expression for the label’s profit.  These substitutions yield the 
following profit expression 
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where k = z(1- Aµ ) – c, z = )]1/2([3
1
Actq µ−++ , and 0/ A <∂∂ µπ .  An explanation for these 
substitutions, as well as the first and second derivatives for this expression, are in part 1 of 
Appendix E. 
  
For simplicity, we formulate the bargaining model in terms of the actual money payoffs 
of the artist and label, xA and xL, where xA and xL sum to π(µ).14  After solving for the optimal 
money payoff, x*, solving for the artist’s optimal share of album sales, µ*, is straightforward.  
After deriving solutions and comparative statics for this scenario, where the surplus is fixed, we 
illustrate the effect that allowing the surplus to vary would have on the bargaining outcome. 
 
To implement the Nash bargaining solution, we specify the payoff functions of both the 
artist, A, and the label, L.  The set of possible agreements in terms of the money payoffs is 
expressed as follows,  
 
Μ =  {( xA, xL): xL = π(µ) - xA , 0 < xA < π(µ)} 
 
where xA and xL represent the nonnegative money payoffs for the artist and label, respectively.  In 
terms of the players’ profit payoffs, xA = )(µπµ ⋅ and xL = )()1( µπµ ⋅− .  For each xi, Ui(xi) is 
participant i’s utility from obtaining a payoff xi of profit, π(µ).  The following utility functions 
represent the artist’s and label’s payoff functions.  The label is viewed as risk-neutral and has a 
utility function, UL, expressed as 
  
UL = xL  ,       (37) 
 
and the artist is viewed as risk-averse and has a utility function, UA, of the following form: 
 
UA(xA) = , 0 < γ < 1.     (38) γAx
 
The γ  parameter represents the artist’s level of risk aversion, with the artist becoming less risk 
averse as γ  approaches one, and more risk averse as γ  approaches zero. 
 
The next step in implementing the Nash solution is defining the disagreement point of the 
bargaining arrangement, d = (dL, dA), which ensures a mutually beneficial agreement in 
partitioning the profit, π(µ).  Incidentally, there is no reason to believe that the artist’s 
disagreement point could not vary.  For example, the advances in digital technology have already 
made it easier for artists to take on some of the label’s functions, and it is easy to see how digital 
                                                     
14 For ease of exposition, we refer to the artist’s share of album sales, µA, as simply µ. 
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downloading over the Internet could allow artists to distribute their music without as much help 
from a label. 
 
These types of technological advances could increase an artist’s expected net wealth from 
producing music without a label contract, thus requiring a larger share of album sales to entice the 
artist to sign.15  The artist’s disagreement point represents some level of expected net wealth from 
not signing with a label.  In other words, the artist’s outside option is the expected wealth from 
not signing with the label.  If the artist’s expected wealth from not signing exceeds the expected 
wealth from signing, the artist will not sign.  Some artists may believe that the amount of money 
they can make without signing a record-label contract is not worth the effort of producing a 
product.16  Hence, for these artists, the disagreement point equals zero.  Otherwise, the artist 
would have a positive disagreement point. 
 
The label’s disagreement point represents its level of expected wealth from not signing 
the artist.  One reasonable point of view is that the label will not sign an artist unless it thinks it 
could break even on its investment.  For example, the label would walk away from negotiations if 
the artist was trying to get too high of a share (from the label’s perspective) of the profits.  If the 
label would only sign an artist when it expects its share of profits to be positive, its disagreement 
point would equal zero.  If, on the other hand, the label views the sales from a given artist as part 
of a larger surplus from a group of its signed artists, it would have a positive disagreement point.  
Therefore, in general, we can say that the disagreement points of the artist and the label are as 
follows: 
 
   dA ≥  0      (39) 
 
            dL ≥ 0      (40) 
 
where dA is the artist’s disagreement point and dL is the label’s disagreement point.  Below, we 
examine the case where both the artist’s and label’s disagreement points equal zero, and we then 
relax this assumption for the artist, allowing us to examine the implications of a nonzero 
disagreement point. 
 
Provided we meet a concavity condition, we can now use the Nash solution to examine 
the artist-label arrangement.  Given that meeting the concavity condition is straightforward (as 
discussed below) when the bargaining is done over the payoffs, and because finding a solution to 
the bargaining problem is simplified by this method, we assume that the bargaining takes place 
over the money payoffs.  Since we are formulating the bargaining over the actual money payoffs 
that the artist and label will obtain, the utility functions need only be concave in the money 
payoffs.  Specifically, UA must be concave in xA, and UL must be concave in xL. 
 
Since the label’s utility, UL, is linear in the label’s money payoff, it is clearly concave in 
the label’s money payoff.  In the case of the artist, since γ is less than one, the artist’s utility, UA, 
is concave in the artist’s money payoff.  Therefore, we can apply the Nash solution over the 
money payoffs and then use the results to solve for the artist’s optimal share of album sales, µ*. 
  
                                                     
15 This increase in expected net wealth could also lead to higher bargaining power for the artist, an issue 
which will be explored more fully below. 
16 The term “producing” is used here in generic sense, as in “supplying a product.” 
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Using this method, the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of the artist-label negotiation is 
the unique pair of money payoffs, ( )NANL xx , , that solves the following maximization problem 
 
( ) ( ) LLLAAA
LA
dxdx
xx
ααγ −−  )(max
),(
        (45) 
 
where xA and xL sum to π(µ), αA and αL represent the bargaining powers of the artist and the label, 
respectively, and where αA ≥ 0, and αL ≥ 0.  Maximizing equation (45) with respect to, and then 
solving for, the artist’s and label’s money payoffs, xA and xL, provides the money payoffs that will 
be agreed upon during the bargaining.  Once we have solved (45) for the optimal money payoffs, 
we can obtain a solution for the artist’s optimal share of album sales, µ∗.  Solving for the optimal 
µ is achieved by substituting the definition of xA (or xL) into the expression for the optimal xA (or 
xL) and solving for µ. 
 
5.4   Bargaining With Fixed Profit 
 
 In this section, we derive the optimal payoffs for each player when their bargaining 
powers differ, the asymmetric bargaining case.  To simplify, we hold the players’ disagreement 
points equal to zero and treat the profit as fixed, assumptions that will be relaxed later.  By 
relaxing the fixed profit assumption, we allow the players to exhibit forward-looking behavior 
with regard to the expected surplus, a technique that allows us to more effectively examine the 
impact that bargaining over a variable profit has on the optimal share, price and quantity 
solutions.  For the asymmetric case, we can rewrite the Nash product (45) as follows,  
 ( ) ( ααγ µπ −−= 1)( AA xxN )      (46) 
 
where αA and αL sum to one (i.e., αL = 1- αA), dL and dA are equal to zero, and the “A” subscript 
for the artist’s bargaining power, αA, is dropped for ease of exposition.17 Maximizing (46) with 
respect to xA and solving for xA results in the following optimal money payoff for the artist 
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−−=Ax      (47) 
 
Given that the label’s money payoff, xL, is simply π(µ) – xA, the corresponding solution in terms 
of the label’s payoff is as follows 
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   We can now use the definition of the artist’s (or label’s) money payoff to solve for the  
artist’s optimal share of album sales.  By substituting the definition of the artist’s money share, xA 
= µπ(µ), into (47), we obtain the following optimal share of album sales, 
                                                     
17 See part 2 of Appendix E for the derivation of the Nash product (46), the optimal payoffs, their 
corresponding comparative statics, and the derivation of the optimal share of album sales (49). 
 
 76
 
)1(1
* γα
αγµ −−=      (49) 
 
which shows that the optimal share depends on the artist’s level of risk aversion and bargaining 
power.  It can be seen from (49) that when γ equals one, µ∗ is equal to α.  In other words, when γ 
equals one, the solution depends only on the artist’s relative bargaining power indicator, α.  
Taking the comparative statics of (49) with respect to α and γ, respectively, results in the 
following expressions, 
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which show that the artist’s optimal share of album sales is positively related to both γ and α.18  
The optimal share is, therefore, positively related to the artist’s bargaining power and negatively 
related to the artist’s level of risk aversion.  As the artist’s bargaining power increases, the artist’s 
optimal share increases.  As γ  increases, the artist becomes less risk averse and the artist’s 
optimal share rises.  For example, if an artist were afraid that negotiations would break down, 
thus leaving the parties without an agreement, the more risk averse artist may adopt a strategy to 
speed up negotiations.  Consequently, the artist may be more likely to reach a less favorable 
agreement (a lower share of album sales) in the interest of agreeing quickly. 
 
Also, since the label’s share is simply 1-µ*, we can see from equations (49) through (51) 
that the label’s optimal share would be negatively related to the artist’s bargaining power, α, and 
positively related to the artist’s level of risk aversion.  It follows that the artist’s optimal share is 
negatively related to the label’s bargaining power and vice versa.  It is also clear that as the artist 
becomes more risk averse (γ decreases), the label’s optimal share will rise.  For the sake of 
completeness, we briefly discuss a special case of (46), where the bargaining powers of both 
players are equal. 
 
In this scenario, referred to as symmetric bargaining, we restate the Nash product (46) as 
follows, 
 
))(( )( AA xxN −= µπγ      (52) 
 
where αA and αL are both equal to one, and dL and dA are equal to zero.  Maximizing (52) with 
respect to xA and using the definition of xA to solve for µ results in the following expression for 
the artist’s optimal share of album sales. 
 
1
* += γ
γµ            (53) 
 
                                                     
18 See part 3 of Appendix E for the derivations of comparative statics on the optimal shares derived in 
section 5.4. 
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The optimal share (53) shows that, in the symmetric case, the optimal share depends only on the 
artist’s level of risk aversion.19  It can be seen from (53) that when γ equals one, µ∗ is equal to 
one half.  In other words, when the two players see the bargaining situation symmetrically, the 
solution is that both players obtain an equal share. 
 
Taking the comparative static of (53) with respect to γ gives the following expression, 
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which shows that the artist’s optimal share of album sales is positively related to γ and, therefore, 
negatively related to the artist’s level of risk aversion.  Just as in the asymmetric case, as γ  
increases, the artist becomes less risk averse and the artist’s optimal share rises. 
 
 Also, since the label’s share is simply 1-µ*, we can see from equations (53) and (54) that 
the label’s optimal share would be negatively related to γ.  As the artist becomes less risk averse 
(γ increases), the label’s share of album sales will fall.  By the above reasoning, an artist with a 
lower level of risk aversion is more likely to negotiate for a larger share of album sales, thus 
decreasing the label’s share.  Next, we examine the relationships between  the optimal share 
solution and the optimal price and demand solutions derived in chapter 4. 
 
5.5  Optimal Price and Consumer Demand With Endogenous µ-share 
 
In stage two of the three-stage game, while holding the artist’s share exogenous, we 
found that the label chooses between the following two optimal price solutions,  
 



−++= A
ctqp µ1
2
3
1*      (24) 
tqp +=*       (25) 
 
where µA represented the artist’s exogenous share of album sales, depending on whether q + t is 
greater than or less than )1/( Ac µ− .  As seen in Chapter 4, the label chooses optimal price (25) 
when the cost of copying (t) is very low and the difference between the copy and CD quality (q) 
is close to zero.  Conversely, the label chooses optimal price (24) when the transaction cost of 
copying (t) and the copy/CD quality difference (q) is significant.  Since the optimal price solution 
(25) does not depend on the artist’s share of album sales, we now substitute the newly derived 
endogenous artist’s share (49) into expression (24) to examine the effect the bargaining process 
has on the optimal price (24).  This substitution yields the following expression for the optimal 
price,  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19 The complete derivation and the comparative statics for the optimal money payoffs in the symmetric case 
are presented in Appendix E. 
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where the expression for µ* (49) is substituted for µA.20 
 
Endogenizing the bargaining agreement allows us to examine the relationship between 
the optimal price and the artist’s risk aversion and bargaining power, respectively.  Aside from 
calculating comparative statics on the new optimal price expression (55), we can see that the 
bargaining power and risk aversion parameters work through a multiplier effect on the marginal 
cost parameter, c.  In (55), the label’s marginal cost is multiplied by the term 1 )1( γα −− / α−1 , 
which is increasing in both α and γ. 
 
For instance, if the artist’s bargaining power, α, increases, the marginal cost multiplier 
increases and the label perceives the marginal cost as more important.  The greater the increase in 
the artist’s bargaining power, therefore, the greater the price increase expected from the label.  
Similarly, as the artist’s risk aversion decreases (the γ parameter increases), the artist is more 
likely to extract a larger share of album sales, whereby the label would be expected to institute a 
greater price increase because of the marginal cost multiplier.  We can also examine the effects of 
the bargaining power and risk aversion parameters on the optimal price with the following two 
comparative statics. 
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The comparative static (56) suggests that the effect the artist’s bargaining power has on 
the optimal price is magnified by the artist’s level of risk aversion.  In other words, as the artist 
becomes less risk averse (γ increases) the magnitude of (56) increases.  On the other hand, as the 
artist becomes more risk averse (γ decreases), the improved bargaining power has a smaller effect 
on the price.  Likewise, the comparative static (57) demonstrates that that the effect of the artist’s 
risk aversion on the optimal price is magnified as the artist’s bargaining power increases (α 
increases). 
 
More generally, equation (56) shows that there is a positive relationship between the 
artist’s bargaining power and the optimal price, and equation (57) shows that there is a negative 
relationship between the artist’s risk aversion and the optimal price (as γ increases, the optimal 
price rises because the artist becomes less risk averse).  For example, the comparative static in 
(56) shows that as artists obtain more bargaining power and, thus, demand a larger share of album 
                                                     
20 From the comparative static derived in Chapter 4 (equation (26)), we know that the optimal price is 
positively related to µA.  The derivation of equation (55) and the corresponding comparative statics are in 
part 3 of Appendix E. 
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sales, the optimal response by the label is to increase the price of the CD.  Since there is a positive 
relationship between the artist’s share and the optimal price, it follows that any parameter that 
increases this share would increase the label’s optimal price. 
 
Consequently, since there is a positive relationship between the γ parameter and the 
artist’s optimal share (which represents a negative relationship between the artist’s level of risk 
aversion and the optimal share), it follows that increasing γ leads to an increase in the optimal 
price, p*.  For instance, (57) shows that as the artist becomes more risk averse and, thus, demands 
a smaller share of album sales, the optimal response by the label is to lower the price for the CD.  
Next, we examine the effect that the endogenous bargaining arrangement has on the consumer 
demand equations derived in Chapter 4. 
 
In the third stage of the three stage game, we found that, given an exogenous price, the 
utility maximizing consumer was faced with the following demand for CDs,  
 
yCD ≡ ( )2
2
1 tpq
qt
+−  
 
which was presented as equation (8) in Chapter 4.  Substituting the newly derived optimal price 
(55) into (8) results in the following consumer demand expression, 
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where the expression for p* (55) is substituted for p.21  Before discussing the comparative statics, 
we can see that the same marginal cost multiplier, 1 )1( γα −− / α−1 , in the optimal price 
expression (55) is present in the new consumer demand expression (58).  Thus, as the artist’s 
bargaining power, α, increases, the marginal cost multiplier increases and the label perceives the 
marginal cost as more important.  Through the higher CD price, therefore, the artist’s increased 
bargaining power would have a more negative impact on the demand for the CD.  Likewise, if the 
artist’s risk aversion decreases (the γ parameter increases), the corresponding higher price will 
have a more negative impact on the demand for the CD.  We can also examine the following 
comparative statics. 
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Equations (59) and (60) show that the demand for CDs is negatively related to the artist’s 
bargaining power (a negative relationship with α) and positively related to the artist’s level of risk 
aversion (a negative relationship with γ).  As seen in equation (56), the artist’s bargaining power, 
                                                     
21 From the partial derivative taken in Chapter 4 (equation (12)), we know that consumer demand for CDs 
is negatively related to the price of the CD.  The derivation of equation (58) and the corresponding 
comparative statics are in part 3 of Appendix E. 
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α, is positively related to the optimal price, p*.  Since any parameter that is positively 
(negatively) related to the optimal price would be negatively (positively) related to the demand 
for CDs, an increase (decrease) in the artist’s bargaining power, α, would decrease (increase) the 
quantity of CDs demanded, yCD.  The magnitude of this impact, as seen from equations (56) and 
(57), will be greater depending on the α and γ parameters. 
 
Additionally, equation (57) demonstrates that the γ parameter is positively related to the 
optimal price, p*.  As γ increases (the artist becomes less risk averse), the label’s optimal 
response is to increase the CD price.  Therefore, an increase in γ  would lead to a decrease in the 
demand for CDs.  For instance, when the artist becomes more risk averse (γ  decreases) and, thus, 
demands a smaller share of album sales, the model predicts that the label’s response will be to 
lower the price of the CD.  This lower price, in turn, leads to an increase in the quantity of CDs 
demanded (the impact of which, again, will be greater or smaller depending on the α and γ 
parameters).  This same logic can be applied to the demand for copies and the profit expression 
derived in Chapter 4. 
  
The demand for copies was derived for two different cases.  The first case (equation (10)) 
represented the demand for copies when the quality adjusted transaction cost was less than the 
quality adjusted difference between the price of the CD and the transaction cost.  The second case 
(equation (11)) represented the demand for copies when the quality adjusted transaction cost was 
equal to the quality adjusted difference between the price of the CD and the transaction cost.  
Since both cases showed a positive relationship to p (the partial derivatives (15) and (19)), 
substituting the newly derived p* would yield the same sign. 
 
Consequently, any parameter that is positively (negatively) related to the optimal price, 
p*, would be positively (negatively) related to the demand for copies.  For instance, the artist’s 
bargaining power, which is positively related to the optimal price, would be positively related to 
the demand for copies.  Additionally, the artist’s level of risk aversion would be negatively 
related to the demand for copies.  When the artist becomes less risk averse (γ  increases) and, 
thus, demands a larger share of sales, we can predict that the label’s response will be to raise the 
price of the CD, leading to a decrease in the demand for CDs and a corresponding increase in the 
demand for copies.  Another variable from Chapter 4 that can now be reexamined with 
endogenous bargaining is the label’s profit expression (still assuming that optimal price (24) is 
chosen). 
 
The comparative statics on equation (36) show that the label’s profit is negatively related 
to the artist’s optimal share of album sales (see Appendix E).  For any given level of profit, a 
higher share of sales going to the artist corresponds to a lower amount for the label.  It follows 
that any parameter which increases the artist’s optimal share, µ*, decreases the label’s profit.  
Therefore, the label’s profit is negatively related to the artist’s bargaining power and positively 
related to the artist’s level of risk aversion. 
 
For example, when the artist becomes less risk averse and successfully bargains for a 
larger share of album sales, the label’s profit will decrease.  Of course, the model predicts that the 
label’s response to paying out the higher share will be to raise the price of the CD, leading to an 
increase in the profit from selling these CDs.  Similarly, when the artist’s bargaining power, α, 
increases, resulting in a higher share being paid out to the artist, the label’s profit will decrease.  
Again, the model predicts that the firm’s optimal response will be to raise the price of the CD, 
thus increasing the profit from selling these CDs.  In the next section, we examine the effect of 
the artist having a nonzero disagreement point. 
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5.6   The Optimal Shares With Asymmetric Bargaining and a Nonzero dA 
 
In section 5.4, we derived the optimal shares for the asymmetric and symmetric cases 
while holding both the artist’s and label’s disagreement points to zero.  In this section, we 
examine the symmetric case when the zero disagreement point assumption is relaxed.  We now 
allow the artist’s disagreement point, dA, to be positive while continuing to restrict the label’s 
disagreement point, dL, to be zero.  Given the nonzero disagreement point, we can now rewrite 
the Nash product (equation (46)) in terms of the artist’s money payoff as follows, 
 
))(( )( AAA xdxN −−= µπγ                (61) 
 
where αA and αL are both equal to one, dL = 0, and xL )( )( Ax−= µπ .22  Maximizing equation (61) 
with respect to xA leaves us with the following first order condition 
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By attempting to solve (62) for xA , we find that a closed form solution can be found only when γ 
is equal to one.  This difficulty can be seen from the following derivation. 
 
0)(1 =+−−− AAAA dxxx γγγ γµπγ  
AAA dxx =−+ −1)()1( γγ µγπγ  
 
As can be seen from the last line of the derivation, given a nonzero disagreement point, dA , there 
is no closed form solution for xA unless γ equals one. 
 
While we cannot derive an optimal money payoff in this case, we can use the implicit 
function theorem to examine the impact of a nonzero disagreement point, dA, on the respective 
money shares, xA and xL.  By applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition 
(62) and taking the partial derivative with respect to xA, we have the following expression,  
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where, since  is less than zero, 
AxF AA dx ∂∂ /  must be greater than zero.  Therefore, the artist’s 
disagreement point, dA, is positively related to the artist’s optimal money payoff and, since xL is 
simply π(µ) – xA, negatively related to the label’s optimal money payoff.  If, for instance, the 
artist’s expected net wealth from not signing with a label increased, we would expect the artist to 
bargain for a larger payoff.  In the next section, we discuss the effect that bargaining over a 
variable profit has on the bargaining outcome. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
22 The complete derivation of (61) and the corresponding comparative statics are in  part 2 of Appendix E. 
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5.7 Optimal Shares With Variable Profit 
 
 The optimal shares discussed in sections 5.3 through 5.6 were derived under the 
assumption that the artist and label would bargain over a fixed profit.  In this section, we examine 
the most general and interesting case, where a “follow-up” game is allowed to impact the 
bargaining.  Specifically, we now examine the effect that bargaining over a variable surplus has 
on the optimal shares by comparing the new results to those derived previously, where the players 
bargained over a fixed profit.  To illustrate these effects, we re-formulate the asymmetric Nash 
product (46) in terms of the profit shares as follows, 
 
( ) ( ) αµπµαµµπ
µ
γ −− 1)()1( ))((max
)(
        (64) 
 
where γ < 1, αA and αL sum to one (i.e., αL = 1- αA), dL and dA are equal to zero, the “A” subscript 
for the artist’s bargaining power, αA, is dropped for ease of exposition, and where the expression 
for profit as a function of the artist’s share, π(µ), is as derived in equation (36).23  Taking the log 
of (64) results in the following expression for the Nash product.24 
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Since the profit is no longer fixed, maximizing (65) results in the following first order 
condition. 
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Using parameters defined in section 5.3, the first order condition (66) can be expressed as 
follows:   
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where k = z(1-µ) – c, z = )]1/2([
3
1
Actq µ−++ , and, for simplicity, the label’s fixed cost is equal 
to zero.25  Since no tractable solution can be derived from (67), we illustrate the solution by 
graphing two curves – the first and second terms of (67) as one curve, and the last term of (67) as 
the second curve – whose intersection indicates the optimal share solution.  To illustrate the effect 
the last term of the first order condition (67) has on the bargaining solution, we define the 
following functions 
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αγµ −
−−=g              (68) 
                                                     
23 For simplicity, we have also dropped the “A” subscript from the artist’s share, denoting profit as π(µ). 
24 All derivations for this section are in part 4 of Appendix E. 
25 Since bargaining over a variable profit coincides with the label choosing the optimal price (24), we 
substituted this optimal price solution, given consumer demand, into the profit expression.  The expressions 
for z and k are presented in section 3.3, and their derivations are in part 1 of Appendix E. 
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where g(µ) and f(µ) are identically equal to the first two terms and the last term (without the 
multiplier) of the first order condition (67), respectively.  The g(µ) expression (68) represents the 
first order condition when the players bargain over a fixed profit, and solving the expression for µ 
would result in the optimal share derived in section 5.4 (this result will be shown below). 
 
Taking the derivative of (69) with respect to (1-µ) results in the following expression,  
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where, for simplicity, x = (1-µ), and m = q + t.26  Since (70) is decreasing in (1-µ), it is increasing 
in µ.  Additionally, if we evaluate (69) at zero, we find that  
 
f(0) = 
cm
cm
−
+ 22       (71) 
 
where, for simplicity, m = q + t.  As long as the label’s marginal costs are low, as they have been 
for some time, the expression in (71) is positive.  We can now use a graphical representation of 
the g(µ) and the f(µ) functions to examine the effect bargaining over a variable profit has on the 
solution for the artist’s optimal share. 
 
The resulting graph, Figure 5-2, plots the g(µ) function (68) on the vertical axis and the 
artist’s share, µ, on the horizontal axis (where 0 <µ <1).  The downward sloping curve in Figure 
5-2 represents the g(µ) function (the first two terms of the first order condition (67)), and the 
upward sloping curve represents the f(µ) function (the last term in the first order condition (67)). 
 
Figure 5-2 
g(µ) 
      g(µ) 
             f(µ) 
 
    
0      µ*        1    µ 
 
 
                                                     
26 As long as the label’s marginal costs are relatively low, as they have been in the industry for some time, 
the derivative is increasing in µ.  The derivation of this derivative is in part 4 of Appendix E. 
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The solution for the artist’s share, µ *, is found where the two curves intersect.  By examining 
how the curves in Figure 5-2 change as the parameters in the g(µ) and f(µ) functions change, we 
can study how these changes, as well as how bargaining over a variable profit, cause the solution 
for the artist’s share to change. 
  
To begin, if we assumed that both the risk aversion parameter and the bargaining powers 
of both players were equal to one, the first two terms in the first order condition (67) would have 
numerators equal to one.  With both numerators equal to one, the downward sloping curve in 
Figure 5-2 would shift upward.  Therefore, the less bargaining power the artist has (the smaller α 
is), and the more risk averse the artist is (the smaller γ is), the lower the position of the downward 
sloping curve and, therefore, the lower the optimal share of sales for the artist.   
 
While the exact location of the µ* solution would depend on the precise position of the 
f(µ) curve, we can examine how changing the parameters in the f(µ) function would affect the µ* 
solution.  To see how the f(µ) function (69) interacts with the artist’s optimal share, we can take 
its derivatives with respect to m and c.  First, we restate (69) as follows 
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where, for simplicity, x = (1-µ), and m = q + t.  We then take the following partial derivatives. 
 
0
])[(
6)(
2
2
<−−≡∂
∂
cmxx
cx
m
f µ      (73) 
0
])[(
6)(
2
2
>−≡∂
∂
cmxx
mx
c
f µ      (74) 
 
 The derivative (73) shows that as the sum of the CD/copy quality difference and the 
transaction costs of copying rise, the f(µ) function decreases.  Thus, as m increases, the upward 
sloping curve in Figure 5-2 shifts downward.  We can see that, as m increases,  the artist’s 
optimal share would increase.  These directional changes coincide with those derived for the 
fixed profit cases, where an increase in either q or t would increase the artist’s payoff. 
 
Similarly, the implications from the derivative (74) coincide with those derived for the 
label’s marginal cost, c, when profit is fixed.  The positive relationship between the f(µ) function 
and c imply that an increase in the label’s marginal cost would cause the upward sloping curve in 
Figure 5-2 to shift up, resulting in a decrease in the artist’s optimal share.  This result is intuitive 
given that we would expect the label to respond to higher marginal costs by reducing the share it 
offers to the artist.  Another key implication that can be seen from Figure 5-2 is that, for any 
given set of parameters, the µ* solution from bargaining over a variable profit would be less than 
that obtained from bargaining over a fixed profit. 
 
To see that the artist’s share would be smaller when the profit is allowed to vary, we can 
reexamine the log of the Nash product (65) and its corresponding first order condition (66).  If the 
bargaining were over a fixed profit, rather than a variable profit, then the first order condition (66) 
would be expressed as follows, 
 
 
 85
0
)1(
1 =−
−− µ
α
µ
αγ       (75)   
 
where the expression is identical to the first two terms in (66), the first order condition with 
variable profit.  When (75) is solved for µ, we find that µ* is equal to )1(1/ γααγ −− , an 
expression that is identically equal to the µ* solution derived in section 5.4, when the players 
bargained over a fixed profit.  In the first order condition for the variable profit case (66), 
however, there is a third term subtracted from the first two.   
 
Therefore, for any given set of parameters, when the profit is allowed to vary, the optimal 
µ is less than when the artist and label bargain over a fixed profit.  In terms of Figure 5-2, we can 
see that removing the third term of the first order condition, i.e., holding the profit fixed, allows 
us to remove the upward sloping line from the graph.  Removing the upward sloping line results 
in an optimal µ solution where the downward sloping line intersects the horizontal axis (rather 
than where the two curves intersect). 
 
As long as the f(µ) function is positive, which the model predicts, the two curves will 
intersect at a point to the left of where the downward sloping curve intersects the horizontal axis, 
ensuring that the optimal µ in the variable profit case is less than the optimal µ when the profit is 
fixed.  Given the positive relationship between the optimal µ and the CD price, the model predicts 
that bargaining over a variable profit will lead to a lower optimal price than in the fixed profit 
case.  Similarly, since there is a negative relationship between the optimal µ and the demand for 
CDs, the model predicts that bargaining over a variable profit will lead to a higher quantity of 
CDs demanded than in the fixed profit scenario. 
 
5.8 Conclusions and Ideas for Future Research 
 
In this chapter, we endogenized the artist-label bargaining agreement by incorporating it 
into a theoretical framework using the Nash cooperative bargaining solution.  The model, which 
accounted for the artist’s bargaining power and risk aversion, was used to solve for the optimal 
share of album sales, µ*, and the corresponding optimal price, p*, and demand for CDs, yCD.  
These results were as follows: 
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Table 5-1 lists the signs of the comparative statics for these endogenous variables with respect to 
the exogenous parameters of the model, α, γ, t, q, c, and F, as well as the implied relationships 
between the demand for copies and the exogenous parameters. 
 
Endogenizing the bargaining arrangement allows us to predict a positive relationship 
between the artist’s optimal share of album sales and the artist’s bargaining power, as well as a 
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negative relationship between the artist’s optimal share and level of risk aversion.  The 
endogenous bargaining framework also predicts that the artist’s optimal share is positively related 
to the artist’s disagreement point. 
 
Combined, these results suggest that building a relatively large fan base and selling many 
albums as an independent artist, as well as being able to patiently negotiate with the label, should 
result in a higher share for the artist.  Not only would building a large fan base increase the 
number of labels interested in the artist, but it would legitimately improve the artist’s “fall back” 
position, thus bolstering the artist’s overall bargaining position.   
 
Therefore, the model predicts that artists with relatively higher album sales and tour 
income as an independent would be more likely to sign a contract awarding a higher share of 
album sales.  While a more direct test of this hypothesis is desirable, we do know that artists’ 
ability to build a solid fan-base and sell albums as an independent has long been an important 
factor used by major labels as a predictor of success. 
 
Table 5-1  Summary of Key Results 
 
 
Key Relationships for µ* 
Relationship With:             Sign 
Artist’s bargaining power, α          + 
 Risk aversion coefficient, γ         + 
 
 
Key Relationships for p* 
Relationship With:       Sign 
             Artist’s bargaining power, α         + 
 Risk aversion coefficient, γ         + 
 Transaction cost of copying, t         + 
Degree of substitutability, q       + 
Marginal cost of CD, c            + 
 
 
Key Relationships for yCD 
Relationship With:       Sign 
Artist’s bargaining power, α         - 
 Risk aversion coefficient, γ         - 
 Transaction cost of copying, t         + 
Degree of substitutability, q        + 
 
 
Key Relationships for yCOPY 
Relationship With:       Sign 
 Optimal price of CD, p∗           + 
 Artist’s bargaining power, α         + 
 Risk aversion coefficient, γ         + 
 Transaction cost of copying, t          - 
Degree of substitutability, q        - 
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By improving artists’ ability to increase their fan base and sell their own music, the 
Internet and digital downloading could strengthen artists’ bargaining position and thus allow them 
to rely less on the label for distribution.  Lowering their reliance on labels for distribution would 
greatly increase artists’ bargaining power.  Therefore, our model predicts that artists’ share of 
profits should increase as legitimate digital distribution on the internet gains prominence. 
 
Although the model predicts an improved bargaining position would increase the artist’s 
optimal share of album sales, it is not entirely clear that the artist (or the label) would have a 
larger absolute payoff if digital downloading were the dominant form of distribution.  One reason 
for this ambiguity is that the new technology seems to be moving toward a different preferred 
format, where the single song, or “track,” is sold for less than/equal to its proportional share on a 
pre-packaged CD. 
 
Nonetheless, for a given method of distribution, an improved bargaining position for the 
artist is predicted to lead to a higher price for music.  For example, the model predicts that a label 
will respond to paying out a higher share of album sales by raising the price charged for the 
artist’s CDs.  The elasticity of demand for CDs is an important factor though, since there is a 
negative relationship between the demand for CDs and p*, α and γ.  If the demand for CDs is 
inelastic, labels could realize higher total revenue and artists could realize higher royalties by 
charging higher prices.  However, in the case of digital downloading, where firms are currently 
selling individual songs for $1 each, a considerably higher level of sales will be needed for the 
label and the artist to obtain the same absolute payoff that they receive under traditional 
distribution methods.  Still, if the price elasticity of demand for music proves to be rather elastic 
in the digital downloading environment, lowering the price for downloads could increase the 
revenue that both parties receive.  Another benefit of a lower price would be the reduced demand 
for copying. 
 
In fact, the model predicts a positive relationship between the demand for copies and p*, 
α and γ, as well as a negative relationship between the label’s profit and µ*, α and γ.  Combined, 
these relationships suggest that the label would have less incentive to sign an artist with higher 
bargaining power because it would then have to relinquish a larger share of album sales.  
Consequently, the model predicts that labels will sign very few artists to contracts which give 
away a particularly high share of album sales.  Though a direct test of this hypothesis is needed, 
evidence suggests that only the “best” artists sign for a noticeably higher share of album sales, 
and contracts are usually structured such that artists’ can increase their share of album sales based 
on performance.  There are also several model results that have not changed from the second to 
the third stage. 
 
To begin, there is a positive relationship between the optimal price, p*, and the 
transaction cost of copying, t, and the quality difference of the copy and CD, q.  As such, the 
model predicts that labels’ optimal response to a decrease in either t or q will be to lower prices.  
Yet, for very low values of these parameters, the model predicts that labels’ CD prices will not be 
very responsive to changes in either its marginal cost or in the share of album sales it pays out to 
artists.  For example, while one would normally expect labels to charge higher prices for artists’ 
albums when it pays them a higher share, the model suggests that labels may not have responded 
this way in recent years. 
 
In recent years, both conditions –lower transaction cost and lower quality difference– 
have been present that would have lead the model to predict  both lower and less responsive (less 
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responsive to a higher payout to artists and changes in marginal cost) CD prices, a testable 
hypothesis.  The technical innovations of the internet, digital file compression techniques, read-
write CD devices and portable digital players have dramatically lowered copy transaction costs 
and increased the degree of substitutability between copies and pre-packaged CDs.27 
 
Other than lowering CD prices, the model predicts that the label could respond to lower 
copy costs and higher substitutability by increasing the transaction cost of copying by, for 
example, increasing efforts to protect its copyright.  While more direct testing is desirable, at least 
one major label has recently announced decreases in suggested retail prices, and the labels have 
been engaged in a campaign to increase the transaction cost of copying since the launch of 
Napster.28  Labels have been experimenting with various forms of electronic copy protection 
techniques and have increased efforts to enforce copyright laws on file-traders through the court 
system. 
 
Not surprisingly, if the label can increase copy protection and raise CD prices, the model 
predicts that the label could obtain higher profits.  Since consumers vary in their taste for music, 
some are likely to pay the higher prices for CDs.  Of course, at some point, the higher prices will 
lead to a smaller concentration of “high valuation” consumers, thus leading to an overall 
reduction in sales.  An empirical study, one with pricing data from different types of stores, is 
needed to examine whether such price increases may have contributed to past CD sales declines.  
In the next chapter of this dissertation, we empirically test the hypothesis that much of the file-
sharing since 1999 has been done by low valuation consumers.  Still, there are many other topics 
that future research can address, both through theoretical and empirical work. 
 
For example, instead of using the Nash bargaining framework, applying incentive 
contract theory to the artist-label relationship may be useful to more fully examine the 
relationships between the artist and the label.  Very little work has been done to jointly examine 
the relationships between the artist, label and consumer, and adding to the theory would greatly 
benefit any future empirical work.  Additionally, there are some specific aspects of the typical 
artist-label relationship that seem to warrant further study. 
 
The artist-label contract is typically on an exclusive basis for a given number of albums 
and usually gives the label the option to pick up several more albums based on the success of the 
first album(s).  This arrangement suggests that the label is making a long-term investment in an 
asset (the artist), and that it seeks to earn returns over time.  The arrangement could also suggest 
that the label has revealed information by signing an artist.  Specifically, by signing an artist, the 
label could be revealing that the artist has the ability to consistently sell a large number of albums 
over an extended period of time.  Another aspect of these relationships deals with the supply of 
artists. 
 
In this chapter, we assumed that the supply of artists by far outweighed the number of 
labels.  However, it could be the case that many individuals calling themselves artists should not 
be considered “true” artists.  A thorough examination of the supply of artists and artists’ 
characteristics would be indispensable to researching the music industry.  Another innovation that 
may prove useful would be to explicitly include a parameter for government regulation, enabling 
a better examination of the effects of copyright protection. 
27 Given the format of the file-sharing platforms, it appears that any reduction in sales should be most 
pronounced in the market for CD singles.  However, as seen in Chapter 3, the market for CD singles had 
been falling before 1999. 
28 See Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 6, An Empirical Examination of Consumer Expenditures 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The demand equations for CDs and copies derived in Chapter 4 showed that, depending 
on factors such as price, the substitutability of copies and CDs, taste for music and understanding 
of technology, consumers will choose to buy, copy or stay out of the market completely.  One of 
the main hypotheses from our model is that, due to the recent decrease in copy transaction costs 
and CD/copy substitutability, some of the consumers using Internet file-sharing services were 
those previously not in the market.  One way to test this hypothesis is to examine consumers’ CD 
expenditures before and after the launch of file-sharing services, such as Napster, in 1999.  If, for 
example, average CD expenditures did not decrease in a predictable manner, we would be unable 
to reject our hypothesis.  Since a necessary condition for our hypothesis is that significant 
differences exist among consumers’ taste for music, finding empirical evidence of such 
heterogeneity across consumers is needed to support our hypothesis.  After briefly discussing 
what we view as the “ideal” data for studying our hypothesis, we present detailed descriptions of 
our data sets, the tests that we perform and our results. 
 
6.1 Ideal data 
 
In a perfect world, we would be able to directly test changes in artists’ income and 
consumers’ CD expenditures using longitudinal data that spans, at least, 1998 through 2001.  
Having such data would allow us to test for patterns in consumers’ entertainment expenditures to 
see, for example, if popular trends are more important than factors such as price and CD/copy 
substitutability.  We would also be able to directly test how these factors affect artists’ income 
and consumers’ expenditures, as well as how sensitive aggregate CD sales are to the sales of 
various types of artists’ music.  Of course, we would want these data to include control 
characteristics, such as the types of music each consumer purchases, as well as standard consumer 
demographic characteristics, such as age, family size and income.  Unfortunately, most of the 
available data sources only contain a few of these desired properties. 
 
For instance, the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) publishes the annual National 
Compensation Survey which includes aggregate earnings for the category “musicians and 
composers.”  However, the BLS does not release the micro data from the survey, making any 
comparison of individual artists’ income impossible.  Similarly, the BLS publishes the annual 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), whereby various categories of aggregate expenditures can 
be studied for different groups of consumers.  Although the CEX micro data can be purchased, 
the data are not longitudinal, rendering a study of year-to-year changes in individual consumers’ 
expenditures impossible.  Nonetheless, the CEX data files do contain a wealth of demographic 
information on consumers.  So, given the absence of the ideal data to study year-to-year changes 
in the same artists’ income and the same consumers’ expenditures, we attempt to study our 
hypothesis using the best – in terms of the above characteristics – available data that we could 
find. 
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We use a confidential data set from the U.S. Treasury’s Statistics on Income (SOI) 
division, and we use the CEX micro data files (available for purchase from the BLS).  Since both 
the SOI and CEX files consist of data for the years 1998 through 2001, using these data allows us 
to compare artists’ income and consumers’ expenditures for the year prior to the launch of any 
file sharing service to comparable income and expenditures in years after the launch of these 
services.1  If the bulk of the file-sharing has been done by consumers formerly not in the market, 
then artists’ income and consumers’ CD expenditures should not have decreased in a predictable 
manner after 1998.  Alternatively, if a large number of consumers previously in the market for 
buying CDs were responsible for the increased file-sharing, artists’ income and consumers’ CD 
expenditures should have decreased in a predictable manner after 1998.  Unfortunately, the SOI 
data set contains artists’ income from many types of artists other than those we are interested in, 
and there is no way to partition the sample on the types of artists.  Therefore, we report our 
findings on the SOI data in Appendix F.  In the main body of the text, we focus on our findings 
from studying the CEX data.  The next section provides a detailed description of the CEX data 
and the tests we performed. 
 
6.2 Consumer Expenditure Survey Aggregate Data 
 
In this section, we examine data from the aggregate level Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) published by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS).2  Using the micro-level survey 
data, the BLS compiles these annual aggregate mean expenditure estimates for select categories.  
As of this writing, the BLS has published annual aggregate means from 1984 to 2001.  One 
disadvantage of using these data is that we cannot examine specific categories of expenditures, 
such as CDs and movie tickets.  Another disadvantage of using the CEX data (at both the 
aggregate and micro-level) is that the unit of measure is the consumer unit (CU), which is not 
necessarily an individual consumer.  According to the BLS, the CU is comprised of either: 
 
(1) all members of a particular household who are related by blood, marriage, adoption, 
or other legal arrangements; (2) a person living alone or sharing a household with others 
or living as a roomer in a private home or lodging house or in permanent living quarters 
in a hotel or motel, but who is financially independent; or (3) two or more persons living 
together who pool their income to make joint expenditure decisions. Financial 
independence is determined by the three major expense categories: Housing, food, and 
other living expenses. To be considered financially independent, at least two of the three 
major expense categories have to be provided by the respondent.3 
 
Nonetheless, using the aggregate CEX data allows us to readily examine a time series of mean 
expenditure changes from 1984 to 2001 for various groups of consumers on different types of 
entertainment goods. 
 
6.2.1 Methodology for Aggregate Consumer Expenditure Survey data 
 
The aggregate expenditure categories that we examine are as follows: (1) fees and 
admissions, (2) televisions, radios and sound equipment, and (3) other entertainment supplies, 
equipment and services.  Since the BLS does not publish the CPI for recreation items prior to 
1993, we adjust the aggregates to 2001 dollars using (1) the CPI for all items less food and 
energy, and (2) the GDP deflator.  We also control for age differences by examining the 
                                                     
1 The first of such services, Napster, was launched in May of 1999. 
2 The aggregate data is available for years 1984 to 2001 at http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm#2001 . 
3 The definition is available at http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm#C. 
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aggregates for the following three groups of consumers: (1) all consumer units, (2)  all with 
reference person age 25 to 34, and (3) all with reference age person 55 to 64.4 
Using the aggregate CEX data, we run the following ordinary least squares (OLS)5 
regression model for the three entertainment expenditure categories, 
 
1321 −+∆+=∆ ttt expENTˆyˆˆexpENT βββ     (76) 
 
where ∆ENTexpt represents the first difference of the aggregate mean expenditure for a given 
category, ∆yt represents the first difference in the aggregate mean of before tax income, and 
ENTexpt-1 represents the one-period lagged aggregate mean of the expenditure for the given 
category.6  Model (76) was run separately for each consumer groups’ distinct expenditure 
categories using both nominal and 2001 dollars.  To check for autocorrelation in the error term, 
we saved the residuals from each OLS regression using model (76), lagged them one period, and 
then regressed the residual on its lagged value and all independent variables 
( ).13211 −− +∆++= tttt expENTˆyˆˆeˆ ˆeˆ βββρ 7  The null hypothesis for this test is that the 
coefficient on the lagged error is zero, which can be rejected when the coefficient is statistically 
significant. 
 
6.2.2 Results for Aggregate CEX regressions 
 
The results from using the OLS regression model (76) on real mean aggregate 
expenditures from 1984 to 2001 are presented in tables 6-1 through 6-3, and the summary 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in tables 6-4 through 6-6.  
Panels A through C of Table 6-1 show the results using expenditures on fees and admissions as 
the dependent variable for all consumer units (CUs), all CUs age 25 to 34, and all CUs age 55-64, 
respectively.  Using the same table design, panels A through C of Table 6-2 show the results 
using expenditures on other entertainment supplies, equipment and services as the dependent 
variable, and panels A through C of Table 6-3 show the results using expenditures on televisions, 
radios and sound equipment as the dependent variable. 
 
Out of the 18 regressions that were run, two specifications were found to fail the overall 
significance F-test.  These two insignificant models were found using the GDP deflator to adjust 
fees and admissions expenditures for the categories of all CUs and CUs with reference person age 
25 to 34.  For each of the OLS regressions, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation.  Across all expenditure categories, across all types of consumers, an average R2 
value of 41.28 percent was found.  Among the younger and older consumer groups, average R2 
values of 35.25 and 48.58 percent, respectively, were found across all expenditure categories. 
 
                                                     
4 The age of the reference person in the consumer unit is the member of the consumer unit that responds to 
the survey questions. 
5 Since we are using differences and lags of sample means for dependent and independent variables, 
respectively, we also ran weighted least squares (WLS) to correct for any possible heteroscedasticity (using 
the square root of the sample sizes as the weights).  Since the aggregate-level WLS results did not differ 
from the aggregate-level OLS results, we present only the OLS results. 
6 To provide for better comparisons to the micro-data regressions in the next section of this chapter, we use 
before tax income.  In 2001, the BLS changed the definition of before tax income, making comparisons 
across 1998 to 2001, the years for which we have the micro-data, difficult.  In the regressions on the micro-
data, therefore, we use wage and salary income.  Since the BLS does not publish the aggregate CEX wage 
and salary data, we use before tax income. 
7 See Wooldridge (2003), p. 399. 
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Irrespective of the statistical significance of the parameters, for all 18 OLS regressions, 
we find a negative relationship between the first difference of the mean expenditure (the 
dependent variable, ∆ENTexpt) and the lagged expenditure, ENTexpt-1, and a positive relationship 
between ∆ENTexpt and the first difference of income, ∆yt.  Overall, our results suggest that, on 
average, changes in consumers’ annual expenditures are negatively related to their level of 
expenditures in the prior year and positively related to changes in their income.  Accounting for 
the statistical significance of the estimated parameter values, we find variation in these 
relationships for different age categories of consumers. 
 
Panel A of Table 6-1 shows that, for all CUs’ fees and admissions expenditures, only 
when adjusting to 2001 dollars with the CPI for all items less food and energy were any 
relationships found to be statistically significant.  For ENTexpt-1, a parameter value of (.654)8 was 
found to be significant at the 1 percent level, but the coefficient on ∆yt was found to be 
statistically insignificant.  Similarly, panel B shows that, for CUs age 25 to 34, only when fees 
and admissions expenditures were adjusted with the CPI measure were any of the relationships 
found to be statistically significant.  Here, too, a negative relationship was found for ENTexpt-1 (a 
parameter estimate of (.597) at the 1 percent level of significance), and no statistically significant 
relationship was found for ∆y. 
 
On the other hand, for CUs age 55 to 64, regardless of the measure of inflation, the 
coefficient on ∆yt was found to be positively related to ∆ENTexpt, and was statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level of significance using the CPI measure and the 1 percent level using the GDP 
deflator.  Additionally, for this older group of CUs, when the CPI for all items less food and 
energy was used, the coefficient on ENTexpt-1 was found to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (the parameter value was (.684)).  These results suggest that, 
relative to those of pre-retirement age consumers, younger consumers’ expenditures are less 
sensitive to changes in income.  The results presented in Table 6-2 support this finding of 
consumer heterogeneity across age groups. 
 
Table 6-2 shows the OLS results using the aggregate expenditure category other 
entertainment supplies, equipment and services as the dependent variable, ∆ENTexpt.  For all 
CUs’, the parameter estimate on ∆yt was found to be positive and statistically significant (at the 
10 percent level) only when the GDP deflator was used. For the oldest group of CUs’, however, 
the estimate on the ∆yt coefficient was found to be positive and statistically significant for both 
measures of real expenditures (at the 10 percent level).  The oldest groups’ estimated parameter 
values on ∆y, for the two measures of real expenditures, were .024 and .026, respectively.  For the 
younger group of CUs, the coefficient on ∆y was found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
However, for the younger group of CUs, a statistically significant negative relationship 
was found on the coefficient for ENTexpt-1.  The younger groups’ parameter estimates were (.74) 
for the CPI adjusted expenditures (at the 1 percent level), and (.85) for the GDP deflator adjusted 
expenditures (at the 1 percent level).  For the oldest CUs’ real expenditures, the parameter 
estimates for ENTexpt-1, were significant at the 5 percent level, with estimates of (.616) and (.513) 
for the CPI and GDP deflator adjusted expenditures, respectively.  These results suggest that, for 
this category of expenditures as well, the relationships between changes in consumers’ 
expenditures and both changes in income and prior year expenditures differ across consumer age 
groups.  The results presented in Table 6-3 suggest that, for expenditures on television, radios and 
sound equipment, consumer heterogeneity across age groups plays less of a role. 
                                                     
8 Parentheses denote a negative value. 
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Table 6-1, OLS Results for Fees and Admissions
Panel A - All CUs
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 332.196 105.006 3.164 0.007 0.012 0.231 0.469
∆  y 0.006 0.004 1.43 0.175
ENTexp t-1 -0.654 0.204 -3.203 0.006 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 206.572 120.195 1.719 0.108 0.218 0.231 0.195
∆  y 0.005 0.005 0.905 0.381
ENTexp t-1 -0.431 0.251 -1.718 0.108 No. Of Observations 17
Panel B - Age 25 to 34
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 270.374 91.95 2.94 0.011 0.032 0.457 0.387
∆  y .000 0.001 0.176 0.863
ENTexp t-1 -0.597 0.201 -2.969 0.01 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 202.858 125.676 1.614 0.129 0.296 0.572 0.16
∆  y .000 0.002 0.163 0.872
ENTexp t-1 -0.47 0.295 -1.596 0.133 No. Of Observations 17
Panel C - Age 55 to 64
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 362.199 156.991 2.307 0.037 0.001 0.456 0.612
∆  y 0.008 0.004 2.147 0.05
ENTexp t-1 -0.684 0.294 -2.326 0.036 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 172.275 132.905 1.296 0.216 0.004 0.977 0.539
∆  y 0.011 0.004 2.793 0.014
ENTexp t-1 -0.349 0.264 -1.323 0.207 No. Of Observations 17
* b represents the parameter estimate, SE represents the standard error of the estimate, t represents the t statistic 
for the paremeter estimate, F-Sig. (1) represents the test for overall signficance of the model, where the reported value is  
the p  value for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, and F-Sig. (2) represents the 
p value for the null that the coefficient on the lagged error term is equal to zero.
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Panel A - All CUs
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 343.306 107.803 3.185 0.007 0.008 0.781 0.495
∆  y 0.017 0.011 1.575 0.138
ENTexp t-1 -0.774 0.238 -3.255 0.006 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 294.198 93.019 3.163 0.007 0.007 0.894 0.505
∆  y 0.021 0.012 1.776 0.098
ENTexp t-1 -0.721 0.218 -3.306 0.005 No. Of Observations 17
Panel B - Age 25 to 34
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 341.01 121.385 2.809 0.014 0.037 0.404 0.376
∆  y 0.001 0.005 0.209 0.837
ENTexp t-1 -0.74 0.26 -2.847 0.013 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 368.897 114.367 3.226 0.006 0.018 0.526 0.435
∆  y 0.001 0.004 0.303 0.767
ENTexp t-1 -0.85 0.263 -3.238 0.006 No. Of Observations 17
Panel C - Age 55 to 64
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 324.482 128.266 2.53 0.024 0.016 0.527 0.445
∆  y 0.024 0.013 1.868 0.083
ENTexp t-1 -0.616 0.236 -2.612 0.02 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 258.279 118.305 2.183 0.047 0.023 0.551 0.417
∆  y 0.026 0.013 1.955 0.071
ENTexp t-1 -0.533 0.229 -2.329 0.035 No. Of Observations 17
* b represents the parameter estimate, SE represents the standard error of the estimate, t represents the t statistic 
for the paremeter estimate, F-Sig. (1) represents the test for overall signficance of the model, where the reported value is  
the p  value for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, and F-Sig. (2) represents the 
p value for the null that the coefficient on the lagged error term is equal to zero.
 
 
 
hen model (76) was run using the expenditure category television, radios and sound 
quipment as the dependent variable, the results are somewhat different than those found for 
either o s 
res 
Table 6-2, OLS Results for Other Entertainmnet Supplies, Equipment & Services
W
e
f the first two expenditure categories.  With this expenditure category, for all three group
of CUs, the coefficient on ENTexpt-1 was found to be statistically significant using both measu
of 2001 dollars (at least at the 5 percent level of significance).  However, the estimated parameter 
on ∆yt was found to be statistically insignificant for each of the groups examined, even the oldest 
CU group.  This is the only expenditure category for which no statistically significant relationship 
was found on ∆y for older CUs.  Collectively, the results from these aggregate-level OLS 
regressions suggest a significant amount of heterogeneity in consumers’ expenditures across 
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different consumer age groups.  The summary statistics for these dependent and independe
variables are shown on Tables 6-4 through 6-6. 
 
 
nt 
 
able 6-4 shows that the younger consumers, on average, spent less on fees and 
admissions each year while older consumers spent more (an average decrease of almost $2 versus 
n average increase of about $2).9  The younger consumers spent less on fees and admissions 
 
 
 
Panel A - All CUs
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 621.687 160.303 3.878 0.002 0.005 0.16 0.528
∆  y 0.001 0.007 0.179 0.86
ENTexp t-1 -0.988 0.256 -3.864 0.002 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 279.883 120.481 2.323 0.036 0.096 0.345 0.285
∆  y 0.004 0.009 0.434 0.671
ENTexp t-1 -0.466 0.204 -2.283 0.039 No. Of Observations 17
Panel B - Age 25 to 34
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 575.233 169.066 3.402 0.004 0.014 0.351 0.455
∆  y 0.000 0.002 0.122 0.905
ENTexp t-1 -0.855 0.25 -3.418 0.004 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 448.155 180.685 2.48 0.026 0.081 0.69 0.302
∆  y 0.001 0.002 0.293 0.774
ENTexp t-1 -0.704 0.286 -2.46 0.028 No. Of Observations 17
Panel C - Age 55 to 64
CPI All Less F.E. b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 538.251 138.495 3.886 0.002 0.003 0.717 0.555
∆  y 0.004 0.004 1.038 0.317
ENTexp t-1 -0.92 0.239 -3.845 0.002 No. Of Observations 17
GDP Deflator b SE t p value F -Sig. (1) F -Sig. (2) R 2
Constant 264.322 107.604 2.456 0.028 0.051 0.344 0.347
∆  y 0.005 0.004 1.16 0.266
ENTexp t-1 -0.471 0.198 -2.384 0.032 No. Of Observations 17
* b represents the parameter estimate, SE represents the standard error of the estimate, t represents the t statistic 
for the paremeter estimate, F-Sig. (1) represents the test for overall signficance of the model, where the reported value is  
the p  value for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, and F-Sig. (2) represents the 
p value for the null that the coefficient on the lagged error term is equal to zero.
T
a
                                                     
9 These averages reflect the changes adjusted with the CPI measure.  As seen on Tables 6-4 through 6-6, 
adjusting to 2001 dollars using the GDP deflator provides estimates of different magnitudes, but the same 
Table 6-3 LS Results for Televisions, Radios and Sound Equipment, O
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even though their prior period average expenditures were less and their average change in inco
was larger compared to the older consumers.  Similarly, Table 6-5 demonstrates that, for other 
entertainment supplies, equipment and services, the average change in younger consumers’ 
expenditures was less than the change for the older group of consumers.  For this category as
well, when compared to older consumers, the change in younger consumers’ spending was les
even though their average expenditure was less in the prior period.  Using another expenditure 
category, a slightly different result is seen on Table 6-6. 
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he 
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hen using a broader aggregate expenditure category, other entertainment supplies 
equipm ant 
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or this expenditure category, using either measure of inflation, the differences in the 
coeffici  
comparing across all three age categories, and statistically insignificant when comparing the 
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T
nd sound equipment.  For this category, younger consumers’ average change in 
expenditures is negative (using the CPI measure) while older consumers’ average change
positive.10  However, for this expenditure category, younger consumers’ average prior period
expenditures is about $100 higher than that of older consumers.  To directly test for consumer 
heterogeneity across consumer age groups, but within expenditure categories, we ran model (76
for all three age classifications (all CUs, CUs age 25 to 34, and CUs age 55 to 64) in a three-
equation seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model.  The SUR system was run for each 
expenditure category (using both measures of inflation) and allowed us to jointly test the 
hypothesis that model parameters were statistically different across age categories. 
 
T
w that consumer heterogeneity does exist across age categories.  When examining 
expenditures on fees and admissions, we find that, irrespective of the measure of inflation, t
parameter estimates on ∆yt are not statistically different for all CUs versus the youngest CUs.  
However, the joint test that the parameter estimates on ∆yt are the same across all three age 
groups does reject that the estimates are the same (with a p value of .0551 using the CPI measure, 
and a p value of .0174 using the GDP deflator).  Comparing the youngest group to all CUs, the 
difference in the coefficients on ENTexpt-1 are statistically insignificant using either measure of 
inflation (a p value of .2865 with the CPI measure and .0685 using the GDP deflator).  However
comparing all three age groups, using either measure of inflation, the differences are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
W
ent and services, we find that the parameter estimates on ∆yt are statistically insignific
when comparing all CUs to the youngest CUs if the CPI measure is used, but significant at the 5 
percent level if the GDP deflator is used.  When comparing across all three age groups, the 
differences in the estimates for ∆yt are statistically insignificant.  The differences in the para
estimate for, ENTexpt-1, however, are significant at the one percent level using the GDP deflator, 
and just above the 1 percent level using the CPI measure.  Panels E and F of Table 6-7 present the
results using the TV, radios and sound equipment expenditure category. 
 
F
ents on ∆yt are statistically insignificant when comparing the younger CUs to the entire
group, and when comparing the coefficients across all three age groups.  The differences in the 
parameter estimates on ENTexpt-1 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level when 
younger CUs to all CUs (using each measure of inflation).  Overall, these results do suggest that
                                                                                                                                                            
differences across age groups exist.  For instance, adjusting with the GDP deflator, the younger consumers’ 
average expenditure change was positive, but smaller than the positive change for the older consumers. 
10 Using the GDP deflator, both groups exhibit a positive average change, but the younger groups’ average 
is smaller than the older groups’.  
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within these aggregate expenditure categories there is significant consumer heterogeneity
relationships between the dependent and independent variables appear to vary across consum
of different age groups.  For instance, the strength of the relationship between a change in 
consumers’ expenditures and their lagged expenditures was found to be statistically different 
across age categories (within all three expenditure categories). 
 
 
Table 6-4, Summary Statistics, Fees and Admissions Table 6-5, Summ
; the 
ers 
ary Statistics, Other Ent. Equip. & Svc.
Panel A - All CUs Panel A - All CUs
 
 
 
CPI All Less F.E. Mean Std. Dev. N CPI All Less F.E. Mean Std. Dev. N
∆ ENTexp -1.816 23.995 17 ∆ ENTexp 1.223 64.691 17
∆ y 338.872 1138.676 17 ∆ y 338.872 1138.676 17
ENTexpt-1 513.537 22.878 17 ENTexpt-1 449.258 51.737 17
GDP Deflator Mean Std. Dev. N GDP Deflator Mean Std. Dev. N
∆ ENTexp 2.741 21.658 17 ∆ ENTexp 4.572 62.043 17
∆ y 680.481 1004.707 17 ∆ y 680.481 1004.707 17
ENTexpt-1 480.705 20.913 17 ENTexpt-1 421.047 53.491 17
Panel B - Age 25 to 34 Panel B - Age 25 to 34
CPI All Less F.E. Mean Std. Dev. N CPI All Less F.E. Mean Std. Dev. N
∆ ENTexp -2.142 28.710 17 ∆ ENTexp 0.816 94.433 17
∆ y 368.749 4411.852 17 ∆ y 368.749 4411.852 17
ENTexpt-1 456.442 30.097 17 ENTexpt-1 459.986 77.279 17
GDP Deflator Mean Std. Dev. N GDP Deflator Mean Std. Dev. N
∆ ENTexp 2.182 26.165 17 ∆ ENTexp 4.499 87.705 17
∆ y 721.888 4231.352 17 ∆ y 721.888 4231.352 17
ENTexpt-1 426.999 22.807 17 ENTexpt-1 429.790 67.302 17
Panel C - Age 55 to 64 Panel C - Age 55 to 64
CPI All Less F.E. Mean Std. Dev. N CPI All Less F.E. Mean Std. Dev. N
∆ ENTexp 1.935 52.502 17 ∆ ENTexp 9.243 169.589 17
∆ y 324.814 2688.367 17 ∆ y 324.814 2688.367 17
ENTexpt-1 530.885 35.506 17 ENTexpt-1 524.085 143.725 17
GDP Deflator Mean Std. Dev. N GDP Deflator Mean Std. Dev. N
∆ ENTexp 6.478 49.769 17 ∆ ENTexp 13.669 161.817 17
∆ y 704.859 2527.261 17 ∆ y 704.859 2527.261 17
ENTexpt-1 497.293 38.470 17 ENTexpt-1 493.117 144.783 17
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T ble 6-6, Sum m ary Statistics, Televisions, Radios and Sound Equipm enta
P nel A - All CUs
CPI All Less F.E. M ean Std. Dev. N
a
 
 
 
 
∆  ENTexp 5.124 44.059 17
∆  y 338.872 1138.676 17
ENTexp t-1 624.228 32.104 17
GDP Deflator M ean Std. Dev. N
∆  ENTexp 9.812 41.547 17
∆  y 680.481 1004.707 17
ENTexp t-1 585.350 46.122 17
Panel B - Age 25 to 34
CPI All Less F.E. M ean Std. Dev. N
∆  ENTexp -1.746 47.997 17
∆  y 368.749 4411.852 17
ENTexp t-1 674.552 37.828 17
GDP Deflator M ean Std. Dev. N
∆  ENTexp 4.209 42.793 17
∆  y 721.888 4231.352 17
ENTexp t-1 631.396 33.720 17
Panel C - Age 55 to 64
CPI All Less F.E. M ean Std. Dev. N
∆  ENTexp 8.670 52.198 17
∆  y 324.814 2688.367 17
ENTexp t-1 576.972 39.349 17
GDP Deflator M ean Std. Dev. N
∆  ENTexp 12.718 46.937 17
∆  y 704.859 2527.261 17
ENTexp t-1 541.310 51.438 17
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Table 6-7 UR Results; Tests for Differences in Aggregate OLS Parameters
Panel A, Fees and Admissions; CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
Equation No. Of Obs. F Value F -Sig. (1) Joint Tests F -Sig. (2) F -Sig. (3)
All CUs 17 10.4432 0.0002 ∆  y 0.2123 0.0551
25 to 34 17 7.2837 0.0019 ENTexp t-1 0.2865 0.0165
55 to 64 17 14.1170 0.0000
All CUs b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0028 0.0029 0.9600 0.3420
ENTexp t-1 -0.7349 0.1660 -4.4300 0.0000
Constant 374.6214 85.3759 4.3900 0.0000
25 to 34 b SE t p value
∆  y -0.0009 0.0010 -0.9900 0.3290
ENTexp t-1 -0.5657 0.1632 -3.4700 0.0010
Constant 256.4174 74.6084 3.4400 0.0010
55 to 64 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0079 0.0034 2.3500 0.0240
ENTexp t-1 -0.7132 0.2502 -2.8500 0.0070
Constant 378.0200 133.6113 2.8300 0.0070
Panel B, Fees and Admissions; GDP Deflator
Equation No. Of Obs. F Value F -Sig. (1) Joint Tests F -Sig. (2) F -Sig. (3)
All CUs 17 6.6506 0.0031 ∆  y 0.1756 0.0174
25 to 34 17 2.3463 0.1081 ENTexp t-1 0.0685 0.0392
55 to 64 17 10.7977 0.0002
All CUs b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0035 0.0035 0.9900 0.3290
ENTexp t-1 -0.6515 0.1833 -3.5500 0.0010
Constant 313.5649 88.1450 3.5600 0.0010
25 to 34 b SE t p value
∆  y -0.0015 0.0011 -1.4300 0.1600
ENTexp t-1 -0.2550 0.2259 -1.1300 0.2650
Constant 112.1415 96.4032 1.1600 0.2510
55 to 64 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0101 0.0035 2.9100 0.0060
ENTexp t-1 -0.4500 0.2229 -2.0200 0.0500
Constant 223.1235 112.1951 1.9900 0.0530
* b represents the parameter estimate, SE represents the standard error of the estimate, t represents the t statistic 
for the paremeter estimate, F-Sig. (1) represents the test for overall signficance of the equation, where the reported 
value is the p  value for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, F-Sig. (2) represents the 
p value for the joint signficance test across all CUs  and 25 to 34 year-old CUs , and F-Sig. (3) represents the 
p value for the joint signficance test across all three age groups of CUs.
 S
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Table 6-7 Continued
Panel C, Other Ent. Expenditures; CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
Equation No. Of Obs. F Value F -Sig. (1) Joint Tests F -Sig. (2) F -Sig. (3)
All CUs 17 9.6736 0.0004 ∆  y 0.0616 0.0757
25 to 34 17 7.2518 0.0020 ENTexp t-1 0.5666 0.0187
55 to 64 17 6.2844 0.0041
All CUs b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0179 0.0090 2.0000 0.0520
ENTexp t-1 -0.7124 0.1892 -3.7600 0.0010
Constant 315.2186 85.9690 3.6700 0.0010
25 to 34 b SE t p value
∆  y -0.0008 0.0040 -0.1900 0.8510
ENTexp t-1 -0.8782 0.2312 -3.8000 0.0000
Constant 405.0695 107.9882 3.7500 0.0010
55 to 64 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0210 0.0106 1.9700 0.0550
ENTexp t-1 -0.5237 0.1900 -2.7600 0.0090
Constant 276.9204 104.2614 2.6600 0.0110
Panel D, Other Ent. Expenditures; GDP Deflator
Equation No. Of Obs. F Value F -Sig. (1) Joint Tests F -Sig. (2) F -Sig. (3)
All CUs 17 11.8980 0.0001 ∆  y 0.0362 0.0549
25 to 34 17 7.9573 0.0012 ENTexp t-1 0.4133 0.0080
55 to 64 17 7.0134 0.0024
All CUs b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0216 0.0093 2.3400 0.0240
ENTexp t-1 -0.7039 0.1679 -4.1900 0.0000
Constant 286.2170 71.9475 3.9800 0.0000
25 to 34 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0001 0.0037 0.0300 0.9790
ENTexp t-1 -0.9378 0.2358 -3.9800 0.0000
Constant 407.4730 102.7626 3.9700 0.0000
55 to 64 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0223 0.0105 2.1100 0.0410
ENTexp t-1 -0.5097 0.1768 -2.8800 0.0060
Constant 249.3068 92.8484 2.6900 0.0100
* b represents the parameter estimate, SE represents the standard error of the estimate, t represents the t statistic 
for the paremeter estimate, F-Sig. (1) represents the test for overall signficance of the equation, where the reported
value is the p  value for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, F-Sig. (2) represents the 
p value for the joint signficance test across all CUs  and 25 to 34 year-old CUs , and F-Sig. (3) represents the 
p value for the joint signficance test across all three age groups of CUs.
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Table 6-7 Continued
Panel E, TV, Radios and Sound Equip.; CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
Equation No. Of Obs. F Value F -Sig. (1) Joint Tests F -Sig. (2) F -Sig. (3)
All CUs 17 8.4333 0.0008 ∆  y 0.8373 0.2773
25 to 34 17 7.7937 0.0013 ENTexp t-1 0.9207 0.0013
55 to 64 17 10.1416 0.0003
All CUs b SE t p value
∆  y -0.0012 0.0061 -0.1900 0.8490
ENTexp t-1 -0.8580 0.2108 -4.0700 0.0000
Constant 541.0886 132.1389 4.0900 0.0000
25 to 34 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0001 0.0018 0.0600 0.9520
ENTexp t-1 -0.8284 0.2098 -3.9500 0.0000
Constant 556.9923 141.7855 3.9300 0.0000
55 to 64 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0047 0.0030 1.5500 0.1290
ENTexp t-1 -0.7940 0.2011 -3.9500 0.0000
Constant 465.2769 116.4623 4.0000 0.0000
Panel F, TV, Radios and Sound Equip.; GDP Deflator
Equation No. Of Obs. F Value F -Sig. (1) Joint Tests F -Sig. (2) F -Sig. (3)
All CUs 17 7.1854 0.0021 ∆  y 0.8938 0.1572
25 to 34 17 8.4789 0.0008 ENTexp t-1 0.2418 0.0010
55 to 64 17 9.7040 0.0003
All CUs b SE t p value
∆  y -0.0005 0.0071 -0.0800 0.9400
ENTexp t-1 -0.5880 0.1553 -3.7900 0.0000
Constant 354.3499 91.7370 3.8600 0.0000
25 to 34 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0004 0.0017 0.2500 0.8070
ENTexp t-1 -0.8663 0.2111 -4.1000 0.0000
Constant 550.8639 133.4069 4.1300 0.0000
55 to 64 b SE t p value
∆  y 0.0057 0.0030 1.8800 0.0680
ENTexp t-1 -0.5698 0.1484 -3.8400 0.0000
Constant 317.1251 80.9828 3.9200 0.0000
* b represents the parameter estimate, SE represents the standard error of the estimate, t represents the t statistic 
for the paremeter estimate, F-Sig. (1) represents the test for overall signficance of the equation, where the reported
value is the p  value for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, F-Sig. (2) represents the 
p value for the joint signficance test across all CUs  and 25 to 34 year-old CUs , and F-Sig. (3) represents the 
p value for the joint signficance test across all three age groups of CUs.
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6.2.3 Summary of Aggregate OLS Results 
 
Among the OLS regressions run on the aggregate CEX data, the variable with the most 
explanatory power was one-period lagged expenditures, ENTexpt-1.  This variable was 
consistently found to have a negative relationship with consumers’ average change in 
expenditures (∆ENTexpt) and a larger coefficient than the first difference of income (∆yt).  
Additionally, within expenditure categories, the estimates of ∆ENTexpt were statistically different 
across consumers of different age groups.  While using the aggregate-level expenditure data does 
not allow us to directly test for these factors across CD buying consumers, our aggregate-level 
OLS results do show significant consumer heterogeneity across age groups within different types 
of entertainment goods, and they do suggest that prior period expenditures are an important 
predictor of a change in expenditures.  Specifically, our results suggest that, on average, 
consumers who spend more on goods in a given year are likely to change their spending by less 
the following year.  Unfortunately, the micro-level CEX data do not provide us with consumers’ 
prior year expenditures. 
 
Nonetheless, given that our hypothesis requires significant consumer heterogeneity, our 
aggregate-level OLS regressions provide some evidence for a necessary condition on our 
hypothesis (that, due to the recent decrease in copy transaction costs and CD/copy 
substitutability, some of the consumers using Internet file-sharing services were those previously 
not in the market).  Our hypothesis requires that consumers with different tastes for music will be 
affected differently by the various factors of demand, and our aggregate-level OLS results do 
support consumers having different tastes for entertainment goods.  To directly examine CD 
expenditures for any effects from file-sharing, we now turn our attention to the CEX micro data 
files. 
 
6.3 Consumer Expenditure Survey Micro Data Files 
 
The source of the data examined in this section is the Bureau of Labor and Statistics’ 
(BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) micro data files (available for purchase from the 
BLS).  These data are used by the BLS to compute the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and are 
collected by the Census Department under contract with the BLS.  We use the CEX interview 
survey data files, where Census employees interview consumers regarding their purchases and 
demographic characteristics over the three months prior to their interview.  The samples in the 
CEX files are derived from a  “complex” survey design.  Rather than a simple random sample, 
the data are collected based on a stratified sample design, whereby two primary sampling units 
(PSUs) exist per stratum.  To calculate more precise variances and standard errors, the data are 
supplied with 44 half-sample replicate weights (created by the balanced repeated replication 
(BRR) method). 
 
The expenditure items we examine are annual CD and movie ticket purchases, 
expenditures on two leisure items which should be affected differently by file sharing.  Given that 
the most popular type of good on file-sharing services is music files, it is unlikely that file sharing 
would have impacted both types of goods in the same manner.  Partially attributable to the longer 
download times for movies, even Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), concedes that, unlike the threat to the music industry, file-sharing services are 
more of a threat to the future of the movie industry than to current box office sales.11 
 
                                                     
 
11 See Garinger (2003). 
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6.3.1 Methodology for Consumer Expenditure Survey Micro Data Files 
et 
on period 
  
e 
imate.  To benchmark against the sample data provided by the BLS, we 
only examined CUs that were coded with “complete” income.  We then used the 44 half-sample 
replicat
 
First, we use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) public-use micro files to create 
weighted calendar year estimates of mean income figures and mean CD and movie tick
expenditures.12  Each annual release of CEX micro data includes five quarterly collecti
files which can be used to create either an annual calendar year or collection period sample.
Since the files cannot be used to create longitudinal data across years, we use the five quarterly 
files to create four separate calendar year samples for 1998 through 2001, and one pooled data set 
that combines the four samples. 
 
Interestingly, the sample size used to calculate calendar year mean expenditures in th
CEX data is not equivalent to the number of observations – weighted or unweighted – in the 
sample.  Because of the structure of the interviews and the data files, the number of months each 
observation (each CU) is “in scope” must be accounted for to arrive at the correct sample size 
(and U.S. population) est
e weights to calculate standard errors for the means and confidence intervals for the 
changes in annual means. 
 
The 44 replicate weights are used to create 44 separate “sub-sample” mean estimates to 
which the standard variance formula can be applied.13  Employing the 44 replicate weights, the 
formula for the variance of the mean is as follows,  
( ) ( )  X X
44
1=XV
44
2
WKAKWK ∑ −  
1a=
where XA XWK represents a weighted mean calculated with a replicate weight, and K  represents 
the weighted mean cal eight (named 
FINLWT21 in the data files). 
culated with each consumer units’ unique population w
 
After calculating the variances and standard errors for the means, we calculate the 
standard error of the difference between two means (from year to year) using the following 
standard formula,  ( ) ( ) ( )( )2WC1WC2WC1WC XVXVX,X.E.S +=  
where 1WC X and 2WC X  represent the respective sample means.  The standard error for the 
difference between two means is then used to construct both 95 and 90 percent confidence 
intervals using the following standard formulas,   
 ( ) ( )2WC1WC2WC1WC X,X.E.S*96.1XX ±− , 
and  ( ) ( )2121 ,..*64.1 XXESXX WCWCWCWC ±−  , 
                                                     
12 The weights are supplied by the BLS and used to make the sample representative of the U.S. population.  
The procedures for creating weighted calendar year estimates of expenditure and income categories are 
discussed in the BLS publication entitled 2001 Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey Public Use Micro-
ata Doc mentation.  This publication is available from the BLS at http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htmd
13
u . 
 The procedure for calculating variances and standard errors between the differences of two means is also 
discussed in more detail in the BLS publication entitled 2001 Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey 
ocumentation, available from at http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htmPublic Use Micro-data D . 
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respectively.14  The means, and the respective confidence intervals, are calculated for real 
expenditures and income (using the CPI for recreation items, the CPI for all items less food and 
energy, 
 using a program called WesVar.  Brogan (1998) and Landis, 
Lepkowski, Eklund, and Stehouwer (1982) have shown that ignoring the weighting and sample 
design s
  
onsumer units  
 
 
item CPI, this group’s mean expenditures on 
CDs fell from $46.96 in 1998 to $44.62 in 1999, to $44.05 in 2000, and then to $40.61 in 2001.  
Using the same measure of inflation, the group’s mean expenditures on movie tickets increased 
from $97.21 in 1998 to $98.48 in 1999, then fell to $93.92 in 2000 and $91.35 in 2001.  
 movie tickets. 
ese 
the average consumer did not spend differently on CDs from either 1998 to 
1999 or from 1999 to 2000, they do provide some evidence in favor of our hypothesis (although 
more testing is needed).  In 1999, when Napster was launched, and in 2000, both years in which 
es inc  the 
rket.  
n CD and movie ticket expenditures for 
computer owning CUs. 
 
 
 
                                                     
and the GDP deflator) for all CUs, computer owning CUs, and non-computer owning 
CUs. 
 
While using the micro-level data does not allow us to directly test individuals’ 
expenditure changes across years, it does allow us to directly test for the effects that specific 
demographic characteristics may have on consumers’ expenditures.  To test for these effects, we 
run regressions on the micro data
chemes of complex survey data can lead to biased and inefficient estimators, as well as 
invalid statistical inferences.  The WesVar program produces asymptotically unbiased and 
efficient estimators and valid statistical tests by using the sample’s replicate weights to calculate 
standard errors, and the full-sample weights to correct for the possibility of heteroscedasticity.15
A complete description of the regression model used is provided in section 6.3.7 (prior to 
discussing the regression results). 
 
6.3.2 Expenditures for all c
Table 6-8 shows the annual mean expenditures on CDs and movie tickets in 2001 dollars
for all CUs, and lists the significance results for the year-to-year changes found with 90 and 95 
percent confidence intervals.16  Using the recreation 
Adjusting to 2001 dollars with either of the other two measures for inflation (the CPI for all items 
less food and energy or the GDP deflator) does not change the annual trends in mean 
expenditures for either CDs or
 
Of all the annual mean expenditure changes for all CUs, only the decrease in CD 
expenditures from 2000 to 2001 was statistically significant (at the 5 percent level).  Since th
results suggest that 
aggregate CD sal reased, the average CU did not spend any differently on CDs than in
prior year, suggesting that file sharing was being done by consumers formerly not in the ma
To further test our hypothesis, we examine the mea
 
14 Since both positive and negative mean expenditure and income changes were found, and since a standard 
software package cannot be used to compute the significance tests, we constructed two-tailed tests for all 
changes rather than individual one-tailed tests. 
15 Brogan (1998) and Landis, et al (1982) have also shown that the magnitude of the parameter point 
estimates can be severely affected by ignoring the sample’s weighting scheme, depending on the variability 
in the weights.  There appears to be sufficient variability in the CEX full-sample weights to warrant such 
special considerations; in 2001, the weights range from 475 to 89,149. 
16 The full confidence interval results are listed in Appendix G. 
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Table 6-8, Mean CD and Movie Ticket Expenditures; All CUs
Mean CD Expenditures 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI R
 
s Food/Energy 48.57 45.62 44.53 40.61
GDP Deflator 47.98 45.34 44.40 40.61 b
number of observations 4,921 6,032 5,932 5,857
Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Rec. Items 97.21 98.48 93.92 91.35
CPI Less Food/Energy 100.56 100.68 94.93 91.35
GDP Deflator 99.33 100.08 94.67 91.35
number of observations 8,665 10,431 9,539 9,916
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
ec. Items 46.96 44.62 44.05 40.61 b
 Les bCPI
 
 
6.3.3 Ex
ing 
 
 
, 
n both mean CD and movie expenditures for computer owning CUs were 
tatistic ly significant.  The decrease in mean movie expenditures was significant at the 5 percent 
vel of significance, and the decrease in mean CD expenditures varied between the 5 and 10 
ercent levels depending on the measure of inflation used. 
 
Then, in 2001, the decrease in computer owning CUs’ mean CD expenditures was 
17
 also been spending less on movie tickets, spending 
penditures by Computer Owners  
 
As seen on Table 6-9, the annual mean expenditures for both CDs and movies are 
substantially higher for computer owning CUs than are the corresponding mean expenditures for 
all CUs.  In 2001 dollars using the recreation item CPI, the mean expenditure on CDs for 
computer owners decreased from $75.70 in 1998 to $66.21 in 1999, to $61.15 in 2000 and to 
$56.60 in 2001.  Using the same measure for inflation, mean movie ticket expenditures for 
computer owners increased from $152.69 in 1998 to $153.27 in 1999, then fell to $135.90 and 
$130.56 in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 
 
Adjusting the mean CD expenditures for computer owning CUs to 2001 dollars, us
either measure of inflation, does not change the three-year downward trend.  In the case of mean 
movie ticket expenditures, however, using either the CPI for all items less food and energy, or the
GDP deflator to adjust to 2001 dollars, the trend in mean expenditures changes in 1999.  
However, using either measure of inflation, the change in mean movie expenditures from 1998 to
1999 was statistically insignificant.   
 
For all measures of inflation, the 1998 to 1999 decrease in mean CD expenditures by 
computer owning CUs was statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  From 1999 to 2000
however, the decreases i
s al
le
p
statistically significant,  while their decrease in mean movie ticket expenditures was statistically 
insignificant.  These findings show that, on average, while computer owning CUs have been 
spending less on CDs since 1998, they have
about $20 less in 2001 than 1998 on both types of entertainment goods (in 2001 dollars).  
                                                     
17 The decrease was significant at the 10 percent level using the recreation items CPI, but at the 5 percent 
e GDP deflator. level using either the CPI for all items less food and energy or th
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Additionally, while computer owning CUs have been spending less on CDs, on average, since 
1998, aggregate CD sales increased in both 1999 and 2000 (in 2001 dollars).  Again, these results 
suggest that file sharing was being performed by consumers formerly not in the market.  Despite 
the fact that this group’s average CD expenditures have been about $15 to $30 higher than the 
average for all CUs, their annual average decrease did not correspond to a drop in aggregate CD 
sales in either 1999 or 2000, and the average CU did not spend differently in either of these years.  
We now examine the mean CD and movie ticket expenditures of non-computer owning CUs. 
 
 
 
ter 
owning CUs.  In 2001 dollars (using the recreation item CPI), the mean expenditure on CDs for 
ie ticket expenditures 
 
c. Items 59.82 55.61 51.80 41.15 b
CPI Less Food/Energy 61.87 56.85 52.36 41.15 b
GDP Deflator 61.12 56.51 52.21 41.15 b
number of observations 3,715 3,873 2,969 2,401
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
Table 6-9, Mean CD and Movie Ticket Expenditures; Computer Owners
Mean CD Expenditures 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Rec. Items 75.70 66.21 b 61.15 a 56.60 a
CPI Less Food/Energy 78.30 67.69 b 61.81 b 56.60 b
GDP Deflator 77.35 67.28 b 61.64 a 56.60 b
number of observations 2,870 3,776 4,061 4,378
ean Movie Ticket Expenditures 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
2.69 153.27 135.90 b 130.56
CPI Les
Mean CD Expenditures 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Re
Mean M vie Ticket Expenditures 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Re
M
CPI Rec  Items 15.
s Food/Energy 157.94 156.69 137.37 b 130.56
GDP Deflator 156.02 155.76 136.99 b 130.56
number of observations 4,870 6,428 6,443 7,315
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
Table 6-10, Mean CD and Movie Ticket Expenditures; Non-Computer Owners
c. Items 27.43 27.47 26.72 20.31 b
CPI Less Food/Energy 28.37 28.08 27.01 20.31 b
GDP Deflator 28.02 27.91 26.94 20.31 b
number of observations 2,003 2,189 1,797 1,391
o
 
6.3.4 Expenditures by Non-computer owners 
 
Comparing Tables 6-9 and 6-10, it is clear that the annual mean expenditures for both 
CDs and movies are nearly one-third lower for non-computer owning CUs than for compu
non-computer owners increased from $27.43 in 1998 to $27.47 in 1999, then fell to $26.72 in 
2000 and to $20.31 in 2001.  Using the same inflation measure, mean mov
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for non-computer owners decreased steadily from $59.82 in 1998 to $55.61 in 1999, $51.80 in 
2000 and $41.15 in 2001.  If either the CPI for all items less food and energy or the GDP deflator 
is used to adjust for inflation, non-computer owning CUs’ mean expenditures on CDs decreased 
from 1998 to 1999 rather than increased.  Of all these changes in (for each measure of inflation
mean CD and movie expenditures, only the changes from 2000 to 2001 are statistically 
significant (all at the 5 percent level of significance). 
 
) 
herefore, on average, both computer owning and non-computer owning CUs spent 
significantly less on CDs from 2000 to 2001.  Incidentally, 2001 was the only year for which the 
direction of the change in aggregate CD sales matched the direction of the change in both groups’ 
mean CD expenditures.  Additionally, while the average computer owner spent less on movie 
tickets in 2000, the average non-computer owner’s movie ticket expenditure was the same in 
2000, and the opposite was found in 2001 (computer owning CUs spent the same on movie 
tickets in 2001 as 2000, but non-computer owners spent less).  In both 1999 and 2000, when the 
average computer owning CU’s expenditures on CDs decreased, average non-computer owning 
CUs’ expenditures did not change, and aggregate CD sales increased.  Combined, these results 
suggest there is significant heterogeneity among consumers of both types of entertainment goods, 
and that at least some of the Internet file-sharing was done by consumers formerly not in the 
market.  Since, on average, non-computer owning CUs spend so much less on CDs and movie 
tickets, examining the income of these groups of consumers seems prudent. 
 
6.3.5 Mean annual income for all CUs 
 
Since the CEX definition of before tax income changed in 2001, we use wage and salary 
income for our measure of annual income.  Table 6-11 shows that real mean annual income for 
all CUs (using the CPI for all items less food and energy to adjust to 2001 dollars) rose steadily 
over the four year period, from $35,296 in 1998 to $36,255 in 1999, to $36,485 in 2000, and then 
to $38,360 in 2001.18  This trend holds when income is adjusted to 2001 dollars using the GDP 
deflator.  Of these changes, only the increase in real mean income in 2001 was statistically 
significant (at the 5 percent level for both measures of inflation). 
 
Table 6-12 shows that, for computer owning CUs, annual mean income (using the CPI 
for all items less food and energy) increased from $53,955 in 1998 to $54,374 in 1999, then 
decreased to $52,059 in 2000, and increased to $52,617 in 2001.  These trends hold when 
computer owning CUs’ income is adjusted to 2001 dollars using the GDP deflator.  Computer 
owning CUs’ decrease in mean annual income for 2000 was statistically significant (at the 5 
percent level using the CPI measure and the 10 percent level using the GDP deflator).  All other 
changes in computer owning CUs’ mean income were statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 6-13 demonstrates that the annual mean income for CUs not owning computers 
declined steadily each year.  Using the CPI measure, this group’s annual mean income fell from 
22,837 in 1998 to $21,952 in 1999, $20,856 in 2000, and to $20,172 in 2001.  These trends hold 
hen the income figures are adjusted to 2001 dollars with the GDP deflator.  Of these changes, 
nly the decrease from 1999 to 2000 was statistically significant (at the 10 percent level for both 
easures of inflation).  Together, the statistics on Tables 6-11 through 6-13 illustrate that mean 
imately $30,000 higher each year – for computer 
owning CUs than for those CUs that do not own a computer, and that all groups’ mean income 
T
$
w
o
m
annual income is considerably higher – approx
                                                     
18 This trend matches the national mean wage and salary trend for 1998 through 2000.  However, accord
to the BLS, mean wage and salaries in the U.S. did decline in 2001.  These data are available from the BLS 
at http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm
ing 
.   
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has remained fairly steady from 1998 to 2001 (with few statistically significant changes in mean 
annual income). 
 
Thus, for all CUs, the lack of a statistically significant change in real mean income from 
1998 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2000 corresponds to an unchanged real mean expenditure on 
either CDs or movie tickets for both periods.  However, despite the statistically significa
increase in real mean income from 2000 to 2001, the a
nt 
verage CU spent less on CDs and the same 
on movie tickets for the period.  Although computer owning CUs did not realize a statistically 
significa e 
ut 
 these simple 
correlations between statistically significant changes in mean annual income and expenditures on 
there appears to be significant heterogeneity across 
consumer types within each expenditure category.  To further examine the role that income has in 
CD and 
 
nt change in income in 1999, they spent, on average, significantly less on CDs and th
same on movie tickets compared to what they spent in 1998.  In 2000, when they realized a 
statistically significant decrease in mean annual income, computer owning CUs spent less, on 
average, for both CDs and movie tickets relative to their expenditures in 1999.  Then, with no 
change in mean annual income in 2001, the average computer owning CU spent less on CDs b
the same on movie tickets versus what they spent in 2000. 
 
For non-computer owning CUs, no change in mean annual income from 1998 to 1999 
corresponds to no change, on average, in either mean CD or movie ticket expenditures for the 
period.  However, from 2000 to 2001, when non-computer owning CUs also failed to realize a 
change in mean annual income, they spent, on average, significantly less on both CDs and movie 
tickets.  Also, from 1999 to 2000, when non-computer owning CUs’ mean annual income 
decreased, they spent the same, on average, for both CDs and movies.  When
CDs and movies are considered, again, 
movie expenditures, we tested for statistically significant mean changes by income class. 
 
 
Table 6-11, Mean Annual Income, All CUs
1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Les
14%
GDP De ator 3.36% 0.96% 5.43%
s Food/Energy 35,296 36,255 36,485 38,360 b
GDP Deflator 34,867 36,039 36,384 38,360 b
number of observations 16,167 20,471 20,341 21,907
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
Percent Changes 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy 2.72% 0.63% 5.
fl
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6.3.6 Mean annual expenditures by income class 
 
Table 6-14 shows the mean expenditures for computer owning CUs by income class for 
1998 through 2001 (in 2001 dollars using the CPI for recreation items).  The change in this 
group’s mean CD expenditures in 1999 was statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) only 
for the highest income class, CUs with at least $70,000.19  For the year 2000, the decrease was 
statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) only for the third income class, and for 2001, the 
decrease was significant (at the 5 percent level) only for the fifth and sixth income classes.  These 
results hold for each measure of inflation used.  The complete set of tables for mean changes in 
CD and movie ticket expenditures by income class, as well as the results from the 90 and 95 
percent confidence intervals, are presented in appendix H.  Since these results are secondary to 
our WLS regression results, we only briefly discuss the results here.  
 
Tables H-1 through H-9 show that there is no consistent pattern in the change of CD or 
ovie expenditures from year to year based solely on income class.  For all three groups of CUs, 
eclines in real mean expenditures on CDs and movies were found to be statistically significant 
r different income classes in each of the three time periods.  Table H1 reports the confidence 
tervals by income class for all CUs using the CPI for recreation items to adjust to 2001 dollars.  
hese results demonstrate that, from 1998 to 1999, only CUs in the highest income class (over 
                                                   
Table 6-12, Mean Annual Income, Computer Owning CUs
1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy 53,995 54,374 52,059 b 52,617
GDP Deflator 53,339 54,051 51,915 a 52,617
number of observations 7,733 10,775 11,890 14,106
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
Percent Changes 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy 0.70% -4.26% 1.07%
GDP Deflator 1.33% -3.95% 1.35%
Table 6-13, Mean Annual Income, Non-Computer Owning CUs
 
1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy 22,837 21,952 20,856 a 20,172
GDP Deflator 22,559 21,821 20,798 a 20,172
number of observations 8,277 9,406 8,114 7,369
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
Percent Changes 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy -3.87% -4.99% -3.28%
GDP Deflator -3.27% -4.69% -3.01%
 
 
m
d
fo
in
T
  
 We used the income class variable as it was supplied by the BLS.  This variable divides income into nine 
lasses, and wage and salary income is topcoded for all CUs with wages and salary over $150,000.  The 
topcoded value used by the BLS is the mean wage and salary of the subset of outliers. 
19
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$70,000 in annual income) spent significantly less on CDs (at the 5 percent level of significance).  
CUs in this income class, whose average CD expenditures were more than double the average 
expenditure for the entire group of CUs, spent about $30 less on CDs in 1999 than in 1998.  From 
1999 to 2000, however, none of the income classes spent significantly less on CDs.  Then, from 
2000 to 2001, only the fifth and sixth income classes, those with between $20,000 to $39,999, 
spent significantly less on CDs (at the 5 percent level). 
 
Similarly, statistically significant declines on all CUs’ mean movie expenditures were 
found among none of the income classes for 1998 to 1999, the second highest class from 1999 to 
2000 (at the 5 percent level), and among the second and fifth income classes from 2000 to 2001 
(at the 10 percent level).  Furthermore, patterns different from these were found among non-
computer owning CUs.  Since a wide dispersion of statistically significant changes by income 
class was found for all three groups of CUs, it appears that there is heterogeneity in the 
relationship between changes in income and entertainment expenditures across income classes 
within each category of expenditures.  This evidence also bolsters our hypothesis because it 
shows that, on average, only certain groups of consumers, even within our three classes of CUs, 
spent significantly less on CDs in any of the given years.  We further explore this relationship in 
the next sub-section, where we run several weighted least squares regressions using the CEX 
micro data. 
 
 
 
Table 6-14, Mean CD Exp. By Income Class (Rec. CPI; $2001), Computer Owners
Income Class 1998 1999 98-99 2000 99-00 2001 00-01
Less than $5,000 $72.04 $43.59 $51.11 $48.23
n 122 110 111 138
$5,000 to $9,999 40.78 51.45 41.48 54.60
n 78 101 122 113
$10,000 to $14,999 75.94 58.43 36.02 b 42.10
n 85 126 114 126
$15,000 to $19,999 48.22 42.31 35.27 30.82
140 123 124
$20,000 to $29,999 38.06 46.36 48.79 32.34 b
2 1,800
Total 75.70 66.21 b 61.15 56.60
n 108
n 185 265 328 344
$30,000 to $39,999 55.30 50.01 53.85 39.33 b
n 294 364 413 421
$40,000 to $49,999 49.81 52.47 53.74 51.76
n 294 367 411 461
$50,000 to $69,999 69.17 70.25 61.57 61.50
n 583 767 787 851
$70,000 and over 116.85 88.26 b 81.43 75.75
n 1,121 1,536 1,65
n 2,870 3,776 4,061 4,378
* a  and b  denote statistically significant changes at the 10 and 5 percent levels of signficance, respectively
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6.3.7 CEX Micro Data WLS Results 
 
Using WesVar, we run the following weighted least squares regression (WLS) for both 
CD and movie ticket expenditures. 
362514321 INTˆINTˆINTˆCOMPˆylnˆˆexpENTln ββββββ +++++=    (77) 
 
Model (77) is run separately for the following two dependent variables: the natural log 
CD expenditures and the natural log of movie ticket exp
 
of 
enditures.  The dependent variable is 
represen e 
 
.  
nd 55, between 56 and 65, and over 65. 
For the family size of the CU, we then create a new variable to reclassify the CEX 
variable fam_size.  The new variable, fmsz, is structured so that all consumer units consisting of 6 
or more people are in the largest family size category.  The age dummies and fmsz are then 
multiplied to create the interaction variables.  So, for instance, INT1 is equal to (AgeCat1 * fmsz), 
INT2 is equal to (AgeCat2 * fmsz) and so on.  Since, prior to 2001, the survey does not include 
information on whether CUs subscribed to the Internet, we are unable to test this relationship over 
time.  For completeness, we do examine expenditures for Internet and non-Internet subscribers in 
2001, but these WLS results are presented in Appendix J. 
 
Using model (77), we run WLS regressions for the natural log of CD and movie ticket 
expenditures for the years 1998 through 2001, respectively, and on a pooled data set using the 
observations from all years.  We use two measures of inflation to adjust the pooled data to 2001 
dollars (the CPI for all items less food and energy, and the GDP deflator).  In general, we find 
fairly low R2 values and variation in the sensitivity to the independent variables across consumer 
types and years.  The results from the WLS regressions are presented in Tables 6-15 through 6-
25, and, as an added check for heteroscedasticity in the data, the results from Goldfeld-Quandt 
tests are in Appendix I. 
 
As seen on Tables 6-15 through 6-18, where the natural log of CD expenditures is the 
dependent variable, the R2 statistic is less than 8 percent in each of the respective years, and there 
is some variation by year as to which independent variable coefficients are statistically 
significant.  In 1998, all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level of 
significance.  For this year, the natural log of CD expenditures is positively related to both the 
natural log of income (lny) and computer ownership (COMP), with parameter estimates of .1940 
                                                     
ted by the term expENTln in model (77).  Since the CEX definition of before tax incom
was changed in 2001, we use the natural log of wage and salary income as an independent 
variable (represented by ln y).20  The independent variable on the third coefficient in (77) is a 
dummy variable, set to one if the household owns at least one computer.  The last three 
coefficients are interaction variables meant to capture age and family size differences. 
 
The CEX contains several variables each for consumer unit size, consumer unit age, and
age and number of children, and there is no apparent “best” way to capture these interactions
Therefore, we create interaction variables between family size and reference person’s age.  First, 
we create four dummy variables to group the reference person of the CU into four age categories 
(AgeCat1, AgeCat2, AgeCat3 and AgeCat4).21  These age groupings are as follows: under 31, 
between 31 a
 
20 For the aggregate CEX data, before tax income was used because the BLS does not publish wage and 
salary aggregates from the CEX files. 
21 The CEX variable name is ref_age. 
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and .1169, respectively.  However, for 1998, the natural log of CD expenditures is negatively 
related to all three age interaction variables (INT1, INT2 and INT3), with parameter estimates of 
(.0723), (.0496), and (.0940), respectively. 
 
Given the results described in the previous sub-sections, the positive relationship between 
the log of CD expenditures and both lny and COMP is as expected.  However, since the 
comparison dummy variable (INT4) is for the oldest age group, the negative relationship for all 
three age interaction variables seems somewhat unusual.  In alternative specifications to (77), 
where the model was run with separate age and family size dummy variables, it appears that the 
age effect could be overtaking the family size effect.22  However, the alternative specifications 
did not reveal any consistent patterns in the relationship between age categories or family size 
and either of the dependent variables; in several instances, no statistically significant relationship 
was found and the sign of the parameter estimates, even when still statistically significant, 
changed.  Due to the difficulty in classifying the exact age of a CU, we run our main regressions 
with the interaction variables as described in (77).23  Using the model as specified in (77), with 
the natural log of CD expenditures as the dependent variable, only the coefficient on lny remains 
statistically significant for all four years, with a parameter estimate of approximately .20 in each 
year. 
 
In 2000, the coefficient on COMP is statistically insignificant, and it is only marginally 
significant in 2001 (only at the 10 percent level of significance), with a parameter estimate of 
.0708.  In 1999, of the three interaction variables, only the coefficient on INT2 is statistically 
significant (at the 1 percent level), with a parameter estimate of (.0338).  In 2000, the coefficient 
on INT3  is significant at the 10 percent level, with an estimated parameter value of (.0333), and, 
in 2001, the parameters on both INT2 and INT3 are significant at the 1 percent level, with 
estimated values of (.0337) and (.0610), respectively.  In terms of the statistical significance of 
the interaction variables, similar variation is found when they are regressors, instead, for the 
natural log of movie ticket expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 These 
it is just as ambiguous whether using the spouse’s age, or the oldest/youngest child’s age is the best 
 
r less than 5 percent of the observations in a given year). 
results are presented in Appendix I. 
23 For instance, it is not entirely clear that the age of the reference person is the best measure of CU age, but 
measure of CU age.  Based on our results, these ambiguities are not alleviated by eliminating multiple CU
houshelds (these households account fo
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Table 6-15, WLS Results on 1998 CD Expenditures
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 4,407 F Value: 47.3480
INT1 -0.0723 0.0181 0.0002
5,392 F Value: 32.9817
Weighted: 73,344,767 Prob > F: 0.0000
2 0.0125 0.0094  
Intercept 1.7548 0.1364 0.0000
0.1895 0.0146 0.0000
0.0291 0.6638
Weighted: 79,003,370 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.0770
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.7425 0.1565 0.0000
lny 0.1940 0.0169 0.0000
COMP 0.1169 0.0301 0.0003
INT2 -0.0496 0.0106 0.0000
INT3 -0.0940 0.0213 0.0001
Table 6-16, WLS Results on 1999 CD Expenditures 
 
No. of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted:
R 2: 0.0713
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.5351 0.1576 0.0000
lny 0.2101 0.0186 0.0000
COMP 0.0678 0.0289 0.0236
INT1 -0.0022 0.0210 0.9174
INT -0.0338
INT3 -0.0304 0.0256 0.2414
Table 6-17, WLS Results on 2000 CD Expenditures
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 5,349 F Value: 42.5399
Weighted: 73,407,856 Prob > F: 0
R 2: 0.0612
Independent Variable b SE p value
lny
COMP -0.0127
INT1 -0.0033 0.0180 0.8548  
INT2 -0.0171 0.0111 0.1284
INT3 -0.0334 0.0186 0.0797
 
 114
Table 6-18, WLS Results on 2001 CD Expenditures
No. O  Observations Overall Fit
0.0367 0.0600
INT1 -0.0029 0.0158 0.8570
INT2 -0.0337 0.0105 0.0025
INT3 -0.0610 0.0185 0.0019
f
Unweighted: 5,283 F Value: 47.1252
Weighted: 74,053,311 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.0784
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.4934 0.1494 0.0000
lny 0.2154 0.0170 0.0000
COMP 0.0708
 
 
 
Tables 6-19 through 6-22 present the WLS results with movie ticket expenditures as the 
dependent variable.  These regressions show a slightly higher R2 than when the log of CD 
expenditures served as the dependent variable, but the R2 statistics are still less than 12 percent in 
all years.  Nonetheless, lny and COMP are positively related to the log of movie ticket 
expenditures, and remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance for each of 
the four ears.  There also appears to be some variation in the magnitude of lny and COMP 
relative to when they serve as regressors for the natural log of CD expenditures.  For instance, in 
all the y ars, the coefficient on lny is around .27 when a regressor for the log of movie 
expenditures, versus .20 when a regressor for the log of CD expenditures. 
 
Similarly, in 2001, the coefficient on COMP was .1638 when a regressor for the log of 
movie expenditures, versus .0708 when a regressor for the log of CD expenditures.  In 1999, the 
parameter estimate on COMP was .1228 when a regressor for the log of movie expenditures, and 
.0678 when a regressor for the log of CD expenditures.  As for the interaction dummy variables, 
when the dependent variable is the log of movie expenditures, none are statistically significant in 
either 1998 or 2001, while the coefficients on both INT2 and INT3 are significant in 1999, and 
INT1 is significant in 2000.  In 1999, INT2 is estimated at (.0184) and is significant at the 5 percent 
level, and the value of INT3 is estimated as .0639 and is significant at the 1 percent level.  In 
2000, INT1 is significant at the 5 percent level and is estimated at (.0286).  The regression results 
on the pooled data set, for either CD or movie expenditures, do nothing to contradict the results 
found on the individual years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y
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Table 6-19, WLS Results on 1998 Movie Ticket Expenditures
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 7,515 F Value: 70.4908
Weighted: 135,412,496 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.1092
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.8564 0.1331 0.0000
lny 0.2780 0.0145 0.0000
COMP 0.1293 0.0280 0.0000
INT1 -0.0186 0.0149 0.2205
INT2 -0.0152 0.0094 0.1128
INT3 0.0116 0.0194 0.5514
Table 6-20, WLS Results on 1999 Movie Ticket Expenditures
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 9,016 F Value: 70.4908
Weighted: 122,659,051 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.1089
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.9256 0.1193 0.0000
lny 0.2743 0.0140 0.0000
COMP 0.1228 0.0258 0.0000
INT1 -0.0082 0.0194 0.6735
INT2 -0.0184 0.0086 0.0382
INT3 0.0639 0.0217 0.0051
Table 6-21, WLS Results on 2000 Movie Ticket Expenditures
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 8,256 F Value: 74.0798
Weighted: 113,128,494 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.1026
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.0337 0.1351 0.0000
lny 0.2647 0.0160 0.0000
COMP 0.0997 0.0312 0.0026
INT1 -0.0286 0.0126 0.0282
INT2 0.0025 0.0104 0.8090
INT3 0.0371 0.0249 0.1427
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Table 6-22, WLS Results on 2001 Movie Ticket Expenditures
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 8,722 F Value: 105.8939
Weighted: 121,959,282 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.1151
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.9057 0.1186 0.0000
lny 0.2711 0.0139 0.0000
COMP 0.1638 0.0275 0.0000
INT1 0.0099 0.0154 0.5234
INT2 0.0142 0.0093 0.1368
INT3 0.0063 0.0169 0.7090
 
 
 
The pooled CD and movie ticket regression results are presented in Tables 6-23 and 6-24
respectively.  With the natural log of CD expenditures as the de
, 
ients 
ovie 
ions, 
egressors 
 is estimated at 
approximately .13.  When regressors for CD expenditures, the estimated value of lny is found to 
be .20, 
each 
 
 log of CD expenditures.  These results to suggest significant 
consumer heterogeneity across consumer types within each expenditure category.  Still, a more 
interesting question is whether the relationship between computer ownership and entertainment 
expenditures changed from 1998 to 2001.  Given the differences in parameter estimates in 1998 
and 2001, we further investigated the possibility of a structural break in the data.   
                                                     
pendent variable, all coeffic
are statistically significant using either measure of inflation, with all except for INT1 being 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.24  When regressors for the natural log of m
expenditures, the coefficients on lny and COMP are statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
(using either measure of inflation).  Similar to what was found in the individual year regress
we find that the estimates for the lny and COMP parameters are a bit higher when regressors for 
the log of movie expenditures instead of the log of CD expenditures.  When serving as r
for the log of movie expenditures, lny is estimated at about .27, and COMP
and the estimated value for COMP is approximately .06.  The results from the pooled 
regressions also show that, using the log of CD expenditures as the dependent variable, INT1, 
INT2 and INT3 are statistically significant for each measure of inflation. 
 
Using each inflation measure, INT1 is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level, 
and INT2 and INT3 are significant at the 1 percent level, with parameter estimates of 
approximately (.02), (.034) and (.057), respectively.  However, when the log of movie 
expenditures is the dependent variable, the results from the pooled regressions show that, for 
measure of inflation, only INT3 is statistically significant (at the 5 percent level).  In fact, INT3 has
an estimated value of about .03, which is of the opposite sign found for this parameter estimate 
when INT3 is a regressor for the
 
 
24 The first interaction dummy, INT1, is significant at the 10 percent level of significance using each 
measure of inflation. 
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Table 6-23, WLS Results on Pooled CD Expenditures, 1998 to 2001
Panel A, CPI all Items Less Food and Energy ($2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 20,431 F Value: 83.9358
Weighted: 299,809,303 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.0699
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.6667 0.1100 0.0000
lny 0.2020 0.0116 0.0000
COMP 0.0564 0.0185 0.0039
INT1 -0.0208 0.0121 0.0932
INT2 -0.0338 0.0057 0.0000
INT3 -0.0575 0.0124 0.0000
Panel B, GDP Deflator ($2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 20,431 F Value: 83.9730
Weighted: 299,809,303 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.07
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.6626 0.1100 0.0000
lny 0.2019 0.0116 0.0000
COMP 0.0575 0.0185 0.0033
INT1 -0.0208 0.0121 0.0941
INT2 -0.0338 0.0057 0.0000
INT3 -0.0574 0.0124 0.0000
 118
 
 
Table 6-24, WLS Results on Pooled Movie Ticket Expenditures,
Panel A, CPI all Items Less Food and Energy ($2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 33,509 F Value: 229.8378
Weighted: 493,159,323 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.1084
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.9529 0.0858 0.0000
lny 0.2723 0.0094 0.0000
COMP 0.1314 0.0159 0.0000
INT1 -0.0110 0.0092 0.2377
INT2 -0.0043 0.0060 0.4795
INT3 0.0292 0.0119 0.0186
COMP 0.1323 0.0159 0.0000
Panel B, GDP Deflator ($2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 33,509 F Value: 230.4163
Weighted: 493,159,323 Prob > F: 0.0000
R 2: 0.1086
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.9479 0.0857 0.0000
lny 0.2723 0.0094 0.0000
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INT1 -0.0110 0.0092 0.2387
INT2 -0.0043 0.0060 0.4775
INT3 0.0292 0.0119 0.0183
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As presented in Tables 6-15 through 6-22, our WLS results show that, when a regressor 
for the log of CD expenditures, the coefficient on COMP is .1169 in 1998, but only .0708 in 
2001.  While this relationship between CD expenditures and computer ownership appears to have 
weakened over the four year period, a similar pattern was not found when COMP was a regressor 
for the log of movie expenditures.  Rather than finding a weaker relationship, when serving as a 
regressor for movie expenditures, the parameter estimate for COMP was actually higher in 2001 
than in 1998 (.1293 versus .1638).  To test for a significant change in the relationship between 
COMP and either expenditure item, we estimated a difference-in-differences estimator using 
pooled data from the years 1998 and 2001.  The specification for this test consisted of adding a 
year dummy and interaction dummy variable to the independent variables in (77).25  The resulting 
right-hand side of (77) is as follows. 
 
 
The seventh parameter is the year dummy, set to one for expenditures made in the year 
2001, and the eighth is the interaction variable, whereby the year dummy (Y01) is multiplied by 
the COMP dummy (set to one for CUs owning a computer).  Using the added categorical 
variables, we ran the model for the log of  both real CD and movie ticket expenditures, using both 
the CPI for all items less food and energy and the GDP deflator to adjust to 2001 dollars.  For all 
four regressions, both Y01 and CMPINT were found to be statistically insignificant, even at the 10 
percent level of significance.26  Thus, while we certainly can point to a positive relationship 
between computer ownership and CD expenditures, we cannot report a significant weakening of 
this positive relationship from 1998 to 2001.  Another question that can be addressed from the 
WLS regressions regards the change in computer owning CUs’ CD and movie expenditures in 
2000, when their real mean income dropped roughly 3 percent. 
 
From 1999 to 2000, among computer owning CUs, the average expenditure on CDs fell 
from about $68 to $62 (8.8 percent), and the average expenditure on movie tickets fell from 
around $157 to $137 (12 percent).27  Our WLS regressions show that the coefficient on lny is 
about .20 for CD expenditures and .27 for movie ticket expenditures, and that the coefficient on 
COMP is about .06 for CDs and .13 for movies.  Therefore, without regard to different types of 
computer owning consumers, the average change in computer owning CUs’ income appears to 
only explain about 1 percent of the decline in the average expenditure of either good ((.06+.2)*3 
= .78 for CDs and (.13+.27)*3 = 1.2) for movie tickets). 
 
6.3.8 Summary of WLS Results on Micro-Level CEX Data 
 
Overall, our micro-level WLS results demonstrate that there is a positive relationship 
between both income and computer ownership for expenditures on both CDs and movie tickets.  
Additionally, using the available measures of consumer age and family size, we find that the 
relationship between these variables and expenditures varies across consumer types.  These 
differences provide evidence for a necessary condition of our hypothesis: that significant 
heterogeneity exists among CD buying consumers.  Furthermore, despite the downward trend in 
real mean CD expenditures by computer owning CUs from 1999 to 2001, we find that the 
                                                     
CMPINTYINTINTINTCOMPy 87362514321 ˆ01ˆˆˆˆˆlnˆˆ ββββββββ +++++++  
25 See W oldridge (2003), p. 434. 
26 Even w en all multiple CU households were eliminated from the data, the results were unchanged.  The 
full resu ese tests are presented in Appendix K.  
27 Both e penditure category changes were found to be statistically significant, as was the change in real 
income from 1999 to 2000. 
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positive relationship between computer ownership and CD expenditures is not statistically 
different in 1998 versus 2001.  Therefore, the data does not appear to support any systematic 
effect from file sharing on CD expenditures, and we cannot reject our hypothesis that some of the 
file-sharing since 1999 has been undertaken by consumers formerly not in the market. 
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusions  
 
We test the hypothesis, derived from our model in chapter 4, that some of the music file-
sharing since 1998 has been done by consumers formerly not in the market for CDs.  After 
running regressions on both aggregate and micro-level consumer expenditure data, we are unable 
to reject our hypothesis.  In aggregate-level OLS regressions, for three different categories of 
entertainment goods, we find a negative relationship between changes in mean expenditures and 
one-period lagged mean expenditures, as well as a positive relationship between changes in mean 
income and expenditures.  The negative relationship with lagged expenditures is more robust than 
the relationship with changes in income, and we find that these relationships are statistically 
different across consumer types.  Our hypothesis requires consumers with different tastes for 
music to be affected differently by the various factors of music demand, and our aggregate-level 
OLS results show that consumer heterogeneity exists across different types of consumers within 
three different entertainment expenditure categories.  We find that evidence of such heterogeneity 
exists at the micro-level as well. 
 
Using nearly all of the available measures for age and family size, our micro-level 
regressions show that the relationship between these variables and expenditures vary across types 
of consumers, thus providing evidence for the required consumer heterogeneity.  We also find 
some direct evidence for our hypothesis in that the positive relationship between computer 
ownership and CD expenditures, while of a lower magnitude, was not significantly different in 
2001 than in 1998.  As for the positive relationship between movie ticket expenditures and 
computer ownership over this time period, we also find that the relationship is not significantly 
different (though the magnitude is slightly larger).  Since this relationship did not change over 
these years, despite the simultaneous downward trend in computer owning consumers’ real mean 
CD and movie ticket expenditures, we cannot report any evidence of a wide-spread effect from 
file sharing on CD sales. 
 
The micro data also show that the average consumer did not spend any differently on 
CDs in 1999, the year Napster went online, than in 1998.  While the average computer owning 
consumer did spend less on CDs in 1999 versus 1998, aggregate CD sales increased in 1999 by 
more than $1 billion.  However, from 2000 to 2001, average expenditures on CDs among both 
computer owning and non-computer owning consumers decreased, as did aggregate CD sales.  
While some consumers probably did spend less on CDs because of file-sharing, there does not 
appear to be any systematic effect from file sharing in the 1998 to 2001 Consumer Expenditure 
Survey data, and we cannot reject our hypothesis that some of the music file-sharing since 1999 
has been done by consumers frequently not in the market for CDs. 
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Appendix A, Chapter 3 – Different Forms of Copying 
 
The following four scenarios outline the copying choices faced by consumers: 
 
Case #1 – The consumer can buy the CD or copy it directly onto a CD-R after borrowing  
it from a friend (“ripping” tracks is included in this scenario). 
 
Case #2 – The consumer can buy the CD or copy individual songs (all of the songs from  
a particular album or just a few of the songs) from an Internet  
sharing service at no charge. 
 
Case #3 – The consumer can buy a digital download or obtain the download from an  
Internet sharing service at no charge. 
 
Case #4 – The consumer can buy the digital download or obtain the download from one  
individual (perhaps through email). 
 
 The first case is very much the same choice faced by consumers for the last 25 or so years 
– either buying an album or making a copy from a friend who already has the album – only with 
newer formats (CDs versus cassette tapes).  The choice will depend largely on the value that the 
consumer places on the good and the transaction costs (including all opportunity costs and the 
cost of buying blank CD-Rs) that would be incurred by making the copy.  Of course, the value 
that consumers place on the CD is revealed by the price they are willing to pay (measured ex-
post).  The higher the price of the CD relative to a consumer’s transaction costs, the more likely 
that consumer is to copy.  Conversely, the higher the transaction costs relative to the price, the 
more likely the consumer is to buy.  While some consumers may make a copy and also buy, this 
action is equivalent to raising the overall cost of the good through positive transaction costs, and 
it still allows both the artist and the label to receive payment (some would argue that it allows 
them to receive higher payments).  Case # 2 is, essentially, an extension of the first case through 
even newer technologies – namely the Internet. 
 
 In this scenario, consumers do not have to know anyone else who owns a copy of the 
album they are looking for – a rather significant difference from the first case.  Instead, the 
consumer can log onto the Internet and find either some or all of the songs from virtually any 
album.  Still, the choice made will depend on the consumer’s valuation of the CD price and the 
transaction costs of copying.  Just as in Case # 1, those who perceive a relatively higher price to 
transaction costs will copy, and those who perceive relatively higher transaction costs to price 
will buy.  Also similar to the first case, those consumers who choose to buy after copying are 
only raising their overall cost for the CD and are not preventing the artist and the label from 
receiving compensation. 
 
 The third case is more relevant to a structure dominated by digital distribution or, at least, 
more relevant to predicting whether a shift to digital distribution will occur.  In this case, 
consumers would choose between paying for a digital copy of a song or acquiring a nearly perfect 
substitute free of charge.  Given that the hardware costs and the transaction costs to acquire either 
good are practically identical, only the increasingly smaller chance that a “bad” copy of the song 
is on the sharing service prevents these goods from being perfect substitutes.  Since most 
consumers would choose the free copy, it is very likely that the predicted shift to digital 
distribution will not occur if sharing services are allowed to continue operating.  The fourth case, 
which also involves a choice between digital downloads, is still very different from Case # 3. 
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 In Case # 4, consumers are no longer able to go online and download any song they can 
think of.  Instead, they would have to obtain the songs they are looking for either by knowing 
another person with that song or conducting an Internet search for someone who has posted that 
song to a website.  Either of these alternatives is different from using an Internet sharing service 
in that the transaction (or search) costs are greater. 
 
If the consumer has to locate a friend with that same song, Case # 4 is very similar to 
Case #1 – some sort of relationship between two people is needed for this form of copying to take 
place.  If, however, the consumer has to perform an Internet search for any given song, a lack of 
any relationship between people would not prevent copying.  Still, a general Internet search for a 
downloadable copy of one song would be more cumbersome than searching for any given title on 
a sharing service.  Therefore, these larger transaction costs make Case # 4 similar to Case #1 with 
low transaction costs.  All four cases are similar in that the choice to buy or copy hinges on 
consumers’ evaluation of price and transaction costs. 
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Appendix B, Consumer Demand With Fixed Transaction Costs 
 
 The model derived in Chapter 4 does not include a fixed component in the transaction 
costs of copying.  In order to show that omitting these fixed costs does not substantially change 
the implications of the model, this appendix derives equations (2) through (8) with fixed 
transaction costs, T, included. 
 
 Given all the assumptions discussed above, the utility function is now taken to be of the 
form 
   
neither  doesconsumer   theif                                          0
 copies,consumer   theif        T)1(
 CD,  thebuysconsumer   theif                          



−−−
−
= xtq
pq
U COPYx
CD
x
x θ
θ
  (B2) 
 
where the fixed component of the transaction costs of copying, T, is added to the utility surplus 
for consumers who copy.  Next, by setting the utilities of the buying and copying consumers 
equal, a new critical value of the taste parameter, θ, is obtained for a given x 
 
q
Txtp
x
−−−= )1(θˆ      (B3) 
where q = qCD - qCOPY (q > 0), and the following new critical value of the cost type, x, is obtained 
for a given θ, as follows 
 
t
Ttpq
x x
++−= θ*      (B4) 
where q = qCD - qCOPY. 
  
All consumers of type x whose taste parameter is larger than this critical value, , in 
equation (B3) will buy a CD, and those whose θ  is smaller than but larger than  
xθˆ
xθˆ
t(1-x)-T/q will copy.  Even though the fixed component of the transaction cost of copying, T, is 
now included, an examination of equation (B3) reveals that, just as in equation (3), will 
increase if the price of the CD ( p) increases, the marginal cost of copying (t) decreases, or the 
difference in the CD and copy quality (q) decreases.  Additionally, will increase if the fixed 
component of the transaction cost of copying, T, decreases.  Alternatively, decreases and CD 
buying increases when the price of the CD ( p) decreases, the marginal cost of copying (t) 
increases, the fixed component of the transaction cost of copying (T ), increases, or the difference 
in the CD and copy quality (q) increases. 
xθˆ
xθˆ
xθˆ
 
All consumers whose cost type exceeds the point of indifference in equation (B4), x*, 
will copy, and those whose x is smaller than x* will buy.  Therefore, as x* decreases, more 
consumers will copy whereas when x* increases, more consumers will buy CDs.  Just as in 
equation (4), an examination of equation (B4) shows that, for a given θ ,  copying will increase if 
the price of the CD increases, the quality of the copy improves, or the quality of the CD declines.  
Also, if there is no difference in the quality of the CD and the copy (q = 0), x* increases as the 
marginal cost of copying ( t ) is increased and/or the fixed component of the transaction cost of 
copying (T ), is increased; consumers will then buy more and copy less. 
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Just as in the original version of the model, if the taste parameter, θ,  were low enough, 
consumers would choose between not consuming music at all and copying.  So, by setting the 
utility of copying equal to 0 (the utility from the choice of “neither”), a new critical value for the 
taste parameter, θ, is found to be  
COPYx q
Txt +−= )1(θˆ      (B5) 
 
This new critical value, , splits the consumers into those who neither buy nor copy and 
those who copy (for a given cost type, x).  Those consumers of a given cost type, x, whose taste 
parameter, θ, exceeds this critical value (B5) will copy, and those with a taste parameter less than 
this critical value (B5) will neither buy nor copy.  Equation (B5) is positively related to the 
marginal transaction cost of copying, t, and the fixed cost of copying, T, and is negatively related 
to the quality of the copy, q
xθˆ
COPY.  So, as either the marginal or fixed transaction cost of copying 
rises or the quality of the copy falls, the critical taste parameter (B5) will rise, indicating that 
fewer consumers will copy and more will stay out of the market altogether. 
 
Next, a new critical cost type, x*, is found by setting the utility of the copying consumers 
equal to the utility of those choosing to neither buy nor copy, i.e., θqCOPY – t(1-x) - T = 0.  
Therefore, this point of indifference represents the division of consumers who are indifferent 
toward copying and staying completely out of the market (for a given θ) and is represented by the 
following expression: 
  
t
qtTx
COPYθ−+=*      (B6) 
 
Consumers whose cost type, x, exceeds this critical value will copy, and those whose cost 
type is less than x* will stay out of the market completely.  This point of indifference (B6) is 
positively related to both the fixed and marginal transaction costs of copying, T and t, 
respectively, and negatively related to the quality of the copy, qCOPY.  Therefore, if either 
transaction cost of copying rises, x* will increase, indicating that fewer consumers will copy.  
Alternatively, if the quality of the copy rises, x* will decrease, indicating that more consumers 
will copy. 
 
Just as in the original version of the model, these equations are then used to derive the 
following alternate demands for CDs and copies (given θ ): 
 
Demand for CDs = 
t
qptT θ+−+
    (B7) 
Demand for copies = 
t
qtT COPYθ−+−1     (B8) 
  
Since θ is uniformly distributed from 0 to 1, in order to obtain the market demands for 
CDs and copies, the above demand equations have to be integrated with respect to θ.  It has 
already been shown that consumers with a very low θ will not buy music.  The lower integration  
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limit will be slightly different now that the fixed component of the transaction cost of copying is 
included; the taste parameter θ must now be at least as large as (p-t-T)/q).  Thus, the following 
market demand functions for CDs is obtained. 
  
 Demand for CDs = 2
1
)(
2
1 Ttpq
qt
d
t
qpt
q
Ttp
++−=+−+
−−
θθT∫ ≡ yCD    (B9) 
 
Next, the demand for copies is shown for those values of the taste parameter, θ, where the 
quality adjusted cost of the copy is lower than the quality adjusted cost difference between buying 
and copying; i.e., COPYq
t  < 
q
tp − . 
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Finally, the demand for copies is shown for those values of the taste parameter, θ, where 
the quality adjusted cost of the copy is equal to the quality adjusted cost difference between 
buying and copying; i.e., COPYq
t  = 
q
tp − . 
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 It is clear from comparing the market demands in equations (9), (10) and (11) to the 
alternate market demands in equations (B9), (B10) and (B11), that the only difference is that a 
new fixed term (T ), one which is signed the opposite of the price of the CD ( p) and signed 
identically to the marginal transaction cost (t), is now included.  Since the fixed component of the 
transaction costs of copying, T, can be viewed as an additional transaction cost and an additional 
“price” component of copying, and since adding this fixed component (T ) does not change the 
original equations in any other way, it is clear that the same inferences can be made from both the 
original and alternate versions of the equations.  Therefore, to make the model more 
parsimonious, the fixed component of the transaction costs of copying, T, are omitted from the 
original model. 
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Appendix C, Consumer Demand With Quadratic Transaction Costs 
 
 The model derived in chapter 4 is linear in transaction costs, with the transaction cost of 
copying introduced as t(1-x), > 0.  D’Aspremont, Gabszewizc and Thisse (1979) pointed out that 
a pure strategy equilibrium did not always exist in Hotelling’s model if consumers were 
distributed uniformly and transportation costs were linear.  This non-existence of an equilibrium 
disappeared, they argued, when transportation costs were quadratic.  Subsequently, Goerce and 
Ramer (1994), Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Baake and Oechssler (1997) have shown that a 
pure strategy equilibrium could still be non-existent even when transportation costs are quadratic.  
Even though an optimal price can be found in the original model above, this appendix partially 
derives an alternative model to show that the market demands for CDs and copies would not 
substantially change when transaction costs are quadratic. 
 
 Given all the assumptions discussed above, the utility functions from buying, copying, or 
choosing to stay out of the market is now taken to be of the form 
 
   
neither  doesconsumer   theif                                         0
 copies,consumer   theif            )1(
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2
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where the only difference from the original utility functions is that transaction costs of copying 
are now quadratic, i.e., t(1-x)2, > 0.  Next, by setting the utilities of the buying and copying 
consumers equal, a critical value of the taste parameter, θ, is obtained for a given x 
 
q
xtp
x
2)1(ˆ −−=θ      (C3) 
where q = qCD-qCOPY (q > 0).  Then, by setting the copy utility equal to the utility from choosing 
neither, a new critical value of the taste parameter, θ, is obtained for a given x 
   
COPYx q
xt 2)1(ˆ −=θ       (C5) 
  
Based on these values of the critical taste parameter, the market demands for CDs and 
copies can be derived just as in the case with linear transaction costs.  In fact, the new version of 
either Figure 4-2A or Figure 4-2B is exactly the same as the original versions –the endpoints of 
both lines are exactly the same.  Furthermore, for both equations (C3) and (C5), the first and 
second derivatives with respect to the cost type, x, are as follows 
 
)1(2
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x 2
ˆ
2
2
−=∂
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Since these results mean that both of the boundaries are concave, even if quadratic 
transaction costs result in curvature at the boundaries, none of the inferences from the original 
version of the model (with linear transaction costs) will change. 
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Appendix D, Derivations of Partial Derivatives From Chapter 4 
 
  This appendix lists all partial derivatives that were not explained in the main body of the 
text, and also describes the optimal price solutions given in equations (24) and (25).  The partial 
derivatives for the critical taste parameter, , given in equation (3), are as follows: xθˆ
  01
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qp
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 0    when0)1(
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The partial derivatives for the critical cost type, x*, given in equation (4), are as follows: 
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The partial derivatives for the critical taste parameter, , found in equation (5), when 
the utility of copying is set equal to the utility of staying out of the market (0), are as follows: 
xθˆ
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 The partial derivatives for the critical cost type, x*, found in equation (6), when the utility 
of copying is set equal to the utility of staying out of the market (0), are as follows: 
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Since the critical cost type, x*, derived in equation (4) represents the proportion of 
consumers who buy CDs (for a given θ ), equation (4) represents the individual demand for CDs 
for a given taste parameter, θ.  Therefore, the partial derivatives for the individual demand for 
CDs in equation (7) are identical to those in equations (D4), (D5) and (D6).  Since the 
complement of the critical cost type, x*, derived in equation (6) represents the proportion of 
consumers who copy (for a given θ ), the partial derivatives for the individual demand for 
copying in equation (9) are as follows: 
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Next, we explain the derivation of the optimal price solutions (equations (24) and (25)).  
The first step, substituting the demand for CDs (8) into the profit function (23), results in the 
following expression. 
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Then, maximizing profit with respect to price, p, results in the following expression. 
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Then, equation (D14) was solved for the price variable, p, resulting in the following two 
solutions: 
 
                           p* = 


−++ A
ctq µ1
2
3
1     ,        (D15) 
   
and,  
 p* = q + t     (D16) 
 
The comparative statics on these optimal price solutions were derived in the main text, as was a 
description of when the respective solutions were the “true” profit maximizing price.  In section 
4.8.1 of the text we stated that when q + t  > )1/( Ac µ− , solution (D15) (equation (24) in the 
main body of the text) is the true maximum, and when q + t  < )1/( Ac µ− , solution (D16) 
(equation (25) in the main body of the text) is the true maximum.  These relationships are 
determined by substituting the derived consumer demand expression (8) into the profit expression 
 
 136
(23), maximizing with respect to price, and examining the sign of the corresponding derivative 
for different values of price p.  This process is now described in detail. 
 
 Substituting the demand expression (8) into the profit expression (23) results in the 
following expression. 
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Ignoring the constant term and maximizing the bracketed term with respect to price results in the 
following expression, 
 [ ]cppqpq AA 2)1(2)ˆ)(1()ˆ( +−−−−−= µµ    (D17) 
 
where  is equal to q + t, and the product of these two bracketed terms is equivalent to the 
derivative of the profit expression with respect to price.  Setting the first and second term, 
respectively, equal to zero and solving for p results in the following two solutions for the optimal 
price. 
qˆ
 
qp ˆ*1 =  
)1(3
2
3
ˆ*
2
A
cqp µ−+=  
 
As seen by comparing to (D15) and (D16), these two sets of optimal price solutions are identical.  
Since we are interested in which of these two expressions is the true maximum, we construct and 
simplify the following inequality. 
 
)1(3
2
3
ˆˆ
A
cqq µ−+<  
)1(3
2
3
ˆˆ
A
cqq µ−<−  
)1(
ˆ
A
cq µ−<  
 
 We can then examine the signs of each bracketed term in (D17) and their product (the 
derivative of the profit expression) for different values of the price p under the respective 
assumptions that  is less than or greater than c / (1 – µqˆ A)).  Starting with the term, assuming 
< c / (1 – µ
qˆ
qˆ A), we know that if p < q ,  must be positive, and that if p > , q  must be 
negative (since we have set the term q equal to zero).  Similarly, for the second term, we know 
that if p < the second term in (D17), the term must be positive, and if p > the second term in 
(D17), then the term must be negative.  These results are illustrated below on Table D-1, and the 
results assuming (instead) that > c / (1 – µ
ˆ
ˆ
qˆ qˆ ˆ
qˆ A) are presented on Table D-2. 
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Table D-1, Signs of Profit Derivative Assuming < c / (1 – µqˆ A) 
term 1 + - -
term 2 + + -
Product + - +
p
p1* p2*
 
 
 
Table D-2, Signs of Profit Derivative Assuming > c / (1 – µqˆ A) 
 
term 1 + + -
term 2 + - -
Product + - +
p
p2* p1*
 
 
 
 Table D-1 shows that, assuming < c / (1 – µqˆ A), the derivative is at a maximum when 
.  And Table D-2 shows that, assuming > c / (1 – µqp ˆ*1 = qˆ A), the derivative is at a maximum 
when 
)1(3
2
3
ˆ*
2
A
cq
µ−+=p . 
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Appendix E, Derivations for Chapter Five 
 
Part 1: Derivatives of the Profit Function 
In equation (36), profit was given the expression  F
qt
k −



− 2
3
)1(
2
µ , where k = z(1- µ ) –
c, and z = 



−++ µ1
2
3
1 ctq .1  To explain how this simplification was made, we now present the 
equations and substitutions used. Before substituting the k expression into the profit function, 
equation (36) would be expressed as: 
 
π(µ) = [ ] Fcz
qt
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
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
 +− )1(
2
)( 2 µ      (E1) 
where  
z = 



−++ µ1
2
3
1 ctq        (E2) 
 
To further simplify equation (E1), the z expression (E2) was solved for q + t. This 
operation resulted in the following expression for q + t. 
 
q + t = zc 3
)1(
2 +−− µ       (E3) 
 
Then, (E3) was substituted into equation (E1).  The resulting expression then simplifies 
to 
F
qt
−



− 2
3
)1(
)c -)-z(1(2
µ
µ       (E4) 
 
Setting k = z(1- µ ) –c then yields equation (36), as used in the main body of the text. Taking the 
derivative of equation (36) with respect to the artist’s share of album sales, µ, yields the following 
result.  
 
0
)1(
2)(
2
2
<−−=∂
∂
µµ
µπ
qt
zk      (E5) 
 
As expected, the label’s total profit is negatively related to the artist’s share of album sales.  For 
any fixed amount of profit, the larger the share given to the artist, the smaller the share left for the 
label.  To derive equation (E5), we manipulate the equations for the z and k parameters, and take 
their partial derivatives with respect to the artist’s share of album sales, µ. 
  
First, we know that z = 



−++ µ1
2
3
1 ctq and k = z(1- µ ) –c imply the following 
expression. 
                                                     
1 For simplification, the subscript “A” is dropped from the artist’s share of album sales, µ. 
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µ−−=+ 1
23 cztq       (E6) 
 
By subtracting z from both sides of (E6), we obtain the following equivalent expressions.  
 
µµ
µ
−=−
−−=+−
−=−+
1
2
1
])1[(22
1
2 kczz
m
cztq    (E7) 
 
We also know from equation (E2) that ctqz 2
)1(
)1)((3 +−
−+= µ
µ , which leads to the following two 
expressions. 
 
ctqz 2)1)(()1(3 +−+=− µµ     (E8) 
3
)1)(( ctqk −−+= µ      (E9) 
 
Next, we take the partial derivatives of the k and z parameters with respect to µ, yielding the 
following results 
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We can now derive equation (E5), the partial derivative of profit (36) with respect to the artist’s 
share of album sales, µ. 
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Then, since k + c = z(1-µ), we have equation (E5), 0
)1(
2)(
2
2
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∂
µµ
µπ
qt
zk . 
 
Using the original form of equation (36), and then substituting as necessary from 
equations (E6) through (E11), the second derivative with respect to the artist’s share of album 
sales is as follows 
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By combining the bracketed terms in the numerator of the first expression for equation 
(E12), and using equation (E9), 
3
)1)(( ctq
k
−−+= µ , we can derive the final form of equation 
(E12). 
 
Since all other terms are positive, the sign of equation (E12) depends on the sign of the 
term k. As noted previously, k = z(1- µ ) –c and z = 



−++ µ1
2
3
1 ctq .  From chapter 4, we know 
that the expression for z is equivalent to the optimal price, p*, a term which is positive.  The 
lower the marginal cost of producing a CD, c, and lower the artist’s share of album sales, µ, the 
higher the value for k.  Given that the marginal cost of producing a CD has been close to zero for 
many years, and that most artists receive about 10 to 15 percent of album sales (gross), there is no 
reason to believe that the parameter k would be negative. Therefore, it is argued that the second 
derivative, equation (E12), is positive and, since the first derivative (E5) is negative, that profit is 
convex in the artist’s share of album sales, µ. 
 
We now present the partial derivatives for equation (36) (and the expressions for k and z) 
with respect to the quality difference between CDs and copies, q, the transaction cost of copying, 
t, the marginal cost of producing CDs, c, and the label’s fixed cost, F. 
 
Since the expression for z is equal to the optimal price,  p*, derived in chapter 4, the 
partial derivatives for z are identical to those derived for p* .  Restated for z, these derivatives are 
as follows. 
 
3
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These results are then used to present the partial derivatives of k, where k = z(1- µ ) –c.  
Substituting z into k results in the following expression for k 
 
k = cctqcctq −+−+−≡−−
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Using this expression, it is clear that the partial derivatives for k are as follows. 
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1 µ−=∂
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k , > 0               (E15) 
                                  
3
1−=∂
∂
c
k , < 0           (E16) 
                                                     
2 It was also noted in Chapter 4 that the derivative of the optimal price (z in Chapter 5) with respect to q can 
be decomposed into two parts.  As such, the optimal price (or z) is negatively related to the quality of the 
copy and positively related to the quality of the CD. 
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Equations (E15) and (E16) can then be used to derive the partial derivatives of the profit 
function, π(µ) = F
qt
k −



− 2
3
)1(
2
µ ,  with respect to the quality difference between CDs and 
copies, q, the transaction cost of copying, t, and the marginal cost of producing CDs, c.  The 
partial derivative of (36) with respect to the label’s fixed cost, F, is also presented here.  The 
partial derivative with respect to q is as follows. 
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 That equation (E17) is positive can be seen by recognizing that k represents a positive 
fraction of (1-µ) less marginal cost, c.  Therefore the second bracketed term in (E17), 
q
k 1 , is a 
positive fraction of the term (1-µ).  As a result, the term must be less than (1-µ), and (E17) must 
be positive.  Profit, therefore, is positively related to the quality difference of the CD and the 
copy, q.  The same logic can be applied to the next partial derivative to show that profit is 
positively related to transaction costs, t.  This partial derivative is shown with the following 
expression. 
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The partial derivatives of profit with respect to the marginal cost of producing CDs, c, 
and to the label’s fixed cost, F, are as follows: 
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The sign of (E19) is clear since we have a negative term divided by a positive term, and 
the sign of (E20) is clear since we have only one negative term.  These partial derivatives, 
equations (E15) through (E20), will be used to derive the comparative statics for the optimal 
payoffs of the artist and label. 
 
Part 2: Derivations of Optimal Shares and Optimal Utilities 
 
 Muthoo (1999) develops several corollaries, propositions, and lemmas concerning the 
optimal shares and utilities obtained using the Nash bargaining solution.  For instance, Muthoo 
presents the optimal money payoffs for players A and B in a symmetric Nash framework, where 
player A is risk averse and both players have a disagreement point equal to zero.3  We have 
applied Muthoo’s method for the analogous artist-label bargaining arrangement, and we have 
generalized his method to derive results for the artist-label arrangement in the asymmetric Nash 
framework.  
 
All of the following derivations are made by using the same basic Nash framework with 
different substitutions.  These substitutions originate mainly from the following definition 
 
• from the strict monotonicity of Ui, there exists a unique share xA ∈ [0,π] such that UA(xA) 
= uA.   
 
In other words, xA = U (u1−A
(1 Au
A), where U  denotes the inverse of U1−A A.  Thus, we can write that 
g(uA) ))( AUBU
−−≡ π , resulting in a Nash product of the following form 
( ) ( ) BA BAAA dugdUN αα −−= )(     (E21) 
 
where g(uA) is identically equal to player B’s utility when player A obtains utility uA.  When using 
the Nash product to derive a symmetric bargaining expression, the bargaining powers in (E21) are 
simply restricted to equal one. 
 
2.1  Risk Averse Artist, Asymmetric Bargaining 
 
In this section of the appendix, we present the derivation of the optimal money payoffs 
from section 5.4 of the main body of the text.  To derive the artist’s optimal money payoff in the 
asymmetric, risk-averse case, we implement the following asymmetric Nash product, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ααγααγ µπµπ −−=−−−= 1)( ))(( A AALAAA xxdxdxN L   (E22) 
 
where αA and αL sum to one, dL and dA are equal to zero, and g(uA) .  Since the 
utility of player B is equal to B’s payoff after player A obtains A’s payoff, we know that U
)( )( Ax−≡ µπ
B = π - 
xA (presented as in (E22)).  For ease of exposition, α)( )( Ax−µπ A and αL sum to one (i.e., αL = 1- 
αA), and the “A” subscript for the artist’s bargaining power, αA, is dropped.  To solve for the 
artist’s optimal payoff, we maximized (E22) and solved the resulting expression for the artist’s 
payoff, xA.  Maximizing (E22) with respect to xA results in the following first order condition. 
 
                                                     
3 See Muthoo (1999) page 16. 
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Solving (E23) for xA results in the following optimal share for the artist,  
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which corresponds to (49) in section 5.4 of the main body of the text.  The derivation of (E24) is 
as follows. 
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By substituting the definition of xA into the left hand side of the optimal payoff, where xA 
= µπ(µ), and dividing both sides by π(µ), we obtain the optimal share presented in section 5.4 of 
the text as equation (49) (
)1(1
* γα
αγµ −−= ).  The comparative statics for the optimal payoffs in 
the asymmetric case are as follows. 
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 In both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, both the artist’s and label’s payoffs are 
positively related to profit, π(µ), quality difference, q, and transaction costs, t, and negatively 
related to marginal cost, c, and fixed cost, F.  Also, the relationship between the respective money 
payoffs and the γ parameter are of opposite sign (equations (E26) and(E33)), a result which, as 
will be seen below, holds for the symmetric case as well.  The artist’s payoff increases with γ (as 
the artist becomes less risk averse), and the label’s payoff decreases with γ.  The key difference 
between the asymmetric and symmetric cases, however, is that the asymmetric case introduces 
asymmetric bargaining power into the derivation of the optimal money payoffs. 
 
 Equations (E25) and (E32) demonstrate the effect the relative bargaining power 
parameter, α, has on the artist’s and label’s optimal payoffs.  The artist’s optimal payoff is 
increasing in the artist’s own bargaining power, (E25), and the label’s optimal payoff is 
decreasing in the artist’s bargaining power (E32).  Furthermore, all of the remaining comparative 
statics for both players, equations (E27) through (E31) for the artist, and (E34) through (E38) for 
the label, have identical denominators and second terms.  These comparative statics differ only in 
their numerators: αγ for the artist’s comparative statics, and (1-α) for the label’s. 
 
 The numerators for the artist’s equations all posses the parameter for the artist’s 
bargaining power, α, while the numerators for the label’s equations all posses the complement of 
this term, 1-α.  The artist’s optimal payoff is positively related to the artist’s bargaining power, 
and the label’s optimal payoff is negatively related to the artist’s bargaining power. 
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2.2 Risk Averse Artist, Symmetric Bargaining 
 
This section of the appendix corresponds to the last part of section 5.4 of the main body 
of the text.  To derive the artist’s optimal share of profit in the symmetric, risk-averse case, we 
implement the following symmetric Nash product,4 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )AALAAA xxdxdxN L −=−−−= )( ))(( A µπµπ γααγ     (E39) 
 
where αA and αL are both equal to one, dL and dA are equal to zero, and g(uA) .  
Since the utility of player B is equal to B’s payoff after player A obtains A’s payoff, we know that 
U
)( )( Ax−≡ µπ
B = π - xA (presented as in (E39)).  In equation (E39), both players have equal 
bargaining powers, the artist is risk averse and the label is risk neutral.  Maximizing (E39) with 
respect to x
)( )( Ax−µπ
A results in the following first order condition 
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Solving (E40) for xA gives the artist’s optimal money payoff.  This derivation is as follows. 
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Since it is a special case of the asymmetric Nash bargaining framework presented in the 
beginning of section 5.4, the expression for the symmetric optimal money payoff, 
1
)(*
+= γ
µγπ
Ax , is 
not presented in the main body of the text.  Nonetheless, it is clear that substituting the definition 
of xA into the left hand side of the optimal payoff, where xA = µπ(µ), and dividing both sides by 
π(µ) results in the optimal share presented in the text as equation (53) (
1
* += γ
γµ ).  The 
comparative statics for the optimal payoffs in the symmetric case are as follows. 
 
                                                     
4 Equation (A39) is presented as equation (52) in section 5.4. 
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 With the exception of those on the γ parameter, all of the above comparative statics are 
signed using the partial derivatives of the profit function as shown in first section of this 
appendix.  Equations (E41) and (E47) show that both the artist’s and label’s optimal money 
payoffs are positively related to the profit from album sales, and that the artist and label would 
split the profit equally if γ equals one.  In other words, as γ  increases (the artist becomes less risk 
averse), the artist’s and label’s optimal payoffs approach each other. 
 
Equations (E42) and (E48) show that the artist’s and label’s optimal money payoffs are 
positively and negatively related, respectively, to the γ parameter.  For instance, as the artist 
becomes less risk averse (γ increases), the artist’s optimal payoff rises and the label’s falls.  From 
the remainder of these comparative statics, we see that all are signed identically for both the artist 
and the label. 
  
Both the artist’s and label’s optimal money payoffs are positively related to the quality 
difference in CDs and copies, q, as well as the transaction costs of copying, t.   Additionally, both 
the artist’s and label’s optimal money payoffs are negatively related to marginal and fixed costs, c 
and F, respectively.  These likenesses seem to make sense in that any variable that increases 
 
 147
(decreases) profit would increase (decrease) the total amount of money to be split.  For example, 
as marginal costs go down, the overall profit would tend to rise, increasing the level of the profits 
to be split. 
 
2.3 Risk Averse Artist, Symmetric Bargaining and a Nonzero dA 
 
This section of the appendix corresponds to section 5.6 of the main body of the text.  To 
examine the relationship between the artist’s optimal payoff and disagreement point, we 
implemented the following symmetric Nash product,5 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )AAALAAA xdxdxdxN L −−=−−−= )( ))(( A µπµπ γααγ         (E53) 
 
where αA and αL are both equal to one, dL is equal to zero, dA is nonzero, and g(uA) 
.  Maximizing (E53) with respect to the artist’s optimal payoff, x)( )( Ax−≡ µπ A, resulted in the 
following first order condition. 
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Due to the difficulty in finding a closed form solution for the first order condition, the 
implicit function theorem was then used to examine the relationship between the artist’s optimal 
payoff and disagreement point (a closed form solution for xA  can only be obtained from (62) 
when γ is equal to one).  Using the implicit function theorem, we demonstrated that the artist’s 
optimal payoff, xA, was positively related to dA, the artist’s disagreement point.  This result was 
presented as the following expression, 
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where, since  is less than zero, 
AxF
A
A
d
x
∂
∂
 must be greater than zero.  The derivation of ,  the 
partial derivative of (62) with respect to the artist’s optimal payoff, is as follows, 
AxF
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whereby  is negative since, as is clearly seen in the second to last line of the derivation, the 
first term is less than the second term, and all other terms are negative.  
AxF
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Equation (A53) is presented as equation (61) in section 5.6. 
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Part 3: Derivations of Comparative Statics 
 
This section of the appendix explains the derivations of the comparative statics presented 
in sections 5.4 and 5.5 in the main body of the text.  In section 5.4, we presented the following 
expressions for the artist’s optimal share of album sales, µ*, and its corresponding comparative 
statics.  
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The derivation for comparative static (50) is as follows, 
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and the derivation for comparative static (51) is as follows, 
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whereby both numerators are positive since α and γ are between zero and one.  Since the 
denominators, identical for both (50) and (51), are also positive, both comparative statics are 
positive. 
 
 In section 5.5, we presented the optimal price and consumer demand functions as well as 
their corresponding comparative statics after substituting the endogenous optimal share solution 
(49) into the optimal price solution (24) derived in chapter four, where the artist’s share was 
exogenous.  In chapter four, the optimal price expression with an exogenous artist’s share was 
presented as follows.6 
 
  
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
−++= A
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2
3
1*       (24) 
                                                     
6 Two optimal price solutions were presented in Chapter 4, but only (24) includes the artist’s share. 
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In chapter five, the following expressions for the optimal price, with an endogenous artist’s share, 
and its corresponding comparative statics were presented in the main body of the text. 
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The derivation of the new optimal price expression (55), with an endogenous artist’s share, is as 
follows. 
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 The derivation of the comparative statics ((56) and (57)) for the newly derived optimal 
price make use of the comparative statics for the optimal artist share, expressions (50) and (51).  
The derivation for (56) is as follows,  
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and the derivation for (57) is as follows,  
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whereby both expressions (56) and (57) are clearly positive. 
 
Taking account of the endogenous artist’s share, the following expressions for the 
optimal consumer demand function and its corresponding comparative statics were presented in 
the main body of the text. 
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To derive the new expression for the optimal consumer demand for CDs (58), we 
substituted the newly derived optimal price expression (55) into the demand function presented 
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as equation (8) in chapter four,  yCD ≡ ( 2
2
1 tpq
qt
+− ) , where the optimal price was taken as 
exogenous.  Making this substitution, the derivation of the new optimal demand expression (58) 
is as follows. 
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Next, making use of the previously derived comparative static expressions (56) and (57), 
we present the derivations for the consumer demand comparative statics (59) and (60).  For ease 
of exposition, we present the demand expression (58) as follows, 
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and the comparative static (60) is derived as follows. 
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Since both α∂
∂ *p and γ∂
∂ *p are positive, and since it is assumed that qtp ≤−  (see chapter 
four), both comparative statics (59) and (60) are less than or equal to zero. 
 
Part 4: Derivations of Variable Profit Expressions 
 
 In section 5.7 of the main body of the text, we examined the effect that bargaining over a 
variable profit has on the artist’s optimal share.  This section of the appendix derives the 
expressions presented in section 5.7.  To begin, we reformulated the Nash product (46) in terms 
of the profit shares as follows, 
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where γ < 1, αA and αL sum to one (i.e., αL = 1- αA), dL and dA are equal to zero, the “A” subscript 
for the artist’s bargaining power, αA, is dropped for ease of exposition, and where the expression 
for profit as a function of the artist’s share, π(µ), is as derived in equation (36).7  Taking the log 
of (64) resulted in the following expression for the Nash product, 
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which was then maximized to obtain the following first order condition,  
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To derive the first order condition (67), we first show that the ratio 
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7 For simplicity, we have also dropped the “A” subscript from the artist’s share, denoting profit as π(µ). 
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Therefore, when the label’s fixed cost, F, is equal to zero, the ratio of 
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follows. 
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We can now complete the derivation of the first order condition (67).  Maximizing (65) 
with respect to µ and using the above result for the ratio 
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µπ ′ , we obtain the following set of 
expressions. 
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 Next, in section 5.7 of the main body of the text, we defined the following two functions, 
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where g(µ) and f(µ) are identically equal to the first two terms and the last term (without the 
multiplier) of the first order condition (67), respectively.  Expression (69) was also restated as 
follows,  
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where, for simplicity, x = (1-µ), and m = q + t.  We note that z = 
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Using expression (72) simplifies the task of deriving the partial derivative of (69).  The 
partial derivative of (69) with respect to (1-µ) was presented as the following expression in the 
main body of the text, 
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where, for simplicity, x = (1-µ), and m = q + t.  The derivation of (70) is as follows. 
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As long as the parameter for the label’s marginal costs, c, is quite low, the numerator is positive. 
Given that the label’s marginal costs have been very low for some time, we assume that the 
numerator is positive and, consequently, that expression (70) is decreasing in (1- µ) and 
increasing in µ. 
 
 In section 5.7 of the main body of the text, we also presented the following partial 
derivatives of (72). 
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The derivation of (73) is as follows, 
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and the derivation of (74) is as follows. 
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Appendix F, An Empirical Examination of Artists’ Income 
 
Part 1, Introduction 
  
To study artists’ income, we use tax return data from all Schedule C filers who indicated 
they were artists by use of the specified principal business code on their Schedule C.  The 
summary statistics on these data are taken from a confidential data set from the U.S. Treasury’s 
Statistics on Income (SOI) division.  From 1998 to the present, the IRS has required filers to use 
the 6 digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 711510, which is 
assigned to the following occupations: Independent Artists, Writers and Performers.  Since the 
key year in this time period is 1999, when Napster was launched, we have a consistent business 
code for “artists” before and after file-sharing services were launched.  Unfortunately, there is no 
way to disaggregate the tax return data into any subcategories.  For example, it is not possible to 
partition the sample into only “musical artists” and “writers.” 
 
Nonetheless, from 1998 to 2001, there are only three occupational categories in the 
sample, all of which could be at least indirectly affected by file sharing.  If, for example, file 
sharing has caused a significant number of consumers to exit the market for CDs, movies and 
books, we would expect to see decreases in artists’ income.  Of course, using the SOI data to 
make robust conclusions about the effects of music file-sharing on CD sales does not seem 
sensible.   
 
Part 2,  Methodology for SOI data 
 
 The methodology used to study the SOI data is rather straightforward and simplistic.  
Since we do not have permanent access to the micro data, and since we cannot disaggregate the 
types of artists in the sample, we examine trends in the summary statistics (mean, median and 
quartiles) and whether these trends have any implications for artists’ income in relation to 
industry sales aggregates.  We adjust nominal income data to 2001 dollars using three measures 
of inflation: the CPI for all items less food and energy, the GDP deflator, and the CPI for 
recreation items.  To examine artists’ income, we obtained a sample representative of all 
Schedule C filers with the business code 711510, and we examined the following income fields. 
  
• Schedule C Gross Receipts or Sales 
• Schedule E Royalties  
• Adjusted Gross Income 
 
Royalties for album sales would be most likely to show up in the Schedule C field “Gross 
Receipts or Sales.”  Provided the tax forms are filled out properly, royalty income from other 
sources (e.g., radio and television) should show up on the Schedule E.  To control for economy 
wide effects, we examined Schedule C receipts, Schedule E royalties and Adjusted Gross Income 
(AGI) for all Schedule C filers, and AGI for all tax filers.  The summary statistics for the artist 
and control samples are presented in both nominal and 2001 dollars on Tables F-1 and F-2. 
 
Part 3, Aggregate Artists’ Income 
 
As panel A of Table F-1 shows, the nominal aggregate amount of artists’ Schedule C 
receipts increased from $9.8 billion in 1998 to $10.3 billion in 1999, to $11.5 billion in 2000, and 
then decreased to $11.3 billion in 2001.  As panels B through D of Table F-1 show, adjusting 
these totals to 2001 dollars (using either of the three measures of inflation) does not change the 
underlying trends. 
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Panel A of Table F-3 shows that these aggregate Schedule C receipts total about half of 
the combined aggregate sales totals for the music and movie industries.  For instance, in 2001, 
total Schedule C receipts for artists were $11.3 billion, while total retail sales in the music 
industry totaled $12.4 billion, and total box office receipts were $8.4 billion in the movie 
industry.  Since artists in the music industry only receive about 10 to 20 percent of total album 
sales (less than $3 billion in 2001), it appears that the SOI data set is “noisy” in that in includes a 
great deal of income from sources other than those that we are most interested in.  Again, using 
the SOI data to make robust conclusions about the effects of music file-sharing on CD sales does 
not seem prudent. 
 
Instead, we use the SOI data to make broad comparisons of the direction of income for 
“artists,” as defined by NAICS 711510, relative to the direction of income for tax-filers in other 
occupations.  We also compare the SOI data to movements in aggregate sales in the music and 
movie industries, keeping in mind that the SOI data include income from other types of artists 
(such as writers). 
 
3.1  Schedule C Receipts 
 
  Tables F-1 and F-2 demonstrate that Schedule C receipts for both artists and all tax-
filers are highly skewed, with mean receipts being larger than even the third quartile for both 
samples.  Panels A through D of Table F-1 show that the trends in artists’ Schedule C receipts are 
basically the same from 1998 through 2001 in both nominal and 2001 dollars (for all three 
measures of inflation).  For instance, in nominal and 2001 dollars, artists’ median and third 
quartile receipts decreased from 1998 to 1999, increased from 1999 to 2000 and increased from 
2000 to 2001.  In 1999 and 2000, artists’ nominal and real mean Schedule C receipts follow these 
same trends. 
 
However, using the CPI for all items less food and energy, and the GDP deflator, artists’ 
annual real mean Schedule C receipts decreased from 2000 to 2001, whereas measured in either 
nominal or 2001 dollars using the recreation CPI, the mean increased (just as the median and 
third quartile).  These data show that most artists in the sample realized a decrease in Schedule C 
receipts from 1998 to 1999, and an increase in both 2000 and 2001 (in both nominal and real 
terms). 
 
Panels A through D of Table F-2 show that, using nominal and 2001 dollars (with all 
three measures of inflation), median Schedule C receipts for all Schedule C filers increased from 
1998 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2000, and then decreased in 2001.  These trends are in the 
opposite direction of artists’ median Schedule C receipts from 1998 to 1999 as well as from 2000 
to 2001.  However, the change in the median receipts for both groups (an increase) is the same for 
1999 to 2000. 
 
The trends in the third quartiles for artists and all Schedule C filers match from 1998 to 
1999 (a decrease) and from 1999 to 2000 (an increase), but are in the opposite direction from 
each other in 2001.  At the mean, the trends for the two groups is less clear.  From 1998 to 1999, 
all Schedule C filers’ mean receipts increased, while artists’ mean receipts decreased.  Then, from 
1999 to 2000, both groups’ mean receipts increased.  These trends from 1998 through 2000 hold 
for both nominal and 2001 dollars, using each of the measures of inflation. 
 
From 2000 to 2001, however, the differences in the trend of the mean receipts for these 
two groups is sensitive to the measure of inflation used to adjust to 2001 dollars.  For instance, in 
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both nominal dollars and when the CPI for recreation items is used, mean receipts increased for 
artists and decreased for all Schedule C filers.  Alternatively, when either the CPI for all items 
less food and energy or the GDP deflator is used, real mean receipts decreased for both groups 
from 2000 to 2001. 
 
At both the mean and the third quartile, real and nominal income for artists and all 
Schedule C filers moved together in two of the three years (1999 and 2000 for the third quartile 
and 2000 and 2001 for the mean).  At the median, real and nominal income for artists and all 
Schedule C filers moved together in 2000, but not in 1999 or 2001.  Overall, there does not 
appear to be any consistent relationship (through the four year period) between artists’ Schedule 
C receipts and the receipts of all Schedule C filers. 
 
3.2  Schedule E Royalties 
 
   Panels A through D of Tables F-1 and F-2 show that Schedule E royalties, for both artists 
and all Schedule C filers, are even more highly skewed than Schedule C receipts.  For both the 
artist and control samples, the first, second and third quartiles are zero for the entire four year 
period.  Nonetheless, mean Schedule E royalties for artists and all filers, using both nominal and 
2001 dollars (with each measure of inflation), show the opposite trend in 1999, but the same trend 
in both 2000 and 2001. 
 
 From 1998 to 1999, all filers’ mean Schedule E royalties increased while artists’ 
decreased.  From 1999 to 2000, mean Schedule E royalties for both artists and all filers 
decreased, and, from 2000 to 2001, mean Schedule E royalties for both artists and all filers 
increased.  These data show that, for this type of income, the artists in our sample realized a 
change in income that was experienced by all Schedule C filers in 2000 and 2001, but not in 
1999.  Given the highly skewed nature of the Schedule E royalties, and that this type of income 
probably does not include artists’ album sales, the Schedule E data do not appear very useful for 
our purposes. 
 
3.3 Adjusted Gross Income 
 
Panels A through D of Table F-1 demonstrate that artists’ adjusted gross income (AGI) is 
also highly skewed, with the mean AGI near or higher than the third quartile in every year.  
Panels A through D of Table F-2 show that AGI for all Schedule C filers and for all tax filers is 
also skewed, though not as highly skewed as artists’ AGI. 
 
For the entire four-year period, artists’ median AGI and all Schedule C filers’ median 
AGI move in the same direction.8  Both groups’ median AGI also moves in the same direction as 
median AGI for all tax-filers from 1998 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2000, but in the opposite 
direction from 2000 to 2001 (the median AGI for all tax filers rose consecutively each year from 
1998 to 2001).  These trends hold when using both nominal and 2001 dollars, for each measure of 
inflation used. 
 
Since there was no definitional change to AGI in 2001, these data demonstrate that 
business owners’ (including artists) AGI moved in a different direction from that of non-business 
owners from 2000 to 2001, but in the same direction in the years prior to 2001.  These data seem 
to support the idea that business owners’ income can be affected by factors which do not affect 
                                                     
8 Artists’ and all Schedule C filers’ AGI at the mean and first quartile also move in the same direction, as 
well as at the third quartile for all years except 1999. 
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non-business owners’ income.  Also, given that AGI includes nearly all types of income, and that 
artists’ Schedule C receipts do not seem to move with the Schedule C receipts of all filers, the 
similar trends in their AGI data suggest that artists in this sample have a significant amount of 
income from other sources. 
 
Part 4,  Industry Sales Data 
 
 Panels A through D of Table F-3 show that, depending on the measure of “industry sales 
revenue,” as well as on the measure of inflation, different conclusions can be drawn from the 
aggregate sales data.  For instance, when music industry sales are measured by total retail units, 
sales increased from 1998 to 1999, then decreased sequentially in 2000 and 2001.  These trends 
hold when total retail sales are in 2001 dollars (for all three measures of inflation).  When only 
CD sales are examined, however, we see increases for the first two years followed by a decrease 
from 2000 to 2001.  These trends also hold when CD sales are in 2001 dollars (for all three 
measures of inflation). 
 
 Given that the SOI artist income data measures the income of “Independent Artists, 
Writers and Performers,” however, it is more appropriate to compare the SOI data to a broader 
measure of “industry sales.”  To construct these broader measures, we combine RIAA sales data 
with “box office receipts” published by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).9  
We construct the following two measures of aggregate industry sales: (1) CD and box office 
sales; and (2) total retail units and box office sales.  For comparing industry sales data to the SOI 
artist income data, the second measure would be the best since it includes sales from a larger 
variety of entertainment industry goods.  For completeness, we compare the SOI data to both 
aggregates. 
 
 Table F-3 shows that the first aggregate measure, CD and box office sales, increased each 
year from 1998 through 2001 in nominal dollars as well as in 2001 dollars if the recreation CPI is 
used.  However, when either the CPI for all items less food and energy or the GDP deflator is 
used to adjust to 2001 dollars, real sales revenue for this category increased sequentially in 1999 
and 2000, and then decreased in 2001. 
 
 The table also shows that the broader aggregate measure, in both nominal and real 
dollars, increased from 1998 to 1999, and then decreased from 1999 to 2000.  However, for the 
broader aggregate, the direction of total sales revenue in 2001 is sensitive to the measure of 
inflation used.  In nominal dollars, and when the recreation CPI is used, the total sales figure for 
the broader aggregate increased in 2001.  Alternatively, when either the CPI for all items less 
food and energy or the GDP deflator is used, the total sales figure decreased in 2001.  In the next 
sub-section, we compare the changes in these aggregates to the SOI data. 
 
Part 5, Comparisons of Industry Sales Data and SOI Artist Income Data 
 
 Unless other types of artists income dominate the SOI sample, we should expect to see 
similar movements in artists’ income and in the broadest of our sales aggregates, total retail units 
and box office sales.  Depending on the relative importance of each type of artist income, we may 
also expect to see similar trends in the alternative aggregate, where box office sales are combined 
                                                     
9 The RIAA data can be found at www.riaa.org, and the MPAA data can be found at www.mpaa.org. 
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with CD sales.10  Table F-3 shows two matrices detailing when the trends in artists’ median 
Schedule C receipts match those in the aggregate industry sales data.11 
 
 Panel A shows that the trends in the broader aggregate (total retail unit and box office 
sales) and in artists’ median Schedule C income only match in two instances.  When examined in 
nominal dollars or in 2001 dollars adjusted with the recreation CPI, the trends in artists’ median 
income and industry sales match from 2000 to 2001.  In each of the other ten possibilities, the 
trends do not match. 
 
 Panel B shows that the trends in the narrower aggregate (CD and box office sales) and in 
artists’ median Schedule C income match in six out of twelve instances.  For the period 1998 to 
1999, none of the trends match, while from 1999 to 2000, all of the trends match (the aggregate 
and artists’ median income both increased from 1999 to 2000 whether measured in nominal or 
2001 dollars). 
 
From 2000 to 2001, however, the trend matched only when the aggregate and median 
income are measured in nominal dollars or the recreation CPI (both the aggregate and income 
increased from 2000 to 2001 using these measures of inflation).  However, when either the CPI 
for all items less food and energy or the GDP deflator is used to measure the aggregate and 
median income, the aggregate decreased from 2000 to 2001 while artists’ median income 
increased. 
  
Focusing on the broader aggregate (panel A of Table F-3), we see that, using either 
nominal or any of the three measures of real dollars, the trend in the aggregate and in artists’ 
median income moved in the opposite direction for both 1999 and 2000.  In 2001, using either 
nominal or 2001 dollars as measured with the CPI for recreation items, the aggregate and artists’ 
median income moved together (they both decreased).  However, using either the CPI for all 
items less food and energy or the GDP deflator, the trends moved in the opposite direction in 
2001 (the aggregate decreased while artists’ median income increased). 
 
Table F-1 also shows that, using both nominal and 2001 dollars, similar patterns emerged 
between artists’ median income and the aggregate income in the SOI sample.  For instance, in 
1999, artists’ income at the mean, median and third quartile fell while the aggregate income 
increased (and the sample size increased).  In 2001, aggregate Schedule C receipts decreased (and 
the sample size decreased) while artists’ income at the mean, median and third quartile increased.  
In 2000, however, this pattern did not hold; the aggregate income (and sample size), income at 
the mean, median and third quartile all increased.  Although these patterns do not directly provide 
any evidence for an effect on artists’ income from file sharing, they do provide a framework for 
interpreting industry aggregate sales data. 
 
These findings demonstrate that artists’ income data is highly skewed and, therefore, that 
both aggregate income and aggregate industry sales data can be significantly impacted by the 
“few” artists at the top of the income scale.  It appears that a significant drop in the industry’s 
aggregate sales data, for example, could be largely attributed to a decline in sales from the 
“biggest” few artists.  In other words, low valuation consumers could enter the market for CDs to 
purchase the “biggest” artists’ music, but then remain out of the market for other artists’ CDs.  If 
this type of buying activity takes place in the presence of popular music trends, it could lead to 
                                                     
10 Given that CD sales are a significant percentage of the music industry’s total retail unit sales, this idea 
does not seem completely unreasonable. 
11 The trend in median artists’ Schedule C receipts also matches the trend at the third quartile. 
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significant swings in the industry’s aggregate sales through time.12  Unfortunately, we do not 
have the type of sales data that would allow us to directly test this hypothesis.  Nonetheless, it is 
possible that declines in aggregate sales data could be explained by such phenomena, whereby the 
end of a fad, for example, contributes to a decline in sales because only high valuation consumers 
remain in the market for CDs.   
 
                                                     
12 For instance, if low valuation consumers were brought into the market to buy CDs based on the 1990’s 
“grunge” fad, the large increases in aggregate CD sales through these years could have been largely 
attributed to popularity of that type of music. 
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Table F-1,  Artists' Income Data
Panel A, Nominal Dollars
Schedule C Receipts
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 9,754,352,379 15,246 974 3,050 10,000
1999 732,210 10,305,076,532 14,074 799 2,657 9,921
2000 774,358 11,500,445,479 14,852 888 3,120 11,168
2001 748,664 11,295,064,605 15,087 911 3,362 11,491
Form 1040 AGI
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 45,994,684,319 71,887 14,480 35,566 72,552
1999 732,210 53,960,883,447 73,696 15,887 39,693 72,497
2000 774,358 63,061,413,943 81,437 18,939 43,646 79,470
2001 748,664 56,270,408,934 75,161 15,685 41,626 76,884
Schedule E Royalties
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 488,076,238 763 0 0 0
1999 732,210 445,296,372 608 0 0 0
2000 774,358 456,193,977 589 0 0 0
2001 748,664 674,699,458 901 0 0 0
Table F-1, Panel B, CPI for Recreation Items
Schedule C Receipts
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $10,120,984,813 $15,819 $1,011 $3,165 $10,376
1999 732,210 10,598,064,002 14,474 821.7167 2,733 10,203
2000 774,358 11,678,574,354 15,082 901.7541 3,168 11,341
2001 748,664 11,295,064,605 15,087 911 3,362 11,491
Form 1040 AGI
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $47,723,465,728 $74,589 $15,024 $36,903 $75,279
1999 732,210 55,495,065,427 75,791 16,339 40,822 74,558
2000 774,358 64,038,163,820 82,698 19,232 44,322 80,701
2001 748,664 56,270,408,934 75,161 15,685 41,626 76,884
Schedule E Royalties
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $506,421,339 $792 $0 $0 $0
1999 732,210 457,956,759 625 0 0 0
2000 774,358 463,259,905 598 0 0 0
2001 748,664 674,699,458 901 0 0 0
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Table F-1, Panel C, CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
Schedule C Receipts
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $10,468,771,498 $16,363 $1,045 $3,273 $10,732
1999 732,210 10,834,885,551 14,798 840.0785 2,794 10,431
2000 774,358 11,804,925,006 15,245 911.5102 3,203 11,464
2001 748,664 11,295,064,605 15,087 911 3,362 11,491
Form 1040 AGI
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $49,363,383,805 $77,152 $15,541 $38,171 $77,866
1999 732,210 56,735,143,556 77,485 16,704 41,734 76,224
2000 774,358 64,730,993,573 83,593 19,440 44,802 81,574
2001 748,664 56,270,408,934 75,161 15,685 41,626 76,884
Schedule E Royalties
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $523,823,460 $819 $0 $0 $0
1999 732,210 468,190,140 639 0 0 0
2000 774,358 468,271,920 605 0 0 0
2001 748,664 674,699,458 901 0 0 0
Table F-1, Panel D, GDP Deflator
Schedule C Receipts
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $10,341,479,908 $16,164 $1,033 $3,234 $10,602
1999 732,210 10,770,394,658 14,710 835 2,777 10,369
2000 774,358 11,772,260,960 15,203 909 3,194 11,432
2001 748,664 11,295,064,605 15,087 911 3,362 11,491
Form 1040 AGI
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $48,763,165,945 $76,214 $15,352 $37,707 $76,919
1999 732,210 56,397,447,320 77,024 16,604 41,485 75,771
2000 774,358 64,551,883,905 83,362 19,387 44,678 81,348
2001 748,664 56,270,408,934 75,161 15,685 41,626 76,884
Schedule E Royalties
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 639,817 $517,454,200 $809 $0 $0 $0
1999 732,210 465,403,401 635 0 0 0
2000 774,358 466,976,219 603 0 0 0
2001 748,664 674,699,458 901 0 0 0
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Table F-2 - Control Samples, SOI Data
Table F-2, Panel A, Nominal Dollars
Receipts from all Schedule C Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 909,005,015,091 52,215 2,450 9,610 36,891
1999 17,575,643 958,843,087,452 54,555 2,447 10,129 36,600
2000 17,902,791 1,010,337,250,040 56,435 2,500 10,401 37,582
2001 18,338,190 1,008,970,814,580 55,020 2,529 10,334 37,086
AGI from All Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 124,770,643 5,416,449,500,369 43,411 11,517 25,212 50,336
1999 127,075,248 5,855,401,059,850 46,078 11,785 26,122 52,647
2000 129,373,153 6,366,630,364,742 49,211 12,286 27,357 54,858
2001 130,255,251 6,171,448,466,866 47,380 12,603 28,118 55,656
AGI from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 1,014,773,156,911 58,291 14,232 34,280 64,596
1999 17,575,643 1,089,644,046,280 61,997 14,554 35,644 67,042
2000 17,902,791 1,182,156,209,724 66,032 14,772 37,114 70,897
2001 18,338,190 1,121,013,209,694 61,130 14,352 36,367 69,825
Royalties from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 3,229,552,835 186 0 0 0
1999 17,575,643 5,481,075,643 312 0 0 0
2000 17,902,791 4,356,335,809 243 0 0 0
2001 18,338,190 5,212,182,260 284 0 0 0
Table F-2, Panel B, CPI Recreation Items
Receipts from all Schedule C Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $943,171,375,698 $54,178 $2,542 $9,971 $38,278
1999 17,575,643 986,104,312,487 56,106 2,517 10,417 37,641
2000 17,902,791 1,025,986,229,711 57,309 2,539 10,562 38,164
2001 18,338,190 1,008,970,814,580 55,020 2,529 10,334 37,086
AGI from All Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 124,770,643 $5,620,035,139,354 $45,043 $11,950 $26,160 $52,228
1999 127,075,248 6,021,878,148,807 47,388 12,120 26,865 54,144
2000 129,373,153 6,465,242,258,097 49,973 12,476 27,781 55,708
2001 130,255,251 6,171,448,466,866 47,380 12,603 28,118 55,656
AGI from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $1,052,914,976,854 $60,482 $14,767 $35,568 $67,024
1999 17,575,643 1,120,624,122,106 63,760 14,968 36,657 68,948
2000 17,902,791 1,200,466,470,475 67,055 15,001 37,689 71,995
2001 18,338,190 1,121,013,209,694 61,130 14,352 36,367 69,825
Royalties from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $3,350,940,578 $193 $0 $0 $0
1999 17,575,643 5,636,910,147 321 0 0 0
2000 17,902,791 4,423,810,517 247 0 0 0
2001 18,338,190 5,212,182,260 284 0 0 0
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Table F-2, Panel C, CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
Receipts from all Schedule C Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $975,581,506,969 $56,039 $2,629 $10,314 $39,593
1999 17,575,643 1,008,139,539,971 57,360 2,573 10,650 38,482
2000 17,902,791 1,037,086,388,486 57,929 2,566 10,676 38,577
2001 18,338,190 1,008,970,814,580 55,020 2,529 10,334 37,086
AGI from All Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 124,770,643 $5,813,156,009,335 $46,590 $12,361 $27,059 $54,023
1999 127,075,248 6,156,441,453,323 48,447 12,391 27,465 55,354
2000 129,373,153 6,535,189,800,764 50,514 12,611 28,081 56,310
2001 130,255,251 6,171,448,466,866 47,380 12,603 28,118 55,656
AGI from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $1,089,096,219,730 $62,560 $15,274 $36,791 $69,327
1999 17,575,643 1,145,665,293,857 65,184 15,302 37,477 70,489
2000 17,902,791 1,213,454,333,313 67,780 15,163 38,097 72,774
2001 18,338,190 1,121,013,209,694 61,130 14,352 36,367 69,825
Royalties from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $3,466,088,712 $200 $0 $0 $0
1999 17,575,643 5,762,871,057 328 0 0 0
2000 17,902,791 4,471,671,782 249 0 0 0
2001 18,338,190 5,212,182,260 284 0 0 0
Tabel F-2, Panel D, GDP Deflator
Receipts from all Schedule C Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $963,719,243,916 $55,358 $2,597 $10,188 $39,112
1999 17,575,643 1,002,138,939,510 57,018 2,557 10,586 38,253
2000 17,902,791 1,034,216,786,329 57,769 2,559 10,647 38,470
2001 18,338,190 1,008,970,814,580 55,020 2,529 10,334 37,086
AGI from All Filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 124,770,643 $5,742,472,847,285 $46,024 $12,210 $26,730 $53,366
1999 127,075,248 6,119,797,373,849 48,159 12,317 27,302 55,024
2000 129,373,153 6,517,107,030,658 50,374 12,576 28,004 56,155
2001 130,255,251 6,171,448,466,866 47,380 12,603 28,118 55,656
AGI from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $1,075,853,711,794 $61,800 $15,089 $36,343 $68,484
1999 17,575,643 1,138,846,119,112 64,796 15,211 37,253 70,069
2000 17,902,791 1,210,096,723,754 67,593 15,121 37,991 72,573
2001 18,338,190 1,121,013,209,694 61,130 14,352 36,367 69,825
Royalties from all Schedule C filers
No. of 
Returns Amount Mean Q1 Median Q3
1998 17,408,809 $3,423,943,944 $197 $0 $0 $0
1999 17,575,643 5,728,569,569 326 0 0 0
2000 17,902,791 4,459,298,735 249 0 0 0
2001 18,338,190 5,212,182,260 284 0 0 0
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Table F-3, RIAA and MPA Sales data
Table F-3, Panel A, Nominal
(in millions)
Year: 1998 1999 2000 2001
RIAA data
CD $11,416 $12,816 $13,215 $12,909
net units shipped 847 939 943 882
Total Retail Units $12,165 $13,048 $12,705 $12,389
net units shipped 1,124 1,161 1,079 969
MPA data
Box Office Sales $6,949 $7,448 $7,661 $8,413
RIAA and MPA
Box Office and Total CD Sales $18,365 $20,264 $20,876 $21,322
Box Office and Total Retail Units $19,114 $20,496 $20,366 $20,802
Table F-3, Panel B, CPI For Recreation Items
(in millions)
Year: 1998 1999 2000 2001
RIAA data
CD $11,845 $13,180 $13,420 $12,909
net units shipped 847 939 943 882
Total Retail Units $12,622 $13,419 $12,902 $12,389
net units shipped 1,124 1,161 1,079 969
MPA data
Box Office Sales $7,210 $7,660 $7,780 $8,413
RIAA and MPA
Box Office and Total CD Sales $19,055 $20,840 $21,199 $21,322
Box Office and Total Retail Units $19,832 $21,079 $20,681 $20,802
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Table F-3, Panel C, CPI For All Items Less Food and Energy
(in millions)
Year: 1998 1999 2000 2001
RIAA data
CD $12,252 $13,475 $13,565 $12,909
net units shipped 847 939 943 882
Total Retail Units $13,056 $13,719 $13,041 $12,389
net units shipped 1,124 1,161 1,079 969
MPA data
Box Office Sales $7,458 $7,831 $7,864 $8,413
RIAA and MPA
Box Office and Total CD Sales $19,710 $21,306 $21,429 $21,322
Box Office and Total Retail Units $20,514 $21,550 $20,905 $20,802
Table F-3, Panel D, GDP Deflator
(in millions)
Year: 1998 1999 2000 2001
RIAA data
CD $12,103 $13,395 $13,527 $12,909
net units shipped 847 939 943 882
Total Retail Units $12,897 $13,637 $13,005 $12,389
net units shipped 1,124 1,161 1,079 969
MPA data
Box Office Sales $7,367 $7,784 $7,842 $8,413
RIAA and MPA
Box Office and Total CD Sales $19,470 $21,179 $21,369 $21,322
Box Office and Total Retail Units $20,264 $21,421 $20,847 $20,802
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Table F-4, Comparison of Industry Sales Data and SOI Data
Table F-4, Panel A, Schedule C Receipts Vs. Total Retail Units and Box Office Sales
1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001
Nominal Dollars opposite opposite same
CPI Recreation opposite opposite same
CPI All Less Food and Energy opposite opposite opposite
GDP Deflator opposite opposite opposite
Table F-4, Panel B, Schedule C Receipts Vs. Total CD Sales and Box Office Sales
1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001
Nominal Dollars opposite same same
CPI Recreation opposite same same
CPI All Less Food and Energy opposite same opposite
GDP Deflator opposite same opposite
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Appendix G, Confidence Intervals on Expenditures and Income 
 
This appendix presents the results from 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals on the 
changes in real mean CD and movie expenditures, as well as in real mean wage and salary 
income, from the micro-level CEX data.  The tables list the results for all CUs, computer owning 
CUs and non-computer owning CUs, and the statistics are for the years 1998 through 2001, in 
2001 dollars.  The expenditure categories are adjusted using the CPI for recreation items, the CPI 
for all items less food and energy and the GDP deflator, while the income figures are adjusted 
using the CPI for all items less food and energy and the GDP deflator. 
 
 
 
Table G-1, Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals; All CUs
Panel A
CD Expenditures 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Rec. Items Lower -1.15493 -2.31621 0.775754
Upper 5.83397 3.449755 6.103231
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -0.64422 -1.84359 1.235397
Upper 6.556421 4.018009 6.596776
GDP Deflator Lower -0.92702 -1.97908 1.116577
Upper 6.201054 3.856892 6.469178
Panel B
Movie Expenditures
CPI Rec. Items Lower -4.47966 -1.23134 -3.00081
Upper 7.005545 10.3521 8.141733
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -5.78585 -0.13937 -2.02092
Upper 6.031677 11.62906 9.194024
GDP Deflator Lower -5.10702 -0.45121 -2.27422
Upper 6.599685 11.26776 8.921972
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Table G-2, Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals; Computer Owning CUs
Panel A
CD Expenditures 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Rec. Items Lower 2.79497 0.373318 0.565592
Upper 16.18709 9.736482 8.534381
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower 3.709072 1.109551 1.20171
Upper 17.51654 10.63595 9.221496
GDP Deflator Lower 3.232017 0.899648 1.037272
Upper 16.89523 10.38216 9.043853
Panel B
Movie Expenditures
CPI Rec. Items Lower -10.0335 7.373425 -2.81837
Upper 11.17701 27.36074 13.50109
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -9.64699 9.145937 -1.39583
Upper 12.14782 29.49732 15.01913
GDP Deflator Lower -10.5404 8.642455 -1.76356
Upper 11.06566 28.8957 14.62666
Table G-3, Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals; Non-Computer Owning CUs
Panel A
CD Expenditures 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Rec. Items Lower -3.21033 -2.71193 3.689891
Upper 3.288581 4.194888 9.137208
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -3.04819 -2.44584 3.956738
Upper 3.627376 4.578026 9.448624
GDP Deflator Lower -3.19773 -2.52252 3.887758
Upper 3.421286 4.469931 9.368111
Panel B
Movie Expenditures
CPI Rec. Items Lower -1.72238 -1.76969 5.896139
Upper 10.14037 9.399595 15.40179
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -1.07819 -1.18379 6.425001
Upper 11.122 10.17824 15.99367
GDP Deflator Lower -1.43648 -1.35142 6.288292
Upper 10.65239 9.95882 15.84065
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Table G-4, Ninety Five Percent Confidence Intervals; All CUs
Panel A
CD Expenditures 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Rec. Items Lower -1.83678 -2.87874 0.2559996
Upper 6.515814 4.012288 6.6229854
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -1.34673 -2.41546 0.7123353
Upper 7.258923 4.589873 7.1198375
GDP Deflator Lower -1.62244 -2.54844 0.5943724
Upper 6.896476 4.426255 6.9913832
Panel B
Movie Expenditures
CPI Rec. Items Lower -5.60017 -2.36143 -4.087892
Upper 8.126053 11.48219 9.2288107
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -6.93878 -1.28751 -3.115058
Upper 7.184606 12.7772 10.288165
GDP Deflator Lower -6.24914 -1.59453 -3.366536
Upper 7.741803 12.41107 10.014284
Table G-5, Ninety Five Percent Confidence Intervals; Computer Owning CUs
Panel A
CD Expenditures 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Rec. Items Lower 1.488421 -0.54016 -0.211851
Upper 17.49364 10.64996 9.311824
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower 2.362002 0.180146 0.419292
Upper 18.86361 11.56536 10.003914
GDP Deflator Lower 1.89902 -0.02548 0.2561423
Upper 18.22823 11.30729 9.8249832
Panel B
Movie Expenditures
CPI Rec. Items Lower -12.1028 5.423442 -4.410513
Upper 13.24633 29.31073 15.093233
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -11.7733 7.160436 -2.997295
Upper 14.27415 31.48282 16.620586
GDP Deflator Lower -12.6483 6.666529 -3.362611
Upper 13.17357 30.87163 16.22571
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Table G-6, Ninety Five Percent Confidence Intervals; Non-Computer Owning CUs
Panel A
CD Expenditures 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Rec. Items Lower -3.84437 -3.38577 3.1584458
Upper 3.92262 4.868724 9.6686531
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -3.69947 -3.1311 3.4209439
Upper 4.278651 5.263281 9.9844173
GDP Deflator Lower -3.84348 -3.20471 3.3530898
Upper 4.067043 5.152121 9.9027796
Panel B
Movie Expenditures
CPI Rec. Items Lower -2.87972 -2.85938 4.9687581
Upper 11.29771 10.48928 16.32917
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -2.26845 -2.29228 5.491472
Upper 12.31226 11.28673 16.927201
GDP Deflator Lower -2.61588 -2.45486 5.3563555
Upper 11.83179 11.06226 16.772584
Table G-7, Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals; Mean Income Changes, All CUs
Income 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -149.419 -890.112 659.26107
Upper 2066.676 1350.454 3090.7238
GDP Deflator Lower 74.44553 -770.661 761.85847
Upper 2269.566 1460.683 3190.0322
Table G-8, Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals; Mean Income, Computer Owners
Income 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -1946.76 455.6147 -1339.633
Upper 2704.826 4175.876 2456.0979
GDP Deflator Lower -1590.38 284.227 -1193.156
Upper 3014.23 3988.065 2597.7116
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Table G-9, Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals; Mean Income, Non-Computer Owners
Income 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -198.095 69.70758 -396.2639
Upper 1967.663 2122.066 1763.4377
GDP Deflator Lower -334.299 0.866684 -452.3266
Upper 1809.839 2045.001 1704.0837
Table G-10, Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals; Mean Income Changes, All CUs
Income 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -365.624 -1108.7 422.04519
Upper 2282.881 1569.045 3327.9397
GDP Deflator Lower -139.713 -988.353 524.96348
Upper 2483.724 1678.375 3426.9272
Table G-11, Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals; Mean Income, Computer Owners
Income 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -2400.57 92.6624 -1709.948
Upper 3158.639 4538.828 2826.413
GDP Deflator Lower -2039.61 -77.1231 -1562.996
Upper 3463.46 4349.415 2967.5524
Table G-12, Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals; Mean Income, Non-Computer Owners
Income 98-99 99-00 00-01
CPI Less Food/Energy Lower -409.388 -130.522 -606.9665
Upper 2178.956 2322.296 1974.1403
GDP Deflator Lower -543.484 -198.561 -662.7081
Upper 2019.023 2244.428 1914.4651
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Appendix H, Summary Statistics and Confidence Intervals By Income Class 
 
This appendix presents tables with summary statistics and confidence intervals by income 
class for the micro-level CEX data.  The tables list the mean values and the 90 and 95 percent 
confidence intervals for both CD and movie ticket expenditures for all CUs, computer owning 
CUs and non-computer owning CUs.  The statistics are for the years 1998 through 2001, in 2001 
dollars.  The expenditures are adjusted using the CPI for recreation items, the CPI for all items 
less food and energy and the GDP deflator. 
 
 
  
175
 
Table H1, Me
l A, M
1 21.58
9 23.71
$30,000 to $39,999 41.17 40.99 42.87 32.45
$40,000 to $49,999 43.54 47.65 49.83 45.46
$50,000 to $69,999 59.53 62.27 58.11 54.07
$70,000 and over 105.80 82.06 75.81 71.93
Total 46.96 44.62 44.05 40.61
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -3.15891 -9.52188 -11.1851
Upper 30.1152 12.02707 12.90183
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.51242 -5.14332 -5.29055
Upper 8.780798 7.058726 9.768406
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -10.3854 -4.28083 -3.99658
Upper 11.60867 7.80182 9.611838
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -4.80974 -3.73166 -8.00475
Upper 5.486523 8.591443 8.07057
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -2.70379 -1.25878 7.251108
Upper 10.29429 11.15594 18.29927
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.97105 -6.92593 2.637449
Upper 8.341735 10.69762 18.20132
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -6.49546 -8.65187 -5.18008
Upper 14.7027 13.01947 13.91628
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -5.4107 -5.13821 -4.77767
Upper 10.90494 13.47179 12.86059
$70,000 and over Lower 9.758927 -3.96807 -4.71365
Upper 37.71913 16.45935 12.48021
Total Lower -1.83678 -2.87874 0.256
Upper 6.515814 4.012288 6.622985
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -0.44265 -7.76279 -9.21879
Upper 27.39895 10.26797 10.93556
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -2.5089 -4.14723 -4.06125
Upper 7.77727 6.062641 8.539103
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -8.58992 -3.29449 -2.88569
Upper 9.813237 6.815482 8.500947
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -3.96923 -2.72569 -6.69247
Upper 4.646011 7.585476 6.758299
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -1.64272 -0.24533 8.152999
Upper 9.233218 10.1425 17.39738
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -6.63939 -5.48727 3.907969
Upper 7.01008 9.258963 16.9308
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -4.765 -6.88278 -3.6212
Upper 12.97224 11.25039 12.35739
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -4.07881 -3.61903 -3.33781
Upper 9.573049 11.9526 11.42073
$70,000 and over Lower 12.04139 -2.30052 -3.31007
Upper 35.43667 14.79181 11.07663
an Expenditures By Income Class, All CUs, Rec. CPI
Pane ean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $43.81 $30.33 $29.08 $29.94
$5,000 to $9,999 14.79 17.42 16.46 18.70
$10,000 to $14,999 22.91 22.30 20.54 17.73
$15,000 to $19,999 23.70 24.04 21.6
$20,000 to $29,999 27.74 31.54 36.4
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Table H-1 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $53.59 $56.81 $58.48 $60.12
$5,000 to $9,999 30.42 35.08 38.24 28.18
$10,000 to $14,999 43.75 36.93 40.10 36.64
$15,000 to $19,999 50.22 50.86 47.16 43.37
$20,000 to $29,999 63.89 61.37 63.39 51.69
$30,000 to $39,999 91.02 85.26 78.45 78.04
$40,000 to $49,999 103.88 101.52 91.93 79.95
$50,000 to $69,999 120.48 129.24 107.76 109.76
$70,000 and over 216.81 210.68 200.60 188.08
Total 97.21 98.48 93.92 91.35
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -14.1497 -16.1055 -16.7733
Upper 20.59477 19.44671 20.05086
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -6.15522 -9.39814 -1.4756
Upper 15.47484 15.71528 21.59334
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -5.97829 -4.42513 -6.92371
Upper 19.61221 10.75969 13.84811
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -15.0374 -12.0825 -10.3572
Upper 16.3241 19.48241 17.94245
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -8.81303 -12.0503 -2.15488
Upper 13.86237 16.08859 25.54402
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -18.1244 -15.2485 -13.565
Upper 29.6392 28.86943 14.39821
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -16.4577 -6.0445 -3.49616
Upper 21.17074 25.22121 27.45617
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -5.9772 6.031825 -12.2325
Upper 23.49803 36.91513 16.22998
$70,000 and over Lower -16.5763 -10.3001 -5.70436
Upper 28.84218 30.44626 30.75591
Total Lower -5.60017 -2.36143 -4.08789
Upper 8.126053 11.48219 9.228811
90% Confidence Intervals
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -11.3134 -13.2032 -13.7673
Upper 17.75849 16.54449 17.0448
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -4.3895 -7.34806 0.407582
Upper 13.70912 13.6652 19.71016
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -3.88927 -3.18556 -5.22805
Upper 17.52319 9.520111 12.15245
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -12.4773 -9.5058 -8.04703
Upper 13.76398 16.90568 15.63227
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -6.96197 -9.75329 0.106252
Upper 12.01131 13.79153 23.28289
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -14.2253 -11.647 -11.2823
Upper 25.74013 25.26797 12.1155
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -13.386 -3.49219 -0.96944
Upper 18.09903 22.66891 24.92945
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -3.57106 8.552911 -9.90901
Upper 21.09189 34.39405 13.90651
$70,000 and over Lower -12.8687 -6.97384 -2.72801
Upper 25.13455 27.12003 27.77956
Total Lower -4.47966 -1.23134 -3.00081
Upper 7.005545 10.3521 8.141733
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Table H2, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, All CUs, F/E CPI
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $45.32 $31.01 $29.39 $29.94
$5,000 to $9,999 15.30 17.81 16.64 18.70
$10,000 to $14,999 23.70 22.80 20.76 17.73
$15,000 to $19,999 24.52 24.58 21.84 21.58
$20,000 to $29,999 28.70 32.24 36.88 23.71
$30,000 to $39,999 42.59 41.90 43.34 32.45
$40,000 to $49,999 45.04 48.71 50.37 45.46
$50,000 to $69,999 61.57 63.67 58.74 54.07
$70,000 and over 109.43 83.89 76.63 71.93
Total 48.57 45.62 44.53 40.61
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -2.87043 -9.32385 -11.5635
Upper 31.48203 12.55539 12.65104
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.79185 -5.04725 -5.48495
Upper 8.822532 7.38502 9.606549
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -10.4512 -4.11059 -3.79877
Upper 12.25254 8.183818 9.858512
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -5.24175 -3.51283 -7.80933
Upper 5.363998 8.979402 8.342758
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -3.14555 -1.66643 7.602394
Upper 10.23886 10.94359 18.73751
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.70734 -7.51358 3.035918
Upper 9.075886 10.38117 18.73055
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -7.21057 -9.37068 -4.69337
Upper 14.55469 12.68715 14.50778
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -6.29102 -4.52164 -4.21027
Upper 10.47732 14.38102 13.55052
$70,000 and over Lower 11.13829 -3.14157 -3.93975
Upper 39.94351 17.65975 13.34678
Total Lower -1.34673 -2.41546 0.712335
Upper 7.258923 4.589873 7.119837
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -0.06615 -7.53779 -9.58679
Upper 28.67775 10.76933 10.67434
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -2.76211 -4.03237 -4.25299
Upper 7.792786 6.370141 8.37459
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -8.59781 -3.10696 -2.68389
Upper 10.39918 7.180193 8.743631
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -4.37597 -2.49306 -6.4908
Upper 4.498223 7.959628 7.02422
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -2.05295 -0.63704 8.511383
Upper 9.146257 9.914197 17.82852
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -6.33728 -6.05278 4.317113
Upper 7.705827 8.920372 17.44936
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -5.43381 -7.57005 -3.12593
Upper 12.77794 10.88651 12.94034
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -4.92217 -2.97857 -2.76041
Upper 9.108472 12.83795 12.10066
$70,000 and over Lower 13.48974 -1.4435 -2.5286
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Table H-2 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $55.43 $58.08 $59.12 $60.12
$5,000 to $9,999 31.47 35.87 38.66 28.18
$10,000 to $14,999 45.25 37.76 40.53 36.64
$15,000 to $19,999 51.94 52.00 47.67 43.37
$20,000 to $29,999 66.09 62.74 64.07 51.69
$30,000 to $39,999 94.15 87.17 79.30 78.04
$40,000 to $49,999 107.44 103.79 92.93 79.95
$50,000 to $69,999 124.62 132.13 108.93 109.76
$70,000 and over 224.26 215.38 202.77 188.08
Total 100.56 100.68 94.93 91.35
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -15.2284 -17.0198 -17.5151
Upper 20.52947 19.08741 19.52713
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -6.70751 -9.97135 -1.14151
Upper 15.50416 15.54802 22.08675
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -5.71908 -4.93268 -6.52684
Upper 20.7091 10.48439 14.31887
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -16.0533 -11.7343 -9.92554
Upper 16.16176 20.38677 18.53129
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -8.3303 -12.9256 -1.58828
Upper 15.02808 15.59277 26.34898
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -17.5274 -14.634 -12.7922
Upper 31.48713 30.3679 15.32301
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -15.7321 -5.02247 -2.59441
Upper 23.04702 26.74701 28.54362
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -7.62638 7.486252 -13.4777
Upper 22.64314 38.90471 15.14344
$70,000 and over Lower -14.4905 -8.1161 -3.64147
Upper 32.24133 33.33705 33.03366
Total Lower -6.93878 -1.28751 -3.11506
Upper 7.184606 12.7772 10.28816
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -12.3094 -14.0722 -14.4912
Upper 17.61045 16.13989 16.50328
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -4.89431 -7.88814 0.754675
Upper 13.69096 13.46481 20.19056
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -3.56168 -3.67414 -4.82515
Upper 18.55169 9.225855 12.61718
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -13.4235 -9.11215 -7.60253
Upper 13.53196 17.76464 16.20828
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -6.42349 -10.5975 0.692312
Upper 13.12127 13.26474 24.06839
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -13.5262 -10.9603 -10.4971
Upper 27.48595 26.69428 13.02788
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -12.5664 -2.42904 -0.05253
Upper 19.88138 24.15358 26.00174
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -5.1554 10.05102 -11.1413
Upper 20.17216 36.33994 12.80702
$70,000 and over Lower -10.6757 -4.73217 -0.64758
Upper 28.42649 29.95312 30.03978
Total Lower -5.78585 -0.13937 -2.02092
Upper 6.031677 11.62906 9.194024
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Table H3, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, All CUs, GDP Deflator
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $44.76 $30.83 $29.31 $29.94
$5,000 to $9,999 15.11 17.71 16.60 18.70
$10,000 to $14,999 23.41 22.66 20.71 17.73
$15,000 to $19,999 24.22 24.43 21.78 21.58
$20,000 to $29,999 28.35 32.05 36.78 23.71
$30,000 to $39,999 42.07 41.65 43.22 32.45
$40,000 to $49,999 44.49 48.42 50.23 45.46
$50,000 to $69,999 60.82 63.29 58.57 54.07
$70,000 and over 108.10 83.39 76.42 71.93
Total 47.98 45.34 44.40 40.61
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -3.04514 -9.38306 -11.4656
Upper 30.92389 12.40813 12.71584
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.66191 -5.07613 -5.43468
Upper 8.852528 7.293964 9.648379
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -10.4778 -4.16037 -3.84989
Upper 11.97418 8.077084 9.794725
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -5.03714 -3.57632 -7.85983
Upper 5.463011 8.8712 8.27237
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -2.92307 -1.55048 7.511592
Upper 10.3304 11.00737 18.6242
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.89748 -7.34792 2.932921
Upper 8.72919 10.47451 18.59372
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -6.8631 -9.1681 -4.81917
Upper 14.72262 12.78568 14.35484
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -5.84782 -4.69899 -4.35693
Upper 10.77357 14.12551 13.37214
$70,000 and over Lower 10.45162 -3.37846 -4.13979
Upper 38.96762 17.32205 13.12273
Total Lower -1.62244 -2.54844 0.594372
Upper 6.896476 4.426255 6.991383
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -0.27216 -7.60419 -9.49163
Upper 28.15091 10.62925 10.74184
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -2.64032 -4.06632 -4.20341
Upper 7.830942 6.28416 8.417108
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -8.64495 -3.1614 -2.73605
Upper 10.14137 7.078108 8.680878
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -4.17999 -2.5602 -6.54292
Upper 4.605855 7.855076 6.955456
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -1.84115 -0.52535 8.418744
Upper 9.248485 9.982243 17.71705
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -6.5402 -5.89303 4.211354
Upper 7.37191 9.019619 17.31529
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -5.101 -7.37595 -3.25394
Upper 12.96052 10.99354 12.78961
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -4.49097 -3.16229 -2.90966
Upper 9.41672 12.58882 11.92486
$70,000 and over Lower 12.77945 -1.68862 -2.73061
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Table H-3 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $54.76 $57.74 $58.95 $60.12
$5,000 to $9,999 31.09 35.65 38.55 28.18
$10,000 to $14,999 44.70 37.53 40.42 36.64
$15,000 to $19,999 51.31 51.69 47.54 43.37
$20,000 to $29,999 65.28 62.37 63.90 51.69
$30,000 to $39,999 93.00 86.65 79.08 78.04
$40,000 to $49,999 106.14 103.17 92.67 79.95
$50,000 to $69,999 123.10 131.34 108.63 109.76
$70,000 and over 221.53 214.10 202.21 188.08
Total 99.33 100.08 94.67 91.35
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -14.7303 -16.7635 -17.3233
Upper 20.68796 19.19548 19.66247
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -6.44596 -9.81051 -1.22785
Upper 15.58092 15.60024 21.95916
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -5.89487 -4.78915 -6.62941
Upper 20.23392 10.56602 14.19715
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -15.5944 -11.8371 -10.0371
Upper 16.34712 20.13437 18.37902
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -8.64379 -12.6793 -1.73473
Upper 14.48129 15.73884 26.14086
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -17.9583 -14.8136 -12.992
Upper 30.6662 29.94874 15.08389
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -16.2225 -5.31572 -2.82749
Upper 22.16009 26.31899 28.26245
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -6.77119 7.073142 -13.1558
Upper 23.24557 38.34778 15.42429
$70,000 and over Lower -15.7164 -8.74204 -4.17472
Upper 30.57763 32.52114 32.44477
Total Lower -6.24914 -1.59453 -3.36654
Upper 7.741803 12.41107 10.01428
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -11.839 -13.8281 -14.304
Upper 17.79667 16.26005 16.64323
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -4.64785 -7.73616 0.664969
Upper 13.7828 13.5259 20.06635
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -3.76191 -3.53566 -4.92928
Upper 18.10096 9.312533 12.49702
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -12.987 -9.22715 -7.71741
Upper 13.73964 17.52446 16.05934
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -6.75603 -10.3595 0.540825
Upper 12.59352 13.41898 23.8653
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -13.989 -11.1596 -10.7001
Upper 26.69685 26.29467 12.79198
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -13.0892 -2.73329 -0.28953
Upper 19.02682 23.73657 25.7245
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -4.32085 9.626174 -10.8227
Upper 20.79522 35.79475 13.09123
$70,000 and over Lower -11.9373 -5.37362 -1.18537
Upper 26.79852 29.15272 29.45542
Total Lower -5.10702 -0.45121 -2.27422
Upper 6.599685 11.26776 8.921972
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Table H4, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, Computer Owners, Rec. CPI
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $72.04 $43.59 $51.11 $48.23
$5,000 to $9,999 40.78 51.45 41.48 54.60
$10,000 to $14,999 75.94 58.43 36.02 42.10
$15,000 to $19,999 48.22 42.31 35.27 30.82
$20,000 to $29,999 38.06 46.36 48.79 32.34
$30,000 to $39,999 55.30 50.01 53.85 39.33
$40,000 to $49,999 49.81 52.47 53.74 51.76
$50,000 to $69,999 69.17 70.25 61.57 61.50
$70,000 and over 116.85 88.26 81.43 75.75
Total 75.70 66.21 61.15 56.60
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -7.848 -13.0623 -20.3488
Upper 64.73969 28.10291 26.10754
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -19.002 -16.2756 -13.7006
Upper 40.3374 36.21591 39.95405
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -39.4728 3.059312 -14.6446
Upper 74.49038 41.7615 26.79456
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -12.158 -8.88562 -11.6501
Upper 23.97629 22.96368 20.54609
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -7.31846 -11.588 4.758819
Upper 23.93131 16.4392 28.13995
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -8.03917 -9.25938 2.630955
Upper 18.61833 16.93044 26.39987
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -9.92832 -10.9539 -9.66421
Upper 15.25612 13.48127 13.60997
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -9.29554 -1.7224 -10.1136
Upper 11.44676 19.08097 10.26071
$70,000 and over Lower 10.41522 -4.87672 -3.94873
Upper 46.76478 18.53183 15.29978
Total Lower 1.488421 -0.54016 -0.21185
Upper 17.49364 10.64996 9.311824
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -1.92248 -9.70186 -16.5565
Upper 58.81416 24.74248 22.31518
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -14.158 -11.9905 -9.32066
Upper 35.49337 31.93089 35.57407
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -30.1696 6.218674 -11.2618
Upper 65.18727 38.60214 23.41178
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -9.20826 -6.28568 -9.02188
Upper 21.02655 20.36373 17.91783
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -4.76746 -9.30003 6.667482
Upper 21.38031 14.15127 26.23128
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -5.86305 -7.12144 4.571274
Upper 16.44221 14.79249 24.45955
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -7.87244 -8.95918 -7.76428
Upper 13.20024 11.48656 11.71003
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -7.60229 -0.02416 -8.45037
Upper 9.753512 17.38274 8.597505
$70,000 and over Lower 13.38253 -2.96582 -2.37743
Upper 43.79747 16.62093 13.72847
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Table H-4 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $84.94 $90.48 $100.36 $99.91
$5,000 to $9,999 89.08 96.13 94.59 80.23
$10,000 to $14,999 93.98 91.70 80.34 81.24
$15,000 to $19,999 103.50 98.37 87.29 80.24
$20,000 to $29,999 82.10 89.63 96.62 81.87
$30,000 to $39,999 117.30 111.25 99.17 94.78
$40,000 to $49,999 118.60 123.36 101.79 92.05
$50,000 to $69,999 134.13 151.72 122.39 119.84
$70,000 and over 242.15 225.58 207.39 200.06
Total 152.69 153.27 135.90 130.56
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -25.6487 -26.6814 -40.6905
Upper 36.7311 46.43246 41.59493
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -48.1807 -51.8993 -20.5253
Upper 62.26924 54.96736 49.24565
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -31.3993 -16.6887 -31.5336
Upper 35.95182 39.4196 33.34741
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -43.416 -38.8939 -29.543
Upper 53.66396 61.04744 43.64806
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -11.823 -17.9913 -10.0314
Upper 26.88833 31.95977 39.53452
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -40.4575 -30.1853 -17.0499
Upper 52.5493 54.34647 25.82677
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -25.2925 -1.90488 -9.17046
Upper 34.80469 45.04469 28.6506
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -2.9015 8.202327 -14.8484
Upper 38.07753 50.4485 19.95129
$70,000 and over Lower -13.2537 -7.65472 -12.6294
Upper 46.40436 44.0363 27.28277
Total Lower -12.1028 5.423442 -4.41051
Upper 13.24633 29.31073 15.09323
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -20.5565 -20.7129 -33.9733
Upper 31.63887 40.46398 34.87775
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -39.1644 -43.1755 -14.8297
Upper 53.25292 46.24355 43.55006
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -25.9012 -12.1084 -26.2372
Upper 30.45377 34.83933 28.05101
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -35.4911 -30.7354 -23.5682
Upper 45.73907 52.88897 37.67328
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -8.66291 -13.9137 -5.98521
Upper 23.72822 27.88213 35.48832
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -32.8651 -23.2847 -13.5497
Upper 44.95691 47.44592 22.32663
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -20.3866 1.927741 -6.08303
Upper 29.8988 41.21207 25.56316
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower 0.443724 11.65099 -12.0076
Upper 34.7323 46.99984 17.1105
$70,000 and over Lower -8.38366 -3.43504 -9.37127
Upper 41.53431 39.81663 24.02464
Total Lower -10.0335 7.373425 -2.81837
Upper 11.17701 27.36074 13.50109
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Table H5, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, Computer Owners, F/E CPI
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $74.51 $44.56 $51.66 $48.23
$5,000 to $9,999 42.18 52.60 41.92 54.60
$10,000 to $14,999 78.55 59.74 36.41 42.10
$15,000 to $19,999 49.87 43.25 35.65 30.82
$20,000 to $29,999 39.37 47.40 49.32 32.34
$30,000 to $39,999 57.20 51.13 54.43 39.33
$40,000 to $49,999 51.52 53.65 54.32 51.76
$50,000 to $69,999 71.55 71.82 62.24 61.50
$70,000 and over 120.86 90.23 82.31 75.75
Total 78.30 67.69 61.81 56.60
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -7.54905 -13.7825 -19.9302
Upper 67.44338 27.98095 26.79482
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -20.0396 -16.1127 -14.1943
Upper 40.87168 37.45477 39.55026
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -40.0848 3.646032 -15.1253
Upper 77.71019 43.00682 26.49577
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -11.9973 -8.57087 -11.3682
Upper 25.23856 23.77657 21.02727
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -8.0557 -12.3246 5.19106
Upper 24.12507 16.15951 28.76343
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.65162 -9.99778 3.12093
Upper 19.79627 16.59891 27.07502
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -10.811 -11.7657 -9.1348
Upper 15.06072 13.11073 14.24331
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -10.4063 -0.98215 -9.5139
Upper 10.94305 20.14804 10.9933
$70,000 and over Lower 11.89746 -4.00763 -3.11306
Upper 49.36864 19.84513 16.2261
Total Lower 2.362002 0.180146 0.419292
Upper 18.86361 11.56536 10.00391
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -1.42722 -10.3733 -16.1159
Upper 61.32155 24.57168 22.98054
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -15.0673 -11.7398 -9.80698
Upper 35.89933 33.08192 35.16295
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -30.4689 6.859158 -11.7277
Upper 68.09427 39.7937 23.09813
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -8.95766 -5.93026 -8.72365
Upper 22.19889 21.13596 18.38274
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.4287 -9.99941 7.115335
Upper 21.49807 13.83427 26.83915
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -5.41097 -7.82662 5.076366
Upper 17.55563 14.42775 25.11958
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -8.69902 -9.73495 -7.22638
Upper 12.94874 11.08 12.33489
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -8.66353 0.742765 -7.83984
Upper 9.200247 18.42312 9.319247
$70,000 and over Lower 14.95633 -2.06047 -1.53436
Upper 46.30977 17.89796 14.64739
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Table H-5 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $87.86 $92.50 $101.44 $99.91
$5,000 to $9,999 92.15 98.28 95.62 80.23
$10,000 to $14,999 97.21 93.75 81.20 81.24
$15,000 to $19,999 107.05 100.57 88.24 80.24
$20,000 to $29,999 84.92 91.64 97.66 81.87
$30,000 to $39,999 121.33 113.74 100.24 94.78
$40,000 to $49,999 122.67 126.11 102.89 92.05
$50,000 to $69,999 138.74 155.11 123.72 119.84
$70,000 and over 250.47 230.62 209.63 200.06
Total 157.94 156.69 137.37 130.56
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -27.4601 -28.1427 -39.8491
Upper 36.74866 46.0215 42.92501
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -50.5375 -51.8045 -19.7395
Upper 62.79973 57.12176 50.50666
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -31.2003 -16.0159 -32.5006
Upper 38.11323 41.10681 32.5761
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -43.3593 -38.5237 -28.8987
Upper 56.32373 63.18476 44.8926
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -13.223 -19.2817 -9.19975
Upper 26.65169 31.33491 40.79347
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -40.0985 -29.6655 -16.0723
Upper 55.27968 56.65287 26.99511
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -27.4892 -0.69466 -8.16254
Upper 34.36346 47.14497 29.84512
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -4.65468 9.88134 -13.6216
Upper 37.39301 52.90166 21.37285
$70,000 and over Lower -10.8148 -5.34156 -10.5004
Upper 50.52616 47.31706 29.64115
Total Lower -11.7733 7.160436 -2.99729
Upper 14.27415 31.48282 16.62059
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -22.2186 -22.0885 -33.092
Upper 31.50713 39.96728 36.16795
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -41.2855 -42.9125 -14.0051
Upper 53.54771 48.22982 44.77228
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -25.542 -11.3529 -27.1882
Upper 32.45499 36.44373 27.26372
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -35.2219 -30.221 -22.8749
Upper 48.18634 54.88203 38.86882
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -9.96791 -15.1497 -5.11867
Upper 23.39662 27.20294 36.71239
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -32.3125 -22.6191 -12.5566
Upper 47.49371 49.60647 23.4794
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -22.44 3.210614 -5.05988
Upper 29.31426 43.2397 26.74245
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -1.22222 13.3932 -10.7649
Upper 33.96055 49.38979 18.51616
$70,000 and over Lower -5.80734 -1.04289 -7.22352
Upper 45.51873 43.0184 26.36429
Total Lower -9.64699 9.145937 -1.39583
Upper 12.14782 29.49732 15.01913
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Table H6, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, Computer Owners, GDP Deflator
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $73.61 $44.30 $51.52 $48.23
$5,000 to $9,999 41.67 52.28 41.81 54.60
$10,000 to $14,999 77.60 59.39 36.31 42.10
$15,000 to $19,999 49.27 43.00 35.55 30.82
$20,000 to $29,999 38.89 47.12 49.18 32.34
$30,000 to $39,999 56.50 50.82 54.28 39.33
$40,000 to $49,999 50.89 53.33 54.17 51.76
$50,000 to $69,999 70.68 71.39 62.06 61.50
$70,000 and over 119.39 89.69 82.08 75.75
Total 77.35 67.28 61.64 56.60
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -7.75747 -13.5808 -20.0383
Upper 66.3703 28.02381 26.61708
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -19.5927 -16.1638 -14.0666
Upper 40.82441 37.1118 39.65461
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -39.9904 3.479607 -15.001
Upper 76.41667 42.66359 26.57296
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -12.1568 -8.66318 -11.441
Upper 24.70012 23.55127 20.90283
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -7.70118 -12.1178 5.079341
Upper 24.16359 16.24401 28.60222
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.90905 -9.78977 2.994289
Upper 19.27133 16.69834 26.90045
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -10.3935 -11.5372 -9.27163
Upper 15.25755 13.2203 14.07954
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -9.86187 -1.19379 -9.6689
Upper 11.28364 19.84912 10.80389
$70,000 and over Lower 11.15915 -4.25694 -3.32907
Upper 48.24189 19.47581 15.9866
Total Lower 1.89902 -0.02548 0.256142
Upper 18.22823 11.30729 9.824983
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -1.70622 -10.1845 -16.2297
Upper 60.31906 24.62752 22.80848
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -14.6607 -11.8148 -9.68123
Upper 35.8924 32.76277 35.2692
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -30.4878 6.6783 -11.6072
Upper 66.91405 39.4649 23.17917
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -9.14811 -6.03343 -8.80071
Upper 21.69139 20.92152 18.26252
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.09998 -9.80255 6.999577
Upper 21.56239 13.92876 26.68199
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -5.69024 -7.62748 4.945812
Upper 17.05253 14.53605 24.94893
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -8.29957 -9.51621 -7.36541
Upper 13.16358 11.19928 12.17333
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -8.13571 0.524003 -7.99765
Upper 9.557478 18.13133 9.13264
$70,000 and over Lower 14.18631 -2.31957 -1.75228
Upper 45.21472 17.53845 14.40981
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Table H-6 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $86.79 $91.95 $101.16 $99.91
$5,000 to $9,999 91.02 97.69 95.35 80.23
$10,000 to $14,999 96.02 93.19 80.98 81.24
$15,000 to $19,999 105.75 99.97 88.00 80.24
$20,000 to $29,999 83.89 91.09 97.39 81.87
$30,000 to $39,999 119.85 113.06 99.97 94.78
$40,000 to $49,999 121.18 125.36 102.60 92.05
$50,000 to $69,999 137.05 154.18 123.37 119.84
$70,000 and over 247.43 229.24 209.05 200.06
Total 156.02 155.76 136.99 130.56
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -26.635 -27.7335 -40.0665
Upper 36.95892 46.15207 42.58105
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -49.5526 -51.8464 -19.9426
Upper 62.88571 56.52294 50.18058
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -31.4956 -16.2126 -32.2505
Upper 37.16069 40.63682 32.77543
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -43.6496 -38.6404 -29.0652
Upper 55.20794 62.59256 44.57079
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -12.5374 -18.9188 -9.4147
Upper 26.94041 31.52236 40.46796
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -40.5344 -29.8225 -16.325
Upper 54.11911 56.0106 26.69302
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -26.4538 -1.04039 -8.42306
Upper 34.81004 46.5588 29.53626
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -3.72489 9.404804 -13.9387
Upper 37.99066 52.21638 21.0053
$70,000 and over Lower -12.2115 -6.00358 -11.0507
Upper 48.57717 46.39383 29.03141
Total Lower -12.6483 6.666529 -3.36261
Upper 13.17357 30.87163 16.22571
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -21.4436 -21.702 -33.3197
Upper 31.76758 40.1206 35.83431
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -40.3739 -42.9999 -14.2182
Upper 53.70707 47.67647 44.45624
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -25.891 -11.5718 -26.9423
Upper 31.55609 35.99605 27.46719
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -35.5796 -30.3765 -23.0541
Upper 47.13794 54.32864 38.55969
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -9.31473 -14.8011 -5.34265
Upper 23.71773 27.40471 36.39591
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -32.8076 -22.8157 -12.8133
Upper 46.39229 49.00381 23.18134
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -21.4527 2.84526 -5.32434
Upper 29.80891 42.67315 26.43754
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -0.31953 12.89963 -11.0861
Upper 34.58531 48.72156 18.15273
$70,000 and over Lower -7.24918 -1.72624 -7.77871
Upper 43.61483 42.11649 25.7594
Total Lower -10.5404 8.642455 -1.76356
Upper 11.06566 28.8957 14.62666
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Table H7, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, Non-Computer Owners, Rec. CPI
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $26.51 $21.28 $15.99 $12.92
$5,000 to $9,999 9.44 10.00 8.83 7.50
$10,000 to $14,999 12.88 15.31 16.06 8.60
$15,000 to $19,999 17.11 18.16 16.45 17.08
$20,000 to $29,999 23.86 24.86 28.06 16.94
$30,000 to $39,999 32.58 33.94 32.30 24.91
$40,000 to $49,999 38.04 41.16 44.82 33.75
$50,000 to $69,999 46.27 50.28 49.94 33.59
$70,000 and over 72.26 59.22 49.14 51.80
Total 27.43 27.47 26.72 20.31
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -4.94483 -3.05113 -4.84397
Upper 15.39366 13.64615 10.988
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.72599 -3.48673 -3.17144
Upper 4.842461 5.810979 5.831542
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.83521 -5.48253 2.356169
Upper 7.684479 6.995418 12.57587
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -4.3668 -4.95636 -7.98346
Upper 6.458596 8.37805 9.240079
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.39042 -3.36613 5.614048
Upper 7.374408 9.776411 16.63814
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -6.99446 -8.87093 -1.80271
Upper 9.724986 12.16589 16.57275
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -15.2534 -17.5887 -4.84314
Upper 21.48645 24.91688 26.97478
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -9.72223 -15.9005 2.097785
Upper 17.73749 16.57182 30.59434
$70,000 and over Lower -10.1234 -11.4292 -12.2809
Upper 36.20989 31.58638 17.6135
Total Lower -3.84437 -3.38577 3.158446
Upper 3.92262 4.868724 9.668653
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -3.28455 -1.68809 -3.55156
Upper 13.73338 12.28311 9.695599
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.02653 -2.72773 -2.43651
Upper 4.142995 5.051983 5.096604
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -1.97646 -4.46392 3.19043
Upper 6.825729 5.97681 11.7416
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -3.4831 -3.86783 -6.57745
Upper 5.57489 7.289527 7.834076
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -4.34839 -2.29327 6.513974
Upper 6.332382 8.70355 15.73821
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -5.62961 -7.15364 -0.30267
Upper 8.360133 10.4486 15.07271
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -12.2543 -14.1188 -2.24576
Upper 18.48728 21.44704 24.37739
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -7.48062 -13.2497 4.424034
Upper 15.49588 13.92102 28.26809
$70,000 and over Lower -6.34111 -7.91775 -9.84052
Upper 32.42758 28.07491 15.17314
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Table H-7 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $37.31 $37.54 $33.81 $22.02
$5,000 to $9,999 17.59 22.24 22.02 12.18
$10,000 to $14,999 34.70 26.25 28.24 20.13
$15,000 to $19,999 35.99 35.17 30.87 25.97
$20,000 to $29,999 57.15 48.69 43.86 28.43
$30,000 to $39,999 74.52 66.18 58.39 59.26
$40,000 to $49,999 91.09 78.21 75.68 57.73
$50,000 to $69,999 101.71 93.59 75.75 79.98
$70,000 and over 138.97 158.06 169.63 119.81
Total 59.82 55.61 51.80 41.15
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -16.1467 -13.6058 -2.4709
Upper 16.61216 21.06658 26.0461
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -2.70027 -9.13481 1.608798
Upper 12.00007 9.57179 18.05913
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -4.62427 -5.55869 -1.35611
Upper 21.52373 9.536182 17.56784
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -11.3233 -8.53397 -6.39105
Upper 12.97121 17.13309 16.18489
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.51962 -9.23657 2.479155
Upper 22.42365 18.90466 28.37554
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -12.5769 -12.2845 -17.9702
Upper 29.24358 27.87292 19.70745
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -10.6843 -21.3762 -3.87564
Upper 36.42683 26.44006 39.78061
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -13.133 0.904098 -13.8377
Upper 29.36807 34.77809 22.29774
$70,000 and over Lower -20.6259 -35.8186 9.388542
Upper 58.79521 58.96635 90.26501
Total Lower -2.87972 -2.85938 4.968758
Upper 11.29771 10.48928 16.32917
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -13.4725 -10.7754 -0.14298
Upper 13.93797 18.23618 23.71818
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -1.50025 -7.60774 2.951683
Upper 10.80004 8.04472 16.71625
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.48974 -4.32645 0.188703
Upper 19.3892 8.303948 16.02303
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -9.34012 -6.4387 -4.54812
Upper 10.98799 15.03782 14.34196
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -3.23853 -6.93933 4.593145
Upper 20.14257 16.60742 26.26155
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -9.16295 -9.00633 -14.8945
Upper 25.82967 24.59476 16.63172
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -6.83851 -17.4729 -0.31186
Upper 32.58102 22.53669 36.21683
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -9.66352 3.669322 -10.8879
Upper 25.89859 32.01286 19.34791
$70,000 and over Lower -14.1426 -28.0811 15.9907
Upper 52.31185 51.2288 83.66285
Total Lower -1.72238 -1.76969 5.896139
Upper 10.14037 9.399595 15.40179
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Table H8, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, Non-Computer Owners, F/E CPI
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $27.42 $21.76 $16.16 $12.92
$5,000 to $9,999 9.76 10.22 8.93 7.50
$10,000 to $14,999 13.33 15.65 16.24 8.60
$15,000 to $19,999 17.70 18.57 16.63 17.08
$20,000 to $29,999 24.68 25.41 28.36 16.94
$30,000 to $39,999 33.70 34.70 32.64 24.91
$40,000 to $49,999 39.35 42.08 45.30 33.75
$50,000 to $69,999 47.86 51.40 50.48 33.59
$70,000 and over 74.74 60.54 49.67 51.80
Total 28.37 28.08 27.01 20.31
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -4.80443 -2.90284 -4.70309
Upper 16.12388 14.10318 11.19306
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.94057 -3.43905 -3.09905
Upper 4.855166 6.018881 5.950288
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -3.07648 -5.7509 2.484757
Upper 7.724477 6.927259 12.79487
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -4.69261 -4.83391 -8.19329
Upper 6.4198 8.711288 9.093972
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.83564 -3.72533 5.873291
Upper 7.290408 9.631941 16.98609
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.5758 -8.62692 -1.52877
Upper 9.584364 12.74003 16.99761
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -16.0968 -18.3992 -4.48308
Upper 21.55486 24.85795 27.58453
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -10.5591 -15.5757 2.525925
Upper 17.64143 17.41332 31.24682
$70,000 and over Lower -9.58706 -11.0493 -12.9061
Upper 37.99316 32.78971 17.17551
Total Lower -3.69947 -3.1311 3.420944
Upper 4.278651 5.263281 9.984417
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -3.096 -1.5146 -3.40545
Upper 14.41545 12.71493 9.895418
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.22255 -2.66698 -2.36033
Upper 4.137147 5.246804 5.211566
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.19477 -4.71594 3.326399
Upper 6.842766 5.892308 11.95323
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -3.78547 -3.72818 -6.78209
Upper 5.512665 7.605557 7.682767
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -4.76413 -2.63494 6.780458
Upper 6.218893 8.541551 16.07892
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -6.17497 -6.88268 -0.01642
Upper 8.183534 10.99579 15.48526
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -13.0232 -14.868 -1.86532
Upper 18.48126 21.32675 24.96676
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -8.25701 -12.8827 4.870488
Upper 15.33934 14.72034 28.90225
$70,000 and over Lower -5.70296 -7.47064 -10.4505
Upper 34.10906 29.21101 14.71987
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Table H-8 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $38.59 $38.38 $34.18 $22.02
$5,000 to $9,999 18.19 22.73 22.26 12.18
$10,000 to $14,999 35.89 26.83 28.54 20.13
$15,000 to $19,999 37.23 35.95 31.20 25.97
$20,000 to $29,999 59.11 49.78 44.33 28.43
$30,000 to $39,999 77.08 67.66 59.02 59.26
$40,000 to $49,999 94.21 79.96 76.50 57.73
$50,000 to $69,999 105.20 95.68 76.57 79.98
$70,000 and over 143.75 161.59 171.47 119.81
Total 61.87 56.85 52.36 41.15
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -16.6223 -13.4201 -2.21965
Upper 17.0431 21.8271 26.52649
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.00166 -9.02175 1.779119
Upper 12.08657 9.976096 18.36525
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -4.45044 -5.9504 -1.09424
Upper 22.56145 9.365832 17.91695
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -11.188 -8.31377 -6.11628
Upper 13.7377 17.81663 16.57802
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.07198 -8.82526 2.838994
Upper 23.72723 19.72053 28.96475
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -12.0556 -11.813 -18.6755
Upper 30.88579 29.09586 19.14923
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -9.97753 -20.8334 -3.20983
Upper 38.48445 27.7551 40.7524
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -12.3795 1.895639 -14.7441
Upper 31.42186 36.33015 21.56513
$70,000 and over Lower -22.8797 -38.314 10.93611
Upper 58.5618 58.06841 92.38796
Total Lower -2.26845 -2.29228 5.491472
Upper 12.31226 11.28673 16.9272
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -13.8741 -10.5427 0.126969
Upper 14.29491 18.94978 24.17986
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -1.76997 -7.47091 3.133089
Upper 10.85488 8.425251 17.01128
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.24539 -4.7001 0.457697
Upper 20.3564 8.115527 16.36501
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -9.15325 -6.18067 -4.26369
Upper 11.70295 15.68354 14.72542
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -2.72103 -6.495 4.971708
Upper 21.37627 17.39026 26.83204
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -8.55022 -8.4735 -15.5877
Upper 27.38036 25.75636 16.0615
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -6.02145 -16.867 0.378923
Upper 34.52837 23.78869 37.16365
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -8.80392 4.70662 -11.7801
Upper 27.84623 33.51917 18.60111
$70,000 and over Lower -16.2315 -30.4461 17.58524
Upper 51.91351 50.20046 85.73883
Total Lower -1.07819 -1.18379 6.425001
Upper 11.122 10.17824 15.99367
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Table H9, Mean Expenditures By Income Class, Non-Comp. Owners, GDP Deflator
Panel A, Mean CD Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $27.09 $21.63 $16.12 $12.92
$5,000 to $9,999 9.64 10.16 8.90 7.50
$10,000 to $14,999 13.16 15.56 16.19 8.60
$15,000 to $19,999 17.49 18.46 16.58 17.08
$20,000 to $29,999 24.38 25.26 28.29 16.94
$30,000 to $39,999 33.29 34.49 32.55 24.91
$40,000 to $49,999 38.87 41.82 45.18 33.75
$50,000 to $69,999 47.28 51.09 50.34 33.59
$70,000 and over 73.83 60.18 49.53 51.80
Total 28.02 27.91 26.94 20.31
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -4.90984 -2.946 -4.73949
Upper 15.82152 13.97673 11.14003
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.84694 -3.45365 -3.11776
Upper 4.877274 5.961239 5.919577
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.96309 -5.67591 2.451523
Upper 7.74885 6.948707 12.73825
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -4.54272 -4.87025 -8.13902
Upper 6.4794 8.618628 9.131722
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.62737 -3.62382 5.806283
Upper 7.379904 9.675962 16.89612
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -7.30359 -8.69906 -1.59957
Upper 9.718514 12.57973 16.88776
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -15.7325 -18.173 -4.57613
Upper 21.64648 24.88191 27.42686
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -10.1652 -15.6729 2.415274
Upper 17.79945 17.17801 31.07811
$70,000 and over Lower -9.93732 -11.161 -12.7444
Upper 37.24648 32.45552 17.2887
Total Lower -3.84348 -3.20471 3.35309
Upper 4.067043 5.152121 9.90278
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
CD CD CD
Less than $5,000 Lower -3.21748 -1.56456 -3.4432
Upper 14.12916 12.59528 9.843744
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -3.13476 -2.68508 -2.38001
Upper 4.165094 5.192677 5.181836
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.08865 -4.64532 3.291255
Upper 6.874406 5.918127 11.89851
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -3.64296 -3.76912 -6.72917
Upper 5.579635 7.517495 7.721865
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -4.56555 -2.53812 6.711577
Upper 6.318086 8.590266 15.99083
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -5.91403 -6.96202 -0.0904
Upper 8.328954 10.84269 15.37859
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -12.6811 -14.6583 -1.96364
Upper 18.59514 21.36722 24.81437
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -7.88233 -12.9912 4.755097
Upper 15.51662 14.4963 28.73828
$70,000 and over Lower -6.08558 -7.60043 -10.2928
Upper 33.39474 28.89499 14.83701
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Table H-9 continued; Panel B, Mean Movie Ticket Expenditures
Income Class 1998 1999 2000 2001
Less than $5,000 $38.12 $38.15 $34.08 $22.02
$5,000 to $9,999 17.97 22.60 22.20 12.18
$10,000 to $14,999 35.45 26.67 28.46 20.13
$15,000 to $19,999 36.77 35.74 31.11 25.97
$20,000 to $29,999 58.39 49.49 44.21 28.43
$30,000 to $39,999 76.14 67.26 58.86 59.26
$40,000 to $49,999 93.07 79.49 76.29 57.73
$50,000 to $69,999 103.92 95.11 76.36 79.98
$70,000 and over 142.00 160.63 170.99 119.81
Total 61.12 56.51 52.21 41.15
95% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -16.6554 -13.4769 -2.28458
Upper 16.71617 21.61618 26.40227
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -2.85498 -9.05662 1.735105
Upper 12.11165 9.863499 18.2861
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -4.57201 -5.84025 -1.16191
Upper 22.12969 9.417166 17.82667
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -11.3289 -8.37902 -6.18729
Upper 13.40124 17.62656 16.47636
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -5.34679 -8.94523 2.74599
Upper 23.1572 19.49322 28.81241
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -12.4124 -11.951 -18.4931
Upper 30.17362 28.755 19.29349
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -10.4232 -20.9944 -3.3819
Upper 37.59086 27.38753 40.50112
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -12.8651 1.613099 -14.5098
Upper 30.4881 35.8974 21.75448
$70,000 and over Lower -21.7855 -37.6124 10.53614
Upper 59.03972 58.34148 91.83903
Total Lower -2.61588 -2.45486 5.356355
Upper 11.83179 11.06226 16.77258
90% Confidence Intervals
98-99 99-00 00-01
Movie Movie Movie
Less than $5,000 Lower -13.9312 -10.6122 0.057206
Upper 13.99196 18.75144 24.06048
$5,000 to $9,999 Lower -1.63322 -7.51212 3.086206
Upper 10.88988 8.319 16.935
$10,000 to $14,999 Lower -2.39228 -4.59474 0.388179
Upper 19.94996 8.171663 16.27658
$15,000 to $19,999 Lower -9.31007 -6.25611 -4.33719
Upper 11.38246 15.50365 14.62626
$20,000 to $29,999 Lower -3.01993 -6.62373 4.87386
Upper 20.83034 17.17171 26.68454
$30,000 to $39,999 Lower -8.93601 -8.62806 -15.4085
Upper 26.69721 25.43206 16.20887
$40,000 to $49,999 Lower -6.50369 -17.0448 0.200387
Upper 33.67134 23.43799 36.91883
$50,000 to $69,999 Lower -9.32607 4.411818 -11.5494
Upper 26.94906 33.09868 18.79413
$70,000 and over Lower -15.1876 -29.7794 17.17311
Upper 52.44174 50.50851 85.20206
Total Lower -1.43648 -1.35142 6.288292
Upper 10.65239 9.95882 15.84065
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Appendix I, Alternative WLS Specifications For The Micro-Level CEX Data 
 
This appendix includes the regression results from alternative WLS specifications used to 
analyze the micro-level CEX data.  For the natural log of both CD and movie expenditures, we 
run alternate specifications of (77) for years 1998 and 2001, as well as for the pooled data.  On 
the pooled data, we adjusted all figures to 2001 dollars using the CPI for all items less food and 
energy.  The alternate specifications modify only the independent variables of (77) as follows,  
 
 FMSZAGECATAGECATAGECATCOMPy ++++++ 362514321 ln ββββββ     (I77) 
 
and, 
 
FMSZAGECATAGECATAGECATCOMPy ++++++ 463524321 ln ββββββ    (I78) 
 
where the interaction variables originally specified in (77) are separated.  The age category 
variables consist of four dummy variables grouped by age of the CU reference person (the CEX 
variable name is ref_age) as follows: under 31, between 31 and 55, between 56 and 65, and over 
65.  The variable fmsz simply restructures the CEX variable fam_size, and is designed so that all 
CUs consisting of 6 or more people are placed into the largest family size.  The results from these 
regressions, presented in Tables I1 through I12, do not materially change the results presented in 
the main body of the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I1,  Alternate WLS Specifications for CD Exp., Oldest CUs As Reference Category (1998)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit  
Unweighted: 4,407 F Value: 34.6998
Weighted: 79,003,370 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0775
Model: 4,912,251
Error: 58,454,000
Total: 63,366,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.6831 0.1706 0.0000 Intercept 1.3964 1.9699
lny 0.2021 0.0168 0.0000 lny 0.1739 0.2304
COMP 0.1201 0.0307 0.0003 COMP 0.0686 0.1716
AGECAT1 0.0172 0.1413 0.9039 AGECAT1 -0.2203 0.2546
AGECAT2 -0.0324 0.1336 0.8097 AGECAT2 -0.2568 0.1921
AGECAT3 -0.1633 0.1404 0.2509 AGECAT3 -0.3992 0.0725
FMSZ -0.0506 0.0126 0.0002 FMSZ -0.0719 -0.0294
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Table I2, Alternate WLS Specifications for CD Exp., Youngest CUs As Reference Category (1998)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit  
Total: 63,366,000
Independ t Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
In t 1.7003 0.1575 0.0000 Intercept 1.4357 1.9649
lny 0.2021 0.0168 0.0000 lny 0.1739 0.2304
COMP 0.1201 0.0307 0.0003 COMP 0.0686 0.1716
AGECAT2 -0.0495 0.0452 0.2790 AGECAT2 -0.1254 0.0264
AGECAT3 -0.1805 0.0578 0.0032 AGECAT3 -0.2776 -0.0834
AG AT4 -0.0172 0.1413 0.9039 AGECAT4 -0.2546 0.2203
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.1109
Model: 16,502,000
Error: 132,290,000
Total: 148,790,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.9472 0.1549 0.0000 Intercept 0.6868 1.2075
lny 0.2862 0.0148 0.0000 lny 0.2614 0.3110
COMP 0.1356 0.0281 0.0000 COMP 0.0883 0.1829
AGECAT1 -0.1615 0.0990 0.1099 AGECAT1 -0.3279 0.0048
AGECAT2 -0.2448 0.0978 0.0161 AGECAT2 -0.4092 -0.0804
AGECAT3 -0.1510 0.0903 0.1018 AGECAT3 -0.3028 0.0008
FMSZ 0.0015 0.0099 0.8811 FMSZ -0.0152 0.0182
Table I4, Alternate WLS Specifications for Movie Exp., Youngest CUs As Reference Category (1998)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 7,515 F Value: 60.3502
Weighted: 135,412,496 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.1109
Model: 16,502,000
Error: 132,290,000
Total: 148,790,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.7856 0.1346 0.0000 Intercept 0.5594 1.0118
lny 0.2862 0.0148 0.0000 lny 0.2614 0.3110
COMP 0.1356 0.0281 0.0000 COMP 0.0883 0.1829
AGECAT2 -0.0833 0.0263 0.0028 AGECAT2 -0.1274 -0.0391
AGECAT3 0.0105 0.0558 0.8510 AGECAT3 -0.0832 0.1043
AGECAT4 0.1615 0.0990 0.1099 AGECAT4 -0.0048 0.3279
FMSZ 0.0015 0.0099 0.8811 FMSZ -0.0152 0.0182
Unweighted: 4,407 F Value: 34.6998
Weighted: 79,003,370 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0775
Model: 4,912,251
Error: 58,454,000
en
tercep
EC
FMSZ -0.0506 0.0126 0.0002 FMSZ -0.0719 -0.0294
Table I3, Alternate WLS Specifications for Movie Exp., Oldest CUs As Reference Category (1998)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 7,515 F Value: 60.3502
Weighted: 135,412,496 Prob > F: 0.0000
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Table I5,  Alternate WLS Specifications for CD Exp., Oldest CUs As Reference Category (2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 5,283 F Value: 44.7904
Weighted: 74,053,310 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0828
Model: 5,027,888
Error: 55,670,000
Total: 60,698,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.3759 0.1591 0.0000 Intercept 1.0553 1.6965
lny 0.2263 0.0169 0.0000 lny 0.1922 0.2605
COMP 0.0744 0.0359 0.0441 COMP 0.0021 0.1467
AGECAT1 0.1332 0.1038 0.2061 AGECAT1 -0.0760 0.3424
AGECAT2 -0.0263 0.1057 0.8045 AGECAT2 -0.2393 0.1867
AGECAT3 -0.1093 0.1062 0.3090 AGECAT3 -0.3233 0.1047
FMSZ -0.0256 0.0109 0.0231 FMSZ -0.0475 -0.0037
Table I6,  Alternate WLS Specifications for CD Exp., Youngest CUs As Reference Category (2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 5,283 F Value: 44.7904
Weighted: 74,053,310 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0828
Model: 5,027,888
Error: 55,670,000
Total: 60,698,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.5091 0.1420 0.0000 Intercept 1.2230 1.7952
lny 0.2263 0.0169 0.0000 lny 0.1922 0.2605
COMP 0.0744 0.0359 0.0441 COMP 0.0021 0.1467
AGECAT2 -0.1595 0.0310 0.0000 AGECAT2 -0.2220 -0.0971
AGECAT3 -0.2425 0.0459 0.0000 AGECAT3 -0.3351 -0.1499
AGECAT4 -0.1332 0.1038 0.2061 AGECAT4 -0.3424 0.0760
FMSZ -0.0256 0.0109 0.0231 FMSZ -0.0475 -0.0037
Table I7, Alternate WLS Specifications for Movie Exp., Oldest CUs As Reference Category (2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 8,722 F Value: 44.7904
Weighted: 121,959,282 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.1169
Model: 16,403,000
Error: 123,870,000
Total: 140,270,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.0112 0.1207 0.0000 Intercept 0.7678 1.2545
lny 0.2768 0.0143 0.0000 lny 0.2479 0.3057
COMP 0.1686 0.0274 0.0000 COMP 0.1134 0.2239
AGECAT1 -0.1689 0.0944 0.0804 AGECAT1 -0.3591 0.0213
AGECAT2 -0.2148 0.0918 0.0239 AGECAT2 -0.3999 -0.0298
AGECAT3 -0.2190 0.0956 0.0269 AGECAT3 -0.4116 -0.0263
FMSZ 0.0257 0.0117 0.0342 FMSZ 0.0020 0.0493
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Table I8, Alternate WLS Specifications for Movie Exp., Youngest CUs As Reference Category (2001)
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 8,722 F Value: 87.6908
Weighted: 121,959,282 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.1169
Model: 16,403,000
Error: 123,870,000
Total: 140,270,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.8423 0.1277 0.0000 Intercept 0.5849 1.0996
lny 0.2768 0.0143 0.0000 lny 0.2479 0.3057
COMP 0.1686 0.0274 0.0000 COMP 0.1134 0.2239
AGECAT2 -0.0459 0.0324 0.1633 AGECAT2 -0.1112 0.0194
AGECAT3 -0.0501 0.0463 0.2861 AGECAT3 -0.1435 0.0434
AGECAT4 0.1689 0.0944 0.0804 AGECAT4 -0.0213 0.3591
FMSZ 0.0257 0.0117 0.0342 FMSZ 0.0020 0.0493
Table I9,  Alternate WLS Specifications for CD Exp., Oldest CUs As Reference Category (Pooled)
Real Expenditures Using the CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 20,431 F Value: 82.2162
Weighted: 299,809,303 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0726
Model: 17,406,000
Error: 222,250,000
Total: 239,660,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.5556 0.1033 0.0000 Intercept 1.3474 1.7638
lny 0.2095 0.0109 0.0000 lny 0.1876 0.2314
COMP 0.0573 0.0181 0.0028 COMP 0.0208 0.0937
AGECAT1 0.1201 0.0656 0.0738 AGECAT1 -0.0120 0.2522
AGECAT2 0.0253 0.0583 0.6666 AGECAT2 -0.0922 0.1428
AGECAT3 -0.0646 0.0731 0.3820 AGECAT3 -0.2119 0.0828
FMSZ -0.0314 0.0069 0.0000 FMSZ -0.0454 -0.0175
Table I10,  Alternate WLS Specifications for CD Exp., Youngest CUs As Reference Category (Pooled)
Real Expenditures Using the CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 20,431 F Value: 82.2162
Weighted: 299,809,303 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0726
Model: 17,406,000
Error: 222,250,000
Total: 239,660,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.6757 0.1035 0.0000 Intercept 1.4671 1.8843
lny 0.2095 0.0109 0.0000 lny 0.1876 0.2314
COMP 0.0573 0.0181 0.0028 COMP 0.0208 0.0937
AGECAT2 -0.0948 0.0227 0.0001 AGECAT2 -0.1406 -0.0490
AGECAT3 -0.1846 0.0278 0.0000 AGECAT3 -0.2407 -0.1286
AGECAT4 -0.1201 0.0656 0.0738 AGECAT4 -0.2522 0.0120
FMSZ -0.0314 0.0069 0.0000 FMSZ -0.0454 -0.0175
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Table I11,  Alternate WLS Specifications for Movie Exp., Oldest CUs As Reference Category (Pooled)
Real Expenditures Using the CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 33,509 F Value: 147.2030
Weighted: 493,159,323 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.1108
Model: 61,521,000
Error: 493,840,000
Total: 555,360,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.1168 0.0915 0.0000 Intercept 0.9323 1.3013
lny 0.2780 0.0098 0.0000 lny 0.2583 0.2976
COMP 0.1372 0.0161 0.0000 COMP 0.1048 0.1696
AGECAT1 -0.2440 0.0456 0.0000 AGECAT1 -0.3359 -0.1521
AGECAT2 -0.2908 0.0478 0.0000 AGECAT2 -0.3871 -0.1945
AGECAT3 -0.1709 0.0525 0.0022 AGECAT3 -0.2766 -0.0651
FMSZ 0.0120 0.0062 0.0579 FMSZ -0.0004 0.0244
Table I12,  Alternate WLS Specifications for Movie Exp., Youngest CUs As Reference Category (Pooled)
Real Expenditures Using the CPI for All Items Less Food and Energy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 33,509 F Value: 147.2030
Weighted: 493,159,323 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.1108
Model: 61,521,000
Error: 493,840,000
Total: 555,360,000
Independent Variable b SE p value Independent Variable Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.8728 0.0878 0.0000 Intercept 0.6959 1.0497
lny 0.2780 0.0098 0.0000 lny 0.2583 0.2976
COMP 0.1372 0.0161 0.0000 COMP 0.1048 0.1696
AGECAT2 -0.0468 0.0167 0.0076 AGECAT2 -0.0805 -0.0131
AGECAT3 0.0731 0.0343 0.0386 AGECAT3 0.0040 0.1423
AGECAT4 0.2440 0.0456 0.0000 AGECAT4 0.1521 0.3359
FMSZ 0.0120 0.0062 0.0579 FMSZ -0.0004 0.0244
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Appendix J, WLS Results Accounting For Internet Subscriptions 
 
Only starting in 2001 does the Consumer Expenditure data include variables relating to 
CUs Internet subscriptions.  In 2001, the annual mean expenditure on both CDs and movie tickets 
is higher for computer owning CUs with Internet subscriptions versus those computer owning 
CUs without Internet subscriptions.  Table J1 shows that, for 2001, the annual mean CD 
expenditure was $68.90 for those CUs with an Internet subscription, versus $54.48 for those 
without an Internet subscription (but with a computer).  The results also show that the annual 
mean movie ticket expenditures were $149.31 for those with an Internet subscription versus 
$129.25 for those without an Internet subscription. 
 
 Additionally, Table J1 demonstrates that these differences hold for most income classes, 
and Table J2 shows that the annual mean wage and salary income is $60,522 for CUs with an 
Internet subscription, versus $53,050 for those without an Internet subscription.  These 
differences also seem to hold for before and after tax income as well, although the sample size for 
Internet subscribers is considerably lower than for non-subscribers. 
 
 This higher income among computer owners with an Internet subscription suggests that 
higher income CUs do spend more on entertainment goods than lower income CUs.  Once the 
2002 CEX micro data are released (scheduled for the first quarter of 2004), we will be able to 
examine the change in the annual mean CD and movie expenditures for these two groups of CUs, 
a test which should provide better information regarding the impact of file sharing on CD sales.  
For now, we are constrained to examining 2001 relationships for Internet subscribers, something 
we accomplish by modifying our primary OLS regression model (77). 
 
 Taking into account Internet and high-speed access subscribers, we use two additional 
dummy variables to modify (77) as follows,  
 
HSPNETINTINTINTCOMPyENT 87362514321 lnexpln ββββββββ +++++++=    (J77) 
 
where all but the last two independent variables in (J77) are the same as those presented in 
section 6.4.1.  In (J77), however, an indicator variable is included for those CUs with an Internet 
subscription (NET), and those with high-speed Internet access (HSP).  For both dummy variables, 
those CUs with subscriptions are set equivalent to one. 
 
 The results from the regressions using the log of CD and movie expenditures in 2001, 
respectively, as the dependent variable in model (J77), are presented in Tables J3 and J4.  These 
results show that the coefficient on NET is positively related to the log of CD expenditures and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Additionally, the coefficient on HSP, is not 
statistically significant at even the 10 percent level.  When the log of movie expenditures serves 
as the dependent variable, the coefficient on NET is also positive, and it is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level.  Just as when the log of CD expenditures is used as the dependent variable, 
the coefficient on HSP is not statistically significant at even the 10 percent level when serving as 
a regressor for the log of movie expenditures. 
 
 Since we only have data on Internet users for 2001, it seems best to reexamine this issue 
when additional years of data are available rather than to make broad conclusions about the 
relationship between CD expenditures and Internet subscriptions.  Nonetheless, it does appear 
that Internet subscribers are more likely to spend more on both CDs and movie tickets than 
consumers who do not own a computer. 
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Table J1, Internet Users' Expenditures Vs. Non-Internet Users Expenditures, 2001
Mean CD and Movie Expenditures
Internet No Internet Internet No Internet
CD exp CD exp Movie exp Movie exp
Less than $5,000 $13.34 $41.91 $198.17 $106.62
n 2 77 9 171
$5,000 to $9,999 $61.66 $58.80 $86.81 $68.25
n 7 74 12 119
$10,000 to $14,999 $66.16 $42.36 $62.59 $83.39
n 7 96 16 156
$15,000 to $19,999 $21.51 $32.14 $76.93 $82.41
n 6 92 18 168
$20,000 to $29,999 $29.50 $31.19 $99.48 $79.72
n 34 249 62 427
$30,000 to $39,999 $82.31 $33.06 $108.41 $92.58
n 52 293 69 539
$40,000 to $49,999 $55.18 $51.02 $79.65 $91.75
n 53 348 68 550
$50,000 to $69,999 $60.25 $59.66 $121.92 $120.59
n 103 620 153 1,046
$70,000 and over $88.93 $72.93 $222.61 $195.85
n 222 1,311 361 2,227
Total $68.90 $54.48 $149.31 $129.25
n 486 3,160 768 5,403
Table J2, Internet Users' Income Vs. Non-Internet Users Income, 2001
Mean Income for those with computer and internet subscription
wage and salary $60,522
before tax income $66,883
after tax income $61,267
Number of Observations 1,384
Mean Income for those with computer and no internet subscription
wage and salary $53,050
before tax income $58,638
after tax income $54,739
Number of Observations 10,665
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Table J3, WLS Res
anel A  
Independent Variable b SE p value
INT -0.0217 0.0106 0.0468
0.3429 0.1291
INT1 -0.0266 0.0295 -0.0322 0.0351 -0.0434 0.0464
34 -0.0924 -0.0172 -0.1051 -0.0045
Panel B Without High Speed Dummy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit  
Unweighted: 4,297 F Value: 21.1401
Total: 45,108,000
ndependent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 99% Upper 99%
-0.0040 -0.0431 -0.0005 -0.0503 0.0067
INT3 -0.0857 -0.0229 -0.0920 -0.0166 -0.1047 -0.0040
ults on 2001 CD Expenditures, CUs With Internet Access
P With High Speed Dummy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit  
Unweighted: 4,297 F Value: 18.0166
Weighted: 59,900,964 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0581
Model: 2,622,999
Error: 42,485,000
Total: 45,108,000
Intercept 1.7889 0.1989 0.0000
lny 0.1862 0.0217 0.0000
COMP 0.0687 0.0404 0.0959
NETACC      0.0960 0.0346 0.0082
HIGHSPD     -0.1069 0.0877 0.2292
INT1 0.0015 0.0167 0.9308
2
INT3 -0.0548 0.0187 0.0053
Independent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 99% Upper 99%
Intercept 1.4548 2.1231 1.3881 2.1898 1.2535 2.3244
lny 0.1498 0.2227 0.1425 0.2299 0.1278 0.2446
COMP 0.0009 0.1366 -0.0127 0.1502 -0.0400 0.1775
NETACC      0.0378 0.1541 0.0262 0.1657 0.0027 0.1892
HIGHSPD     -0.2542 0.0404 -0.2835 0.0698 -
INT2 -0.0396 -0.0039 -0.0431 -0.0003 -0.0503 0.0069
INT3 -0.0862 -0.02
Weighted: 59,900,964 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0578
Model: 2,606,259
Error: 42,502,000
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.7957 0.1998 0.0000
lny 0.1854 0.0218 0.0000
COMP 0.0668 0.0403 0.1047
NETACC      0.0876 0.0323 0.0096
INT1 0.0013 0.0166 0.9364
INT2 -0.0218 0.0106 0.0454
INT3 -0.0543 0.0187 0.0057
I
Intercept 1.4600 2.1314 1.3931 2.1984 1.2578 2.3336
lny 0.1488 0.2221 0.1415 0.2294 0.1268 0.2441
COMP -0.0010 0.1346 -0.0145 0.1481 -0.0418 0.1754
NETACC      0.0332 0.1419 0.0224 0.1527 0.0005 0.1746
INT1 -0.0266 0.0293 -0.0322 0.0349 -0.0435 0.0461
INT2 -0.0396
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Table J4, WLS Results on 2001 Movie Expenditures, CUs With Internet Access
Panel A  With High Speed Dummy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit  
Unweighted: 7,254 F Value: 68.5984
Weighted: 101,028,430 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0906
Model: 9,976,064
Error: 100,150,000
Total: 110,130,000
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.1807 0.1251 0.0000
lny 0.2450 0.0146 0.0000
COMP 0.1515 0.0275 0.0000
NETACC      0.0830 0.0378 0.0333
HIGHSPD     -0.0745 0.0844 0.3824
INT1 0.0124 0.0168 0.4644
INT2 0.0247 0.0107 0.0263
INT3 0.0133 0.0186 0.4789
Independent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 99% Upper 99%
Intercept 0.9705 1.3910 0.9285 1.4329 0.8438 1.5176
lny 0.2205 0.2695 0.2157 0.2744 0.2058 0.2842
COMP 0.1054 0.1977 0.0962 0.2069 0.0776 0.2255
NETACC      0.0195 0.1464 0.0069 0.1590 -0.0187 0.1846
HIGHSPD     -0.2163 0.0674 -0.2446 0.0956 -0.3018 0.1528
INT1 -0.0158 0.0406 -0.0214 0.0462 -0.0328 0.0576
INT2 0.0066 0.0427 0.0030 0.0463 -0.0042 0.0536
INT3 -0.0180 0.0446 -0.0243 0.0509 -0.0369 0.0635
Panel B Without High Speed Dummy
No. Of Observations Overall Fit  
Unweighted: 4,297 F Value: 82.6264
Weighted: 59,900,964 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares  R 2: 0.0905
Model: 9,961,664
Error: 100,170,000
Total: 110,130,000
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.1838 0.1248 0.0000
lny 0.2446 0.0145 0.0000
COMP 0.1503 0.0276 0.0000
NETACC      0.0755 0.0353 0.0378
INT1 0.0124 0.0169 0.4657
INT2 0.0246 0.0107 0.0266
INT3 0.0136 0.0187 0.4709
ndependent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 99% Upper 99%
Intercept 0.9740 1.3935 0.9322 1.4354 0.8477 1.5199
lny 0.2202 0.2690 0.2154 0.2739 0.2055 0.2837
COMP 0.1040 0.1966 0.0947 0.2059 0.0760 0.2245
NETACC      0.0163 0.1348 0.0044 0.1466 -0.0194 0.1705
INT1 -0.0159 0.0407 -0.0216 0.0464 -0.0330 0.0578
INT2 0.0066 0.0427 0.0030 0.0462 -0.0043 0.0535
INT3 -0.0178 0.0450 -0.0241 0.0513 -0.0368 0.0640
I
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Appendix K, Test For Structural Break (Computer Ownership) 
 
When a regressor for the log of CD expenditures, the parameter estimate for computer 
ownership (COMP) declines through the four-year period (from .1169 in 1998 to .0708 in 2001).  
Alternatively, when a regressor for the log of movie expenditures, the parameter estimate 
increases through the four-year period (.1293 versus .1638).  To test for a statistically significant 
difference in the parameter estimate from 1998 to 2001, we used the difference-in-difference 
method as described in section 6.3.7 of the text.  These tests showed there was no statistically 
significant difference in the parameter estimate for COMP from 1998 to 2001 whether serving as 
a regressor for the log of CD or movie ticket expenditures.  The same tests were performed after 
eliminating multiple CU households from the data, but the results were unchanged (these results 
are available from the author).  
 
 
Table K1, Test For Structural Break, Real CD Expenditures Adjusted With CPI 
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 9,690 F Value: 75.2846
Weighted: 153,056,681 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares R2: 0.0771
Model: 9,570,894
Error: 114,590,000
Total: 124,160,000
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.6729 0.1428 0.0000
lny 0.2043 0.0149 0.0000
COMP 0.1154 0.0305 0.0005
INT1 -0.0384 0.0133 0.0059
INT2 -0.0418 0.0078 0.0000
INT3 -0.0780 0.0136 0.0000
Y01 -0.0430 0.0313 0.1772
CMPINT -0.0450 0.0303 0.1448
Independent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.4330 1.9127 1.3852 1.9606
lny 0.1793 0.2293 0.1744 0.2343
COMP 0.0641 0.1667 0.0539 0.1769
INT1 -0.0607 -0.0161 -0.0651 -0.0117
INT2 -0.0548 -0.0287 -0.0574 -0.0261
INT3 -0.1008 -0.0552 -0.1054 -0.0506
Y01 -0.0957 0.0097 -0.1062 0.0202
CMPINT -0.0960 0.0059 -0.1061 0.0161
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Table K2, Test For Structural Break, Real CD Expenditures Adjusted With GDP Deflator 
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 9,690 F Value: 75.2846
Weighted: 153,056,681 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares R2: 0.0768
Model: 9,529,204
Error: 114,590,000
Total: 124,120,000
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 1.6631 0.1426 0.0000
lny 0.2043 0.0149 0.0000
COMP 0.1154 0.0305 0.0005
INT1 -0.0384 0.0133 0.0059
INT2 -0.0418 0.0078 0.0000
INT3 -0.0780 0.0136 0.0000
Y01 -0.0333 0.0313 0.2934
CMPINT -0.0450 0.0303 0.1448
Independent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.4236 1.9027 1.3758 1.9505
lny 0.1793 0.2293 0.1744 0.2343
COMP 0.0641 0.1667 0.0539 0.1769
INT1 -0.0607 -0.0161 -0.0651 -0.0117
INT2 -0.0548 -0.0287 -0.0574 -0.0261
INT3 -0.1008 -0.0552 -0.1054 -0.0506
Y01 -0.0858 0.0193 -0.0963 0.0298
CMPINT -0.096 0.0059 -0.1061 0.0161
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Table K3, Test Fo
No. O
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.9030 0.1089 0.0000
lny 0.2749 0.0112 0.0000
COMP 0.1253 0.0276 0.0000
INT1 -0.0045 0.0110 0.6877
INT2 -0.0008 0.0072 0.9094
INT3 0.0078 0.0121 0.5251
Y01 0.0019 0.0286 0.9471
CMPINT 0.0436 0.0409 0.2920
Independent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.7201 1.0859 0.6836 1.1224
lny 0.2561 0.2937 0.2523 0.2974
COMP 0.0789 0.1717 0.0696 0.1810
INT1 -0.0230 0.0141 -0.0267 0.0178
INT2 -0.0130 0.0113 -0.0154 0.0137
INT3 -0.0126 0.0281 -0.0166 0.0322
Y01 -0.0461 0.0499 -0.0557 0.0595
CMPINT -0.0251 0.1122 -0.0388 0.1259
r Structural Break, Real Movie Expenditures Adjusted With CPI 
f Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 16,237 F Value: 96.9749
Weighted: 257,371,779 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares R2: 0.1125
Model: 32,565,000
Error: 256,810,000
Total: 289,380,000
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Table K4, Test For Structural Break, Real Movie Expenditures Adjusted With GDP Deflator
No. Of Observations Overall Fit
Unweighted: 16,237 F Value: 96.9749
Weighted: 257,371,779 Prob > F: 0.0000
Sum of Squares R2: 0.1129
Model: 32,685,000
Error: 256,810,000
Total: 289,500,000
Independent Variable b SE p value
Intercept 0.8941 0.1087 0.0000
lny 0.2749 0.0112 0.0000
COMP 0.1253 0.0276 0.0000
INT1 -0.0045 0.0110 0.6877
INT2 -0.0008 0.0072 0.9094
INT3 0.0078 0.0121 0.5251
Y01 0.0108 0.0286 0.7076
CMPINT 0.0436 0.0409 0.2920
Independent Variable Lower 90% Upper 90% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.7114 1.0768 0.6750 1.1133
lny 0.2561 0.2937 0.2523 0.2974
COMP 0.0789 0.1717 0.0696 0.1810
INT1 -0.0230 0.0141 -0.0267 0.0178
INT2 -0.0130 0.0113 -0.0154 0.0137
INT3 -0.0126 0.0281 -0.0166 0.0322
Y01 -0.0372 0.0588 -0.0468 0.0683
CMPINT -0.0251 0.1122 -0.0388 0.1259
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